EBP 1 - The Emperor Mobutu

In this article, journalist Michela Wrong covers the 32-year presidency of Mobutu Sese Soso in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Wrong is informed by the four years spent living in Mobutu’s Zaire near the end of his presidency, as well as an interview with his former advisor. The piece was written for Transition journal which deals with issues of politics, ethnicity, and culture internationally. As an overseas journalist Wrong provides an external view of Mobutu’s political regime yet time spent living under the regime also allows her to provide an inside perspective into the downfall of Mobutu’s Zaire.

Mobutu came to power in 1965 and remained president of Zaire until 1997. This article deals with the particulars of his presidency as an example of personal rule. Personal rule refers to a political environment in which power is personalized and is concentrated in a single person. This person then typically exercises this power in a way that deviates from recognized norms. In a post-colonial setting such as Zaire, it is not uncommon for personalization of power to occur. Post-colonial contexts often lack well established institutions to which those in power are accountable to and the norms relating to use of power have undergone constant change. 

Wrong argues that, as a regime of personal rule, Mobutu’s rule was centred around maintaining and furthering his power in Zaire rather than betterment of the country. To have the power of the nation concentrated in one person makes this person a target and thus much of Mobutu’s presidency was focused on protecting against threats to his rule. As a personal ruler who gained his power through a military coup, Mobutu was unable to rely on any particular group or institution to defend or recognize his right to rule Zaire. As such, the need to maintain a stable position of power was strong and Mobutu did so by stagnating the course of politics.

The article discusses Mobutu’s strategy for protecting against potential political conflict as ‘divide and rule’, ensuring those below him in positions of power would not become united against his presidency. Wrong describes the atmosphere between Mobutu’s advisors and subordinates as one of mistrust and disorder. Mobutu held no open meetings nor discussion, instead his advisors were received one by one which allowed him to tell his advisors what they wanted to hear. On each issue, each advisor would receive what they thought was Mobutu’s view point only to find out that he had contradicted himself in every meeting. Wrong notes that it became common knowledge among his advisors that the last person to have Mobutu’s ear would be the victor of the day. In addition, his advisors were encouraged to inform on their colleagues thus limiting communication and opportunities to foster allies or to mutiny.

To further consolidate his power, Mobutu commandeered the elite forces and built them up as his presidential protection. He fostered loyalty to himself above loyalty to the country and pumped money and resources into what was essentially a glorified security detail. Whilst the elite forces thrived under his rule, the larger Zairean army (Forces Armées Zairoises, FAZ) who were tasked with protecting its citizens suffered neglect and growing corruption. FAZ Generals were paid poorly and thus turned to illegal activities such as taking bribes or enforcing bogus tolls to augment their salaries. As a result of this decline Wrong claims that the military came to resemble a ‘group of armed thugs’ preying on those they were there to protect. With the elite forces occupied in his personal security and the FAZ underfunded and overwhelming untested in warfare, Mobutu often looked abroad for military aid. Though a dictator and president of a non-democratic regime, Mobutu still found himself with international allies such as the United States, Belgium, and France. These countries assisted in crushing rebel uprisings, sending funds and troops to the cause.

Following an attempted coup in the later years of his presidency, Mobutu moved to tribalize the armed forces in Zaire. Mobutu executed the traitors to his regime and then continued to remove approximately 200 people from positions of power within the FAZ and the elite forces. He moved to those he could trust and members of his Ngbandi tribe were promoted to fill the empty positions. From this point on, experience and competence came second to tribal affiliations and kin relations. Still, Mobutu could not trust even his own tribesmen to protect his presidency and continued his divide and rule strategy, pitting those with similar job titles against each other and creating bitter rivalries which kept the animosity focused squarely on each other and away from Mobutu.

Ultimately, Mobutu lost his power to those close to him. A group of four generals seized power out from underneath and ultimately unseated him as president shortly before his death in 1997. Though referred to as the Gang of Four, this seizure of power was primarily orchestrated by just two of the generals; Nzimbi Ngbale and Baramoto Kpama Kata (Mobutu’s own cousin and his commander of the police force respectively). The Gang of Four sought to increase their power in the country and began by gaining control of the country’s intelligence services which they then used to control and manipulate the information relayed to President Mobutu. Along with increasing their political power, the Gang of Four turned to illegal weapons trade to further their wealth. Interested only in making profit, they sold arms to both their allies and enemies alike. They simultaneously provided the rebel opposition with arms whilst selling the FAZ’s own weapons and assets out from under them. Mobutu found himself out-gunned and out-maneuvered. 

In a situation where power is personalized, there is no institutional nor party support for whoever holds power and as such there are no established channels through which power is gained and held. Wrong argues that the personalized nature of Mobutu’s rule in Zaire facilitated his preoccupation with the respect and maintenance of his position. His easily challenged hold on power led him to purposely stagnate the political sphere in an attempt for the stability that his continued rule required. Though to the overwhelming detriment of the country, Mobutu’s cultivation of chaos was successful in delaying his inevitable unseating.

Marquez, Xavier. Non-democratic politics: authoritarianism, dictatorship, and democratization. London: Palgrave, 2017.

Wrong, Michela. “About the Author”. Michela Wrong. Accessed April 3, 2018. http://michelawrong.com/about-the-author/

Wrong, Michela. “The Emperor Mobutu”. Transition 9, no. 81 (2000): 92-112.