Mark R. Beissinger's article examines
how modular democratic transitions are sparked through the connections of
revolutions. For this article, he focusses on four examples of democratic
revolutions: The Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, the Georgian Rose Revolution
in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution of
Kyrgyzstan.
Before getting into the case studies,
however, Beissinger's article first discusses the historical discourse on
revolutions, specifically modular revolutions.
The modular sense of discussing
revolutions looks at how one a successful revolution in one country can often
lead to revolutions in other countries. Specifically, these revolutions are
linked through what Beissinger calls cross-case influence. Several factors are
shared by these countries, whether external or internal, and these factors
increase the likelihood of revolution.
Beissinger first raises many
different scholarly approaches to revolution, all very interesting. This idea
of connected revolutions is known as Galton's problem. Although revolutions may
be separate, they may share common causes, which may have in turn been caused
by earlier revolutions.
Pevehouse argued that for each
democratic country in its region, an authoritarian regime has anywhere from a 6
to 10 percent increased chance of experiencing a democratic transition.
Beissinger argues, however, that even
in looking at the effects of other countries on democratic transitions,
scholars are failing to address the bigger picture of a large-scale cross-case
influence.
Beissinger declares the intentions
for the article as both providing a clear explanation of what the study of
"modular political phenomena" involves, along with examining how it
has fuelled democratic revolutions in post-communist states.
Most scholars did not believe that
Soviet states could ever completely remove all elements of the authoritarian
regime from their countries, so a democratic revolution was not ever really
discussed.
In some cases, countries can stage
revolutions based on the back of another country's successful revolution.
Herzen described this act as "chronological unfairness", as the
second country does not have to pay the same, often bloody price as the
original country to spark a revolution.
Beissinger examines the modular
process through two different models: the elite defection model, and the elite
learning model.
Beissinger lays out six typical
features of a modular democratic revolution. Although he explains that the
model varies across decades, these six elements provide the basis for
revolution:
1) the use of stolen elections as the
occasion for massive mobilizations against pseudo-democratic regimes;
2) foreign support for the
development of local democratic movements;
3) the organization of radical youth
movements using unconventional protest tactics prior to the election in order
to undermine the regime’s popularity and will to repress and to prepare for a
final showdown;
4) a united opposition established in
part through foreign prodding;
5) external diplomatic pressure and
unusually large electoral monitoring; and
6) massive mobilization upon the
announcement of fraudulent electoral results and the use of nonviolent
resistance tactics taken directly from the work of Gene Sharp, the guru of
non-violent resistance in the West.
One group, Otpor (Resistance) had a
significant role in all four revolutions that this article centres on. A
revolutionary student group, Otpor played a key role in the Bulldozer
revolution and the United States spent a lot of resources encouraging the
growth of groups such as Otpor. Since the beginning of the Georgian Rose
Revolution, the U.S. has been a key player in the support of democratic
transitions through revolution, and former U.S. President George W. Bush
promoted the Rose Revolution as a template for future democratic transitions.
This led to an increase of revolutions through emulation, the desire to mimic
success. Typically, revolutions will only occur under suitable structural
circumstances. However, as Beissinger explains, after revolutions such as the
Orange Revolution, people were so encouraged that they engaged in revolution in
regimes where these structural arrangements did not exist or were not likely
to host a revolution, such as what happened through the Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan.
The graph below demonstrates the rise
in the likelihood that democratic revolutionary youth organisations, such as
Otpor, would be formed in post-Communist regimes that had flawed democracies.
From the graph, it is evident that each revolution caused a spike in the
likelihood of formation, which supports Beissinger argument for modular
democratic revolutions based on emulation.
Beissinger examines the modular
process through two different models: the elite defection model, and the elite
learning model.
The elite defection model argues
that, as examples of successful revolutions spread more rapidly, supporters and
members of groups will become discourages, and will often defect and join the revolution in a bandwagoning manner.
In the elite learning model states
that rather than becoming disillusioned with the regime, members and supporters
of the group will analyse previous examples of revolution, and will adapt their
strategies to ensure that they remain in power. If this is the case, no matter
the momentum for revolution or the cross-case influences, the likelihood of
revolution is limited.
Overall, Beissinger provides a very
clear analysis of democratic transitions among post-Soviet states. The
discussion in the article relates to discussion in class on revolutions - how
they are often mimicked and adapted by other groups, and led by similar demographics,
such as the student group Otpor, which was adopted by many other countries as
the face of their own revolutions. It would be interesting to explore in a bit
more depth what the cross-case influences were for the first country to stage a
revolution in a series of revolutions across a certain time period. What are
the specific factors that led that country to be the first to experience a
revolution over the other countries in the series? However, Beissinger's
article provides a sound template of how revolutions can be explored in
correspondence to one another.
Thanks for this summary, Grace. Regarding the first case - this is usually the one where the influence of other countries is minimal; if they succeed, then they export their recipe elsewhere!
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