I would just like to critique a little on the article of Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. Maybe I would like to think more positively of the humankind than the authors. I think, I get were they are going but I got a bit annoyed there. They seem to pressume that people, politicians only act and can act in their self interest/gain, as if there is nothing else to it. Like rats running to the big moneypile. To stay in office you pay your supporters and if not possible you pay your population by providing public goods. I quess to a certain extent there is truth in that, but i do not want to believe that all politicians work like that. It's also to simplistic, no?
If politicians would just swap from one incumbent to the other, just because they will get more private benefits, what would happen to the trust and legitimacy voters have in their preferred party/politician? Their legitimacy is based on principles right, things they stand for, you can't just say well..since the leftist party is offering me a good deal there, I will slightly change my principles for a fancy new private pool.
If it's too obvious, these private benefits, can a politician even function?
And would a politician keep on supporting his incumbent solely on grounds of personal benefits?
Is there not an easier way of achieving many private benefits, like becoming owner of walmart or so?
Aren't there any politicians that might take pride after there term of governing when seeing their country got a little more pleasant to live in for all? I quess that's also self interest..
My point is not all politicians function solely on self-interest, and there for not all political systems function solely in a lesser or higher degree of good politcs and good policy or bad politics and bad policy or a mix of it.
Marloes, good points. Their model certainly does not take into account the kind of leadr, but it is not clear that this would make a lot of difference. Also consider:
ReplyDelete1) BdM et al are trying to model politics in non-democracies. If the assumptions are approximately true they may have value.
2) The incentives to bad policy may still be stronger in dictatorships than in democracies. Suppose two equally nice leaders, both relatively concerned with good policy, but also concerned with staying in office (if only because of the normal human tendency to think yourself indispensable). But in a small-coalition, small selectorate environment the leader may simply face more temptations for paying off key supporters in private goods than in public goods; the institutional environment matters, and over time, small institutional effects can become quite large. Individuals may matter little in the longer time scales!
3) You'd be surprised at the enormous degree of corruption in some of the more notorious and long-lived autocracies. Mobutu in the Congo, Suharto in Indonesia, Gomez in Venezuela, and on and on....Mugabe gives every new minister a new Mercedes Benz, for example. In such environments, becoming owner of the wlamart does not pay (for one thing, you could be easily expropriated) - the stable rules that allow people to become owners of walmarts arre themselves public goods that are politically provided!