EBP 2 Chinese Paradox of High Growth & Low Quality of Governance

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“Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organisation Meets Max Weber” – Bo Rothstein

Abstract

Bo first off talks about the commonly held belief between political scientists that a state’s administrative ability for development is impaired if there is a level of corruption that is present. Failure to get corruption under control in its administration would in turn, be detrimental to economic and social development. This leads into the purpose of the article explaining the paradox that is shown in China when the Weberian model of bureaucracy is used as an explanation for its functionality. Despite China’s low ranking in corruption and Quality of Government measurements, their ability to implement policies suited towards their citizens is unparalleled. Thus the ‘Chinese paradox’. The rest of the article explores the unorthodox organisational system that China uses in substitute to the Western Weberian.

Institutional Theory in Development Research and the China Paradox:

An abundance of research argues for the importance of a state’s administration capacity and QoG being the key driver of economic prosperity and social development, maintained through controlling corruption. China is the example of a developing country with no hard list of laws and a very informal type of public administration which on paper is completely counterintuitive to the Weberian model and thus counterintuitive to institutional development. In spite of this, the last three decades of China’s development showed high economic growth, and impressive improvements in varying measures of human well-being. Rothstein references a quote by Kishore Mahbubani that advocates for the undeniable good that China’s government done for its citizens – improving its quality of human life more than any other society in a short amount of time. Bo says that the reason the quality of life has increased so fast in China is due to good investments in public sectors with the revenue collected from taxes.

To figure out how China succeeds despite it appearing like a paradox on surface level, Bo Rothstein hypothesised three different possibilities:

1.     The quality of governance institutional theory is incorrect in what causes economic and social development – With the challenge being that it is not as general as people initially thought.  This hypothesis was not probable since it would result in accounting for China’s cultural and historical traits – giving a culturist theory. In turn, political scientists would have to start giving culturist theories for each country instead of focussing on what they have in common.

2.     Quality of Governance institutions are conceptions by Westerners, and thus cannot be applied to cases like China – Studies looking into this possibility showed that there was not much evidence to support the idea that China’s paradox was relativistic.

3.     Presence of an institutional feature in China’s system that is otherwise unheard of in discussion that tells of an alternate way to give state capacity without traditional liberal rule-of-law – Bo was more inclined to believe a problem with China was merely a misunderstanding of how Chinese public administration worked. Cadre organisation was found to be the key to China’s administrative success – a form of organisation that can even succeed Weberian.

Measurement the GoC in China:

Despite the high levels of corruption prevalent within China’s administration, the general population still seemed satisfied with services. Even when compared with six Asian-Pacific countries with similar levels of corruption in QoG, Chinese citizens were overall more satisfied with government handling of common issues like crime, unemployment, human rights, economy, etc. More so than global superpower countries like the U.S or Russia. The only country to outrank China in government satisfaction was Australia. Bo refers to a World Value study of China showing their higher level of social trust and growth in comparison to other developing countries. Questioning the origin of Chinese’s high confidence in China’s institutions despite well-known corruption within.

Rothstein proceeds to question what it is, he refers to an article written by Gunter Schubert and Anna L. Ahlers which suggests that obtaining political legitimacy to a local level is achieved by “adaptive authoritarianism” with cadres (a unique variation of civil servant, or political agent) has a strong obligation to be aware of public demands and take into account people’s responses to policy. A distinct difference between Weberian and Cadre organisation in this matter is that whilst civil servants in Weberian bureaucracy’s serve the principles of the law, cadres are affiliated with the political party but are passionate about the idealistic values they hold.

Reforming the Civil Service in China:

Communist party member make up 80% of civil service posts, voiding the usual Weberian style of civil service neutrality. Despite this, China has increased its emphasis on professionalism within its party, making a university degree one of its new criteria of admission to the party. This trend started in the 1990s when China implemented a model of “performance and result based management” within county and township levels. The need for cadres to perform well within their counties is due to their career being directly tied to their ability to fulfil specific policy mandates which include social security, family planning and protest handling.

Public Administration and Development under Authoritarian Regimes:

China’s nondemocratic authoritarian regime is not the same as other authoritarian regimes, it is a single party – whilst other regimes can be monarchies and military rule. Single party has maintained the highest levels of ‘normality of life’ out of the three and are usually the best ran. A study about bank regulation in China gave a glimmer in how business is conducted, it told of heavy use of telephone communication to communicate changes, both impromptu in nature and not - rather than formal meetings or any other dispersed document.

The Cadre Organisation and the China Paradox:

The culmination of the article has Bo Rothstein presenting his findings in what the key to success was with China’s administration. He told that a combination of single-party rule and reinventing of public administration was able to create an incentive structure that would be rational for agents to strive to achieve the goals that the organisation had instead of pursuing fraudulent actions. This differentiates itself from culturist approaches due to the conflicting ideologies of a state being represented in governance shows large inefficiencies. Those that represent the party in the form of cadres have been shown to be passionate about the cause that they are promoting and are incentivised to accomplish goals set by the party not to boost their career but because they are genuinely enthusiastic about the policy doctrine and are able to adapt the doctrine to suit the district that they are overseeing instead of a ‘one size fits all’ model. The cadre organisation model allows for policies to be constantly adapted without the red tape process usually involved with policy changes in Western societies. Rothstein refers to sociologist Balint Balla to describe the differences as bureaucracy being reliable, continuous, with emphasis on execution – in comparison to the more ‘gung-ho’ method of cadre administration with on-the-ball improvisation and negates formalities in favour of quick results.

Cadre Organisation in Western Societies:

The cadre model that China uses is not exclusive to a specific culture or ideology. Though its model is barely referenced in Western societies, its existence has been validated by theorists in countries like the U.S and Sweden.

Comparing the Weberian Bureaucracy and the Cadre Organisation:

Despite implying that norms in Cadre organisation go in an unregulated manner, the hierarchy mandates give a stability to this administration.  The advantage of this is that it does not adhere to norms of other organisations and thus the importance of the norms are irrelevant. A view of representative democracy would denounce cadre organisation in its prompt revitalising of policy doctrines and keeps citizens and companies on their toes as they cannot predict government actions. A table included in the journal article shows the characteristics between bureaucratic and cadre organisations that distinct Cadre organisations to be more geared towards interpersonal motivation and fulfilment of wanting to complete mandates. A cadre’s passion towards policy doctrine is reflected in their passion towards the party.

Discussion and Conclusion:

Bo Rothstein concludes his article by talking about how most research into China’s paradox neglects the possibility of an alternative model of administration. He suggests that the cadre organisation used is indeed very efficient at producing desirable incomes and improving political legitimacy but is quick to say that this is not a result of Chinese administrative culture. Bo advises that a QoG measure in China is likely inadequate due to the measure not taking into account the unique circumstances of China’s administrative model.  Rothstein advises that despite the positive outcomes for China, Cadre organisation is likely not compatible with representative democracy due to the low possibility of prompt policy changes being made with conflicting viewpoints having a take. Bo Rothstein ends on a note that questions the sustainability of the cadre model, citing a book Why Nations Fail by Acemoglu and Robinson which predicts China’s crash as a result of its informal institutions catching up with it but Bo challenges that presumption by referring to the World Survey that shows a clear emphasis on output by the government to maintain political legitimacy. The final sentence of the article contemplates how long the cadre system would last if China ever implemented a multi-party system.

This shows that the China paradox is not a paradox at all, merely a misunderstanding of their system due to its use of a model that is not commonly known due to the certain circumstances that a state has in order to be able to adapt this cadre organisational model efficiently.

Rothstein, B. (2014). The Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber. Governance, 28(4), 533-548.