Background variables relative to RCE topic.

Hey, everyone, this is a miscellaneous blog post relating to a few mechanisms within non-democracy illustrated within the set text that may either have a bearing on or just be of general interest relative to the RCE theme regarding convicts, prisoners and incarceration rates.

In the recent chapter dealing with personalism and reiterated by the "purges" referred to in previous lectures, the notion of "complicity" was identified as typical within such a ruler's toolkit. It appears as though this dynamic is functionally manifest in the assignment of what could be described as a "fall guy," as subordinates are implicitly linked to the shady practices that naturally punctuate the whole regime such as corruption, fraud and so on. Personal loyalty and compliance to the ruler's wishes extend from this dynamic, as does a layer of legal protection in the event of accusation, as the blame can be intentionally shifted from the ruler, elsewhere. Numerous questions sprout from this; is strategic complicity exclusive to personalized rule? Are domestic or international accusations more conducive to its use? Does sentencing procedure flow from this in a consistent and uninhibited way or do the accused usually escape justice on the basis of their connections?  Doubtless, this unique legal characteristic (potentially more acute among in states that face wider external scrutiny) could impact certain data utilized in the RCE both in regards to democratic and non-democratic regimes and could be worth keeping in mind.

Outside of this dimension, ideology could play an important role in sharpening the apprehension of political prisoners. Concentrated rates in these terms could infer aspects closer to totalitarianism; notably, as the conception and acute surveillance of idealized political behaviour or discourse may see wider rates of punishment for nonconformity; undoubtedly the 2014 UN investigation which reported on the presence of political prison camps and detention centres throughout North Korea comes to mind in this instance. Whether internment in facilities of this kind contributes to the overall dataset could impact the resulting hypothesis in divergent ways; their exclusion would limit the general correlation between certain regime types and incarceration, whereas, assimilating such political prisoners into the overall level may reveal patterns of incarceration, less indicative of real crime and punishment rates; if this is the assessed value, as criminal behaviour here may not be genuinely qualified. Moreover, the aforementioned report also alluded to the lack of due process for political prisoners, perhaps illustrating yet another channel whereby the levels of incarceration may diverge from the genuine crime rate. Depending on the nature of the analysis, it could be worth considering the statistical skew potentially contained within highly ideological outlier regimes, particularly if ideology or human rights factor into regime classification system/checklist in an otherwise limited capacity.

Please follow the link below in order to access an article which contextualizes the 2014 UN Report on the DPRK if interested:  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-rights-un/north-korea-maintains-repression-political-prison-camps-u-n-expert-idUSKBN1QP28J