EBP #1 (Turkey: How the Coup Failed)

EBP #1
Turkey: How the Coup Failed
Week 6
Berk Esen, Sebnem Gumuscu

Context

Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu's piece, Turkey: How the Coup Failed analyzes the nature of Turkey's ruling party, its methods for maintaining its competitive-authoritarian regime, as well as the factors contributing to its failed 2016 military coup and its implications for the future. It puts the Turkish power struggle in context as a case study for competitive-authoritarianism's strengths and weaknesses as they relate to authoritarian survival, and attempts to learn something about the tendencies of Turkish politics while predicting the impacts of several monumental events in recent Turkish political history including the coup. 

The Rise of AKP and the Fall of the Military

Prior to diving into its analysis of the contributing factors in the failure of the coup, the article establishes the contemporary background of Turkey's ruling party in the context of its competitive-authoritarian regime: the AKP and its leader Tayyip Erdogan. Firstly, it is noted that the authoritarian nature of the AKP primarily arose as a result of its fostering a coalition with the Islamist Network and its subsequent demotion of the Turkish military in terms of power and political influence. Additionally, the party managed to turn the judiciary from an effective veto player to a tool for authoritarian means. By establishing its own power and reducing the influence of one of Turkey's previously most powerful factions, the AKP and Erdogan were free to bolster the authoritarian nature of the regime and consolidate political resources, including access to the media and the aforementioned utilization of the judiciary for the party's agenda. Thus, the consolidation of political power by the AKP involved the established phenomenon in which a regime's authoritarian characteristics arise in part due to intense political conflicts and purges which allow an entity to remove veto players and institutional constraint. That is to say, the AKP managed to shift the Turkish political arena from one in which institutions are preventative measures in relation to the political power of an individual (or other institution) to one in which institutions are tools for a ruling entity to consolidate and exercise power. 

The Events of the Coup

The article then proceeds to chronicle the sequence of events that followed the initiation of coup and to establish the strategies used by the perpetrators and the AKP during the event. Firstly, the perpetrators of the coup targeted key locations and institutions: "These included the General Staff Headquarters in Ankara plus the police special-forces base at Gölbaşı near the capital. Also targeted for takeover were military high schools, Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport and city hall, the national public-broadcasting station, and facilities critical to controlling the national telecommunications and satellite systems" (Esen/Gumuscu p. 60). Subsequently, Erdogan made a public announcement calling on citizens to assemble and rally in public spaces against the coup and to, more specifically, take back the Atatürk airport. According to the authors, some highly committed "putschists" stood their ground and, in cases, used deadly force against civilians. However, there were also some more moderate members of the perpetrating entity who gave in to the public pressure and laid down their weapons in refusing to fire on civilians. In response to the heightened unrest and violence in the streets of Istanbul and Ankara, the coup perpetrators targeted more high-level state institutions and buildings, including the parliament, the National Intelligence Agency. They also attempted to capture Erdogan by raiding his hotel in Southwest Turkey, but he had already departed for Istanbul upon their arrival. "By early on the morning of July 16, it was apparent that the bulk of the Turkish armed forces were not behind the coup, and that popular resistance was too intense and widespread to overcome" (Esen/Gumuscu p. 62), the article notes, indicating that perhaps the failure of this particular attempt at a military coup was partly owed to its lack of true military support.  

Factors Contributing to the Failure of the Coup

The Strength of the AKP/Popular Mobilization:

The article asserts that one of the most crucial elements contributing to the coup's failure was the popular civilian support for the AKP and rally against the coup during the time in which it transpired, while noting that this was the first time in Turkey's history of coups that public opposition was so strong. The relevant question, then, is how and why the AKP was able to amass popular backing in this case. The authors believe that this case involved the particular resilience that strong competitive-authoritarian regimes have, due to their ability to "manage conflicts within their own elite ranks, mobilize support, and win elections, enhance incumbents’ capacity to suppress, outmaneuver, or coopt opponents and critics" (Esen/Gumuscu p. 62), as these characteristics foster resilience against military coups more specifically. Additionally, the article describes further characteristics contributing to the AKP's strength in this case. For example, the AKP has been highly effective at mobilizing support in part due to its ability to tap into and be in-touch with the public through its use of neighborhood meetings and other community-centered institutions aimed and bringing the public into politics (even if they aren't to hold genuine authority in government). After all, the AKP has "won five general elections, including a snap election, and three local elections to establish its electoral dominance over the opposition" (Esen/Gumuscu p. 64) over the last 15 years. 

The Role of the Media: 

Erdogan and the AKP have been transforming the media into a largely pro-AKP entity during their tenure. The fact that the media were largely in favor of the incumbent government, particularly after Erdogan appeared to call for resistance on what was perceived to be the last bastion of independent traditional media (CNN Turk), fueled the widespread popular resistance against the coup due to the party's monopolization of public information. It is also noted that the AKP utilized social media and text messaging to rally the public, further fostering said resistance. This, as we explored during the week 4 lectures, is a key component that distinguishes competitive-authoritarian regimes from seemingly similar democracies and other forms of authoritarianism: while elections are still genuine vehicles for attaining power, to some degree, there is also a heavy advantage for the incumbent party. In this case, the AKP consolidated this advantage in ways such as their manipulation of the media.

The Diyanet:

The Diyanet of Religious Affairs was also impactful in the failure of the coup, in that it mobilized Mosques to encourage popular protest, and therefore utilized religious appeals, to resist the coup. Thus, the AKP's use of the influence of Islam in public spaces helped them to prevent a coup. 

Public and Private Resources:

AKP's access to loyalists and resources in both the private and public sector were crucial in thwarting the coup on the ground. For example, the article writes: "first in the city of Uşak and later in other places, municipalities put a check on mobilization in support of the coup by simply parking construction equipment athwart the gates of military bases" (Esen/Gumuscu p. 66).

The Role of Opposition Parties:

The article notes the opposition parties' surprisingly anti-coup stance upon receiving calls and appeals from the perpetrators. While one might expect them to have attempted to capitalize on a chance to seize power of the AKP, all three opposition parties with parliamentary seats denounced the coup. For example, the leading opposition party, the CHP, likely stood against the coup in accordance with its values of "democratic accountability and the rule of law" (Esen/Gumuscu p. 67). Thus, opposition parties and Turkish elites who were generally critical of Erdogan were more inclined to fully commit to stability and at least partial democracy than face a turbulent future at the hands of a potentially authoritarian military regime. 

"What Comes Next?"

Esen and Gumuscu then attempt to determine the short and long term implications of the coup. They assert that there are three primary roads that regimes take in the aftermath of a coup: democratization, unstable authoritarianism, and stable authoritarianism. The AKP's recent efforts to consolidate power and reduce the power of opposition parties and the independent press, among other threats to authoritarian power, are predicted to have a stabilizing effect on the regime according to the article. It argues that protests and other turbulent events in the years leading up to the coup, along with the coup itself, fostered the AKP's continued shifts toward a more authoritarian nature. It also predicts that these more authoritarian shifts are not likely to end, and that "the country may soon find itself faced with another kind of authoritarian rule that will surely prove very hard to end" (Esen/Gumuscu p. 71).


Reference:
Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu. Turkey: How the Coup Failed. Johns Hopkins University press. pp. 60-71