As the third-oldest democracy
outside the advanced industrial powers, the breakdown of the democratic party
system and the gradual slide into competitive authoritarianism in Venezuela
raises many fascinating questions. This article examines three of these.
The
article first looks into why and how the party system collapsed when it had
been so highly institutionalized during the 1959-1993 period. Although it is
understood that the economic decline Venezuela experienced during the 1980's
and 1990's and the consequent rise in poverty had a large impact on the party
system it did not directly force its collapse. However, bad economic
performance did help reduce public support for governing parties, which was
reduced further by corruption throughout the governing apparatus. During these
hard economic times parties were forced to shift their governing focus and
underlying ideologies to the point that Venezuelan's felt underrepresented
which in turn made them more likely to support alternative options, such as
Chavez. In summary, poor economic times forced governing parties to make
policies the people did not agree with which lead to under-representation and
public discontent with the government, which in turn helped Chavez gain public
support and therefore influence.
The second question posed in
this article is that of how to categorize the regime under Chavez. This section
sees much debate between those who sympathize with Chavez and those who feel
strongly the other way. Many scholars that sympathize with Chavez draw emphasis
to public participation and some democratic values evident in this regime. This
group look at the use of referendum, community councils that have some
authority at a grassroots level, government-opposition relations, aspects of
welfare evident in the regime, and woman's rights in an attempt to draw
parallels between this regime and aspects of participatory democracy.
Others take a more critical
approach to Chavez's regime, drawing on the path taken to gradually dismantle
democratic institutions whilst instilling authoritarianism. In this they look
closely at the centralization of power, the unfair and undemocratic treatment
of opposition, rampant corruption, unfair dismissal of public-sector employees
that oppose Chavez, and the curtailing of the press and increasingly uneven
playing field. This section is summarized with a definition of democracy and
explaining that although this regime may have some democratic values it cannot
be categorized as a democracy due to its severe lack of democratic
institutions, such as those pertaining to elections, and protections of rights
and freedoms throughout society.
The
third section attempts to explain Chavez's consolidation of power and the
accompanying erosion of democracy. One important feature of the breakdown of
democracy in Venezuela is that there was not a single act that forced a collapse
but rather incremental changes and sequential steps that have resulted in the
erosion of democracy. First and foremost, the decay of the party system was a
necessary condition for consolidating authoritarian rule at the hands of Hugo
Chavez. Also important were the general dissatisfaction with the governing
apparatus prior to Chavez's regime, coupled with the oil-boom after 1998 and
Venezuela's accompanying economic recovery, is it by no means difficult to
deduce Chavez gained much public support which aided power consolidation. An
important theme throughout this article is the level of grassroots level
participatory democratic institutions which also aided Chavez's consolidation
of power and have the people some contentment, detracting from the authoritarian
nature of the regime in general. Chavez also had a lot of control over the
National Electoral Council which allowed him to time referendums in a way that
would maximize his chances of victory, whilst retaining the facade of a
democratic referendum.
The
article then looks at the broader implications of the case in Venezuela. Here,
caution is given in using the concept of “path dependence” in classifying one
state and the happenings thereof solely in regard to the happenings of the
region. This section makes many conclusions such as, strong parties not
necessarily guaranteeing party system stability or even democratic stability,
weakly institutionalized regimes being more vulnerable to change than those
regimes with strong institutions and high levels of stability.
This
article on the situation in Venezuela makes evident the idea that no one thing
is generally responsible for what happens in a state, it is not solely the
fault of hard economic times that crumbled the party system, nor is it only
Chavez’s charisma that allowed consolidation of power. Many things have worked
together with a little luck, and good timing to create the Venezuela of today. This
is something that holds true for every country.
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