Javier Corrales - A Setback for Chavez

In 2010, the Chávez government faced a dilemma: despite an extremely uneven playing field the opposition parties won 52% of the vote and 41% of seats. The Chávez regime was losing support, but forcibly increasing its hegemony only further eroded its appeal to the people. Nevertheless, the regime chose to further consolidate its hold. Corrales' paper argues that the Venezuelan government's declining popularity was principally due to economic blunders and a lackadaisical approach to crime; this was exacerbated by increasingly authoritarian practices.

Like others, Corrales classes the Chávez regime as competitive authoritarian due to informal non-democratic practices which work to undermine the opposition. However, competitive authoritarian regimes face much more uncertainty than completely authoritarian governments: they need to retain some degree of popular support, and even with the odds stacked against the opposition an unpopular regime could lose its hold.

Economics

Corrales cites poor economic performance as a reason for increasing unpopularity. He states that this decline was largely due to state interference: nationalisation, price and exchange-rate controls, subsidising companies which gave political support, over-regulation, and overvalued exchange rates. ‘Chavenomics’ meant the economy became clientelist rather than development focussed.

Furthermore, inexpert toying with the economy caused flight of capital, and multiple exchange rates skewed normal exchange incentives. Corrales states this as the cause of severe shortages; meanwhile abandoned stashes of goods were discovered in warehouses. Shortages have included essentials such as milk, cooking oil, toothpaste and toilet paper, with people joining long queues in the hopes of getting them.

Corrales’ approach here tends to focus on the ways policy has often harmed (and occasionally benefitted) the private sector. He does not address benefits for workers potentially brought by nationalisation. This is a crucial point to miss: if Chavez risked manipulating the economy to help the proletariat, how effective was this in making a tangible difference to workers’ lives? Some suggest that Chávez’ approach to alleviating poverty was badly managed and lacked transparency. Corrales does not investigate the possibility that waning popularity for Chávez could be partially due to failures from a socialist standpoint.

Drugs and Crime

According to Corrales, Venezuela became a drug haven since Chávez curtailed the US Drug Enforcement Administration. The murder rate is now one of the highest in the world; Corrales blames the ‘green light’ the government has given to crime. This allowance was partially due to incapacity – the state could handle the massive crime wave, and feared intervention would lead to a Mexico-style drug war. Additionally, Corrales argues that high crime rates operated as social control. Drug dealing also benefits some key Chávez supporters: young men in barrios, and a rich elite who engage in narcotrafficking. Thus, Corrales argues, the government would not take on crime even if it could.

However, the crime problem played a key role in the most recent election, with both sides vowing to combat it. Corrales' analysis may not be entirely correct. Recently, Chávez' successor Maduro has sent military troops into the streets of Caracas to fight crime, a move the opposition has called ‘half-baked’. It seems that the government is taking a more hands on approach to crime – although this could be a superficial response to declining popular support rather than a real commitment.

Authoritarianism

Decline in what Corrales terms ‘social hegemony’, largely due to economic and crime concerns, led the regime to pursue greater ‘institutional hegemony’. Autocratic changes, particularly after 2006, were numerous: Chávez could change many kinds of legislation without electoral approval; Chávez supporters began to draft changes to the constitution; power was taken from elected mayors and given to non-elected community councils; and many people opposing Chávez were arrested on dubious charges, denied funding, or banned from running for office. Electoral laws were designed to reduce the numbers of opposition seats, allowing Chávez to win 48% of the vote but almost 60% of the seats in 2010.

So why didn’t the regime disregard democratic processes altogether? Corrales argues that staying competitive authoritarian ‘provokes little international condemnation’ and the regime saw manipulating the democratic process as sufficient to weaken the opposition. This argument is fairly unconvincing – Chávez was unafraid of provoking condemnation and the opposition were powerful enough to be an annoyance, for instance winning the 2007 referendum concerning proposed changes to the constitution.

A way out?

Corrales cites Levitsky and Way’s argument that the transition from a competitive authoritarian regime to a democratic one is made more likely by close linkage to the US or EU, and weak internal organisation. Corrales argues that the reverse situation is true for Venezuela: international pressures appear ineffective and the government is becoming increasingly coercive. This predicts a future of 'stable' authoritarianism for Venezuela, as in Russia or Malaysia.

However, although the USA and Venezuela have had a tense relationship under Chávez and Bush, diplomatic ties were re-established with Obama’s election; moreover the USA is Venezuela’s largest oil customer and provides a third of Venezuela’s imports. This close linkage implies that authoritarianism is unlikely to continue indefinitely under the Levitsky-Way model.

EDIT: I take back what I said about diplomacy given recent developments.

Furthermore, though power is highly centralised, there has been organisational conflict within the Chavismo movement. Corrales suggests Chávez’ move to ban legislators from voting against the party line may ‘foster new fissures’ in the party; in 2009 pro-Chávez intellectuals suggested the party become more internally democratic and collectively led, and were told their ideas were ‘nonsense’. The movement is certainly not seen as flawless by many of its supporters, so more serious divides could affect future organisation strength.

The liberal lens

In his critique, Corrales focusses the erosion of the liberal democratic system. However, as Ellner points out, taking a liberal definition of democracy means developments of radical democracy and their successes or failures are not examined. Corrales neglects to discuss important participatory aspects of Venezuelan politics.

Corrales easily establishes that the Chávez government mismanaged the economy, but the economic critique is also narrowed by its focus on private sector interests. Corrales investigates the detrimental effects of state policy on labour productivity, price stability, inflation, and investment (further analysis of this style by Corrales can be found here). He does not investigate how successful the regime was in its efforts to reach socialist economic goals, such as reducing the work week. This is only analysed in terms of production output. However, Chávez often deliberately used a ‘social-prioritisation strategy’ which meant economic goals took a back seat. I think it is important, additionally,  to assess the successes or failures of these goals on their own terms, rather than simply reducing them effects on the private sector.