The article Political “Competition and Economic Growth”
written by Bruce Bueno
de Mesquita, James D.
Morrow, Randolph
Siverson, and Alastair
Smith endeavours to explain the idea that political competition
promotes economic growth within countries. The particular focus is on how
resources are distributed in different countries and/or different regimes in
which the competition of opposition is absent.
These allocations of resources are pivotal in how positions of power are
held or kept over time due to the ways these leaders allocate and distribute
resources. The article also uses two critical parts of practically any
political system, the selectorate and the winning coalition, as to how it is
that these institutions play a part in the all important allocation of
resources.
The selectorate is best described as those who have a say,
or the ability in which to elect a new leader. The selectorate in this case is
easier to see in democratic systems as for example, as they are essentially a
body of people whom are responsible for making a selection. In a democratic
system as New Zealand this should be, and for the most part are the voters
(general public). Following the
democratic example the winning collation is best described as a group of the
selectorate (different sizes in different political regimes) in which helps to
keep the ruler in power. Again under the New Zealand democracy it would consist
of the voters in which their support is crucial in order for the said party or
person to remain in power. In other political systems such as autocracy these
winning coalitions are usually much smaller, as these lesser distinct numbers
are required to keep rulers n power, e.g in times of coup it is only necessary
to have the support of the military generals etc rather than that of the voting
public. However despite the sizes of the winning coalition, the support of the
coalition is essential in maintaining power, and so those in power grant
special privileges to the winning coalitions in order to maintain their
support.
This idea that special privileges are assigned to those in
the winning coalition is where the idea of resource allocation derives from.
Those in power wish to maintain their status and therefore require the support
of the winning coalition. These coalitions vary in sizes and form, in a
democratic sense the best approach taken in awarding such a vast number of
people is to assign the resources in which the ruler holds, into deriving the
desired policy and bettering societal welfare systems. Whilst public goods such
as rights, security and so on are enjoyed by all of the people, private goods
are only subject to those of the winning coalition in a way that opens doors in
which could allow business deals, black marketing and other specific reserves
which benefit them more as individuals. Those in power decide how much of each
sector should have resources allocated and in terms of the winning coalitions
view, as long as the benefits they get from giving support to this leader
outweigh the benefits they would rep if they were to give their support to opposition.
Whilst this is only a brief view into understanding how
resources and there allocation play a part in political systems and the leaders
in which hold power, we can already begin to understand that throughout all of
the political regimes, the ability to have control over the distribution of
resources is detrimental to remaining in power. This can be seen from the
democratic government in which needs to allocate resources into passing public
policies in which their voters hold high value in, to keep their support. Or
even right down to countries in which corrupt, military have the rule and use
these resources in which to keep the select few men of power happy and
fulfilled in a more direct and individual means, so that they will not move to
oppose those who are ruling in any way. The other intergral point in this
reading, is the notion of outside, or other, political competition puts strain
on the power in party in which arguably causes the party in power to not be
able to afford to allocate themselves so many private resources.
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Just one thing I'm a little confused about: what specific examples did the text give in relation to the ruling powers allocating themselves private resources? Not meaning to sound accusatory or confrontational, I just haven't completed this reading yet and so am curious to put the summary into a more specific context. Thanks!
ReplyDeleteThanks for the summary Zach. How do you evaluate the argument? Does it seem plausible, based either on the evidence they offer, or some other evidence - e.g., from the other readings?
ReplyDeleteA couple of other points: "the ability to have control over the distribution of resources is detrimental to remaining in power" - I think you mean "is essential"?
You also write: "The other intergral point in this reading, is the notion of outside, or other, political competition puts strain on the power in party in which arguably causes the party in power to not be able to afford to allocate themselves so many private resources." This is a good point, but could you give some examples of this? How does this mechanism work?