"The Party: The Secret World of China's
Communist Rulers" -Richard McGregor
Described are a group of men comparable to
the leaders of the Soviet Union, who are secretly chosen without knowledge to
the outer world as the heirs to the leadership of the Chinese state. These men,
with styled hair and political identities alike to one another, have only one
apparent difference; some worked for power and some inherited it. However, this
poses a question; don't all those in power, whether in a democratic or
communist state or something in between, gain that power by earning it or
inheriting it? McGregor, however, deems these less important compared to his
point of the order in which the men appeared, displaying the hierarchy of
planned leadership.
These men are described to have clapped
themselves onto the podium, written by McGregor with an implication that no one
else will do this for them. This is an obvious reaction related to an important
point; the public, who know nothing of their future leaders, who are surprised
that one of the chosen who is uncommonly
recognisable is a man who should have been imprisoned for known corruption,
cannot be expected to applaud. However, the rigid, systematic procedure does
not include public participation, for opinions are dangerous and banned. The
Chinese government, conscious that their power does in fact lie in the hands of
its people (unbeknownst to them), will not risk allowing its citizens to have
an opinion, otherwise a situation of 'glasnost collapse' may again arise in
history. The Soviet Union taught China more than simply how to keep a
disciplined image. As a result, security is heavily deployed, opinions are
suppressed and the media is controlled or shut down, all displaying one
overriding idea that the state is in a state of trepidation. They still see the
importance of returning the favour to the people, however. 'Black Jails' begin
to form, a way of suppressing the opinionated, while keeping the crime rate
down to keep up appearances. As a result, the people are accustomed to what
they call 'seasonal rhythms of repression', but this knowledge is not warning
enough for those certain figures who are detained with no charge 'just in case'.
The higher officials also protect themselves by holding lower provincial
leaders responsible for misbehaviour of those in their province and use this as
another way of protection. Government fears could be seen to stem from their
inability to control the thoughts of their people despite their attempts to,
but is nevertheless a way to let the people know what they should be thinking.
Everything is dictated by the government, exemplified by identical press
articles which are not unlike their identical subjects. While the Chinese
government does not hesitate to eliminate political power, their lack of
revolutionary nature means less blood is spilled and more cunning tactics are
employed.
Hu Jintao is described as a puppet,
controlled by a wider puppeteer that uses him as an image for the state, which
is carefully censored to contain only the most flattering of depictions. Other
political leaders are also carefully trained, such as Chen Ailian, who will
readily tell her personal business story but when asked about the state
mindlessly repeats state slogans. Both are not particularly authoritarian and
are rather bland. However, this differs from previous leaders such as Mao
Zedong, who is described as a charismatic figure. Interestingly, the
presentation of the new leaders is held at the very Tiananmen Square that was
the location of Mao's horrors, which now holds lifeless, rigid future leaders,
perhaps to improve China's image to its people and other states? When
interviewed, Hu, among others, is 'baffled' at the suggestion that he was not
democratically elected and robotically insists that he was chosen by the people
and cannot let them down by refusing the position. This in itself is
suspicious; if the system was democratic and he did not want or choose to be leader,
how did he become so without putting his own name forward? His very quote
implies dictatorial elements. Legitimacy is also an important imagery technique
which China has been successful in. Additionally, the Party has changed with
modern society, flocking to the rich and educated, displaying their
opportunistic and wise nature.
China's secrecy is then compared to the
Vatican state. One state the McGregor fails to mention that perhaps he should have,
is the obvious dictatorship evident in DPR Korea, who thrives on secrecy. This
state is so good at keeping secrets, no one knew for two days that Kim Jong-il
had died. Perhaps this is because DPR Korea is considered a monarchy, however,
is China so different? A key aspect of a monarchy is the familial inheritance
of the throne, which both China and the Vatican adopt. McGregor then proceeds
to described China's reliance on the Soviet governmental system which poses
another question; has China not learned enough from the USSR and not to follow
their failed system? This question may be answered with the fact that China
does tend to keep power in the family. The centralised elite government adopted
from Lenin does state that those in power should dictate to the working class
who "are considered unable to rise
above their day to day struggles" which interestingly does not always
work in China as it has developed the very system it desired to overcome and
created two distinct classes; the capitalists and the proletariat.
As a result, despite its many present
communist aspects, McGregor described China's theoretical potential to
"have it all- democracy, a functioning legal system, a vibrant civil
society, disputatious think-tanks... so long as they develop within the
boundaries the Party lays down for them." But as McGregor rightly implies,
China's authoritative history may not be so easy to shed, as seen in former
SSR's and in communist China itself. While this is so, it is widely considered
highly probable that China will become a democracy in the near future. Its
government, while resilient, has displayed that it is fearful and places great
importance on maintaining is grip over the state, therefore it could become
susceptible to public input. Its enormous economy increases the income gap
daily. And as seen, the Chinese are opportunists and numbers of the educated
are rising, therefore it is not unforeseeable that one may rise to democratic
power. McGregor's argument is not controversial and it allows one to not only
determine what a dictatorship is or how it might become a democracy, but also
how it can fail and succeed. While I personally agree that China will emerge as
a democracy, there are still those who disagree. And of course, there are the
obvious 'what if questions'; if Mao had not committed his atrocities, would
China need to be so fearful of its people? If China employed new approaches,
would it fix the income gap so close to that seen in democracies? Only time
will tell what will truly become of China in the near future.
Additional Sources:
http://chinaleftreview.org/?p=471
http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/13/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/3/
I think your description of how China currently operates is a very accurate. The idea of bland almost faceless leaders emerging at the head of the most powerful economy in the world due to the balancing act that the current regime must pull off in an attempt to appease it's people and the global community. I found it especially interesting when you described the reaction of China's leader to the idea that he wasn't chosen by the people. This fascinating because during the Cold War it was enough for Communist leaders to serve the people but now the the lie must be told they were chosen by the people even when it is clear that they were not.
ReplyDeleteThank you! I agree with you, it is interesting that the lie must be told but I have to wonder, is it because China, being relatively adverse to violence, feels that it should lie to the world in order to keep it happy (and perhaps the US off its back)?
DeleteGood summary Rhiannon.
ReplyDeleteA couple of points:
"The Chinese government, conscious that their power does in fact lie in the hands of its people (unbeknownst to them), will not risk allowing its citizens to have an opinion, otherwise a situation of 'glasnost collapse' may again arise in history." I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. It is true that if the people organize and protest, they could (in theory) overthrow the Chinese government; but in practice the Chinese government actually does have the power for the most part, precisely because it is able to suppress political competition.
"Hu Jintao is described as a puppet, controlled by a wider puppeteer" Do you agree with this description? Who is the wider puppeteer in the article?
"This question may be answered with the fact that China does tend to keep power in the family." Is that right? Though some of the top levels of the CCP are descendants of some of the people who were leaders of the revolution, this does not seem to be generally the case.
One final question: what do you mean by rising to democratic power in your final paragraph? That would seem to suggest a pretty fundamental transformation of the Chinese system.
Thank you for your comments Xavier.
DeleteWith regard to your points:
1) I am essentially talking about the point that you make about if people organise and protest they could overthrow the Chinese government. I am aware that the government holds power for the most part CURRENTLY, but if the people were able to voice their opinions and eventually organise and protest, a situation such as the one seen in the Soviet Union (perestroika and glasnost)for example, could occur again, which is why the Chinese government keep such a tight grip on suppressing opinion and as you rightly say, political competition. I then avert to the fact that the Chinese government are aware that their power is strengthened by their elimination of opinion and political competition.
2)I would agree with that description, as it was not expressly mentioned in the article and I made that deliberation myself. I would call him a puppet as his image, behaviour and even childhood is ruled over and dictated by the 'wider puppeteer' which McGregor describes is the Party, which I agree with.
3) With reference to the family, as explained in the comment below, I have to assume that McGregor meant family as a description of what the Party is like (identical) as I don't see how McGregor could be referring to literal familial inheritance. I could have been clearer on this point.
4) Many scholars have deliberated the high possibility that China will make the transition to a democracy in the near future, namely in a few papers and articles, the next 10-15 years. I use the term democratic, although I am not entirely convinced China, even if they do make the transition to a democracy, will be a TRUE democracy such as one seen in New Zealand for example. It is a fundamental transformation of the Chinese system which as I described would be difficult given its current governments characteristics, however, it is widely believed to be POSSIBLE, particularly for economical reasons.
I hope this clarifies a few things!
Thanks Rhiannon. We will be discussing more whether or not China could become democratic later in the term - there's an article at the end of the reader on precisely this topic.
Delete"A key aspect of a monarchy is the familial inheritance of the throne, which both China and the Vatican adopt."
ReplyDeleteI don't understand this. "Familial inheritance of the throne" does not take place in the Vatican let alone the Chinese government.
That particular point was with regard to a mention of "top-level decisions [being] kept in the family." The term 'family' as used in the reading I assumed was not to be taken literally, but more to refer to the Party's family-like characteristics, such as all having identical images and opinions. When I used the term 'familial inheritance' I was referring to the non-literal term McGregor adopted. This could have been made more clear though, my apologies.
DeleteThanks for the clarification, Rhiannon.
Delete