Explanatory Post 1: Mobutu’s Fall from Power

Mobutu’s Fall from Power

This blog post focuses on Michela Wong’s article, The Emperor Mobutu, in which she tries to uncover how Zaire had fallen so deeply into crisis by 1996 that its president had fled the country, and the national army was looting its own cities. In trying to discover how things had gotten so bad in Zaire, Wong looks towards pivotal mistakes President Mobutu made in his four decades in power.  She focuses primarily in Mobutu’s questionable military decisions, which she regards as the primary reason he lost control of the state. 

Wong explains that Mobutu was a very distrusting man, who was constantly concerned about anyone gaining an edge over him. This does not come as a surprise, based on Mobutu’s own history of working against the government before he came to power. This overwhelming distrust combined with understanding that he was dealing with an extremely diverse society, led him to “embrace the philosophy of divide-and-rule.”  By handling things in this manner, Mobutu was able to constantly pit people against one another, and ensure that no one under him ever gained too much power.  Mobuttu came across as the only person who understood the whole picture, and that the system would not function without him. While this strategy worked to make sure no one was able to do anything to question his power, it also made it impossible to get things done when there was a legitimate need to do so.  It became evident that Mobutu’s divide-and-rule principle was “an exercise in procrastination; inaction elevated to an art form; a vacuum.”

This distrust led Mobutu to only have confidence in those from his same tribe, giving high-ranking roles to those that he knew more personally.  He also invested many of his resources into special forces, instead of the generally military. These special forces became more about protecting the president than protecting Zaire. As money was funneled into these forces, it was drained from the regular army – the FAZ.  In response of not being paid well, the generals of the FAZ turned to fraud and extortion, often stealing the salaries of their own soldiers. They became experts at getting more money out of Mobutu, including exaggerating the number of men in their armies. However, as the generals got richer, the army soldiers remained poor and turned to exploiting their position of power over the average citizens. Describing, “the army as no longer the defender of civilians, but an enemy,” it became clear that the military was losing its credibility.

In order to maintain some semblance of power, Mobutu hired mercenaries to help fight against the rebels, but more often than not counted on his numerous foreign friends for help. It must be noted that when Mobutu came to power he was backed by many democracies in the world that hoped to control a sphere of influence in Africa through a positive relationship with Zaire. As the Cold War continued, The US, France, and Belgium, among others, helped Mobutu to avoid communism spreading in Africa. These friendships were very important to Mobutu, in that he knew he always had strong forced ready to help him if the rebels got out of hand.

Mobutu picture with US President Ronald Reagan

The use of mercenaries and foreign aid began to make it clear that Mobutu’s military may not be as strong as once believed.  People began to perceive this weakness, and saw it as an opportune time to take advantage of the struggling leader.  Mobutu’s strategy of only giving power to those close to him would be his downfall, as the group referred to as the Gang of Four, made up men close to him from marriage, friendship and family, strategically abused their military power for financial gain. The Gang of Four became a criminal enterprise, brilliant in scheming their way into money and power. They were part of many money making projects, such as diamond dealing, and counterfeit Zaire notes. However, this was the tip of the iceberg for the group, there most damaging moves came in that of arms sales to the same rebels they were fighting. In one of their must cunning moves, the Gang sold a fleet of Mirage fighter jets, claiming that it was to help the president’s helicopter fleet.  The arms deals became important on the world stage, making “Zaire a pariah in central Africa” because rebels were now strongly armed and a serious threat to established governments. These governments assumed that one of two things were happening: “that either the trading was taking place with Mobutu’s backing or that generals were acting on their own behalf – in which case he no longer controlled the situation. Either way, it was time for Mobutu to go.”

The AFDL (Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire), made up of many African nations surrounding Zaire, quickly started to attack them for these offenses.  Rather than the generals seeing a real threat to their security, they saw an opportunity to ask for more money for supplies, and continued to sell them for a profit. The FAZ was left with nothing to fight off the AFDL, and more and more countries around them joined the fight to get Mobutu out of power. Mobutu reverted back to his old tactics, and again asked his international friends for help. However, Mobutu did not take into consider the current political climate that had shifted drastically in the last five years. The Berlin Wall had fell, the Cold War was over, and the US no longer needed a country in Central Africa to ward of communism.  This shift in world politics meant Mobutu could no longer count on his previously faithful friends.

Finally, Mobutu took measures against his generals, and hired less corrupt people to run his military. However, it was too little to late for the president.  As the AFDL continued to move across Zaire, Mobutu left the country and died of prostate cancer in Morocco in 1997. He left the country in shambles to his successor Laurent-Desire Kabila, who continued to struggle to bring peace to the area.  Mobutu’s Zaire is essential divided into two areas, one torn apart by rival rebels, and the other policed by regional powers that would prefer to stop their military involvement. Unfortunately, the future of the area looks bleak, as there are so many men with guns, and there are no strong leaders negotiating peace.

Wrong, Michela. 2000. "The Emperor Mobutu." Transition no. 9 (1):92-112.

(http://www.jstor.org/stable/3137451,