Tuesday, 17 September 2019

EBP Week 9: How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We Measure It?


How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We Measure It?

This article by Ronald Inglehart, published in 2003, outlines a social scientific study which examines the support for democracy. The study examines how strong support for democracy is in a variety of societies to see whether there is a link between the support of democracy and the level of democracy in a society. While other research programmes have mainly focused on overt support for democracy, this study also examines other factors which could play a role in democracy. Interpersonal trust, tolerance of outgroups, post-materialist emphasis on civil rights and political participation and well-being are used as societal factors due to their apparent links in political literature to democratic support. Interpersonal trust is important because democratic institutions rely on trust that everyone will play by the rules of democracy. Tolerance of outgroups is also important because in order to have a legitimate opposition, tolerance between groups who disagree and dislike each other is necessary. Post-materialist values are deemed important since they emphasise freedom of speech and participation (I have linked the Wikipedia page if you want to know more about what post-materialism is). Well-being is also used as it is linked to economic success which seems to legitimise democratic institutions. By this notion however, economic success could legitimise authoritarian regimes the same way. The study took data from the World Values Survey/European Values Survey, which provides data 77 societies ranging from authoritarian regimes to democracies, and linked the data to a society’s level of democracy as measured by freedom house.
The study found that overt support of democracy is widespread across many different regime types, but that it is not an accurate predictor of the level of democracy in a given society. Instead, the study found that higher levels of tolerance, interpersonal trust, political activism and post-materialist values were a more accurate predictor of democracy. Inglehart labels these values as “self-expression values”. Societies that rank high on one of these factors tend to rank high on all four, whereas societies that rank low on one tend to rank low on all four. Societies that rank low are considered to have “Survival values”. Survival vs self-expression is linked with economic well-being: as a society’s economy develops, the society shifts from survival values to self-expression values. Inglehart argues that this explains the link between economic development and democracy – while economic development does not bring about democracy by itself, it brings a rising level of values that lead to growing demands for democratisation.
The first table shows the results for the percentage of those surveyed from each country who think that a democratic system is “very good” or “fairly good”. The results show that most people in the world support democracy, even in authoritarian societies. Albania and Egypt were the top ranked countries with 99% of those interviewed supporting democracies. The table highlights Islamic countries in bold, and with the exception of Pakistan which scores low at 68%, they score highly. Going from these results, it seems as though democracy is appealing to these societies, contrary to popular belief. Overall the results show that the image of democracy throughout the world is overwhelmingly positive. The median country scored 92%.



The second table shows the results for the percentage of those interviewed from each country who think that rule by a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections would be “very good” or “good”. These results show that support for democracy is in fact not as widespread as the results for table 1 suggest. In 18 societies a majority of people support the idea of an authoritarian leader.



 The third table shows the results of how well mass attitudes predict a society’s level of democracy. Each variable in table 3 is cross-validated by two criteria, the society’s level of democracy in 1995, and its level of democracy from 1981 to 2000. This is to get more accurate results, since a society’s level of democracy can fluctuate from year to year. For example, a military coup will cause a sudden change in a society’s freedom house score but it will not necessarily change the underlying political culture. The results show that correlations between mass attitudes and democracy are higher using the longer period. Inglehart concludes from this that political culture is a better predictor of democratic stability in the long-term rather than a society’s level of democracy at a given time.
From the democracy/autocracy index, we can see that countries that rank high on support for democracy and high on the rejection of authoritarianism tend to be stable democracies. This is shown by the 0.506 correlation. The survival/self-expression values are an even stronger predictor of stable democracy. The five values measured by the questions were trust, well-being, tolerance, political activism and post-materialism. The results show a strong correlation between the survival/self-expression factor scores and stable democracy.



Based on the results, the survival vs self-expression values score is a stronger explanatory variable for stable democracy than overt support for democracy. Figure 1 shows the relationship between scores on the survival/self-expression dimension and the level of democracy in the given country between 1981 and 2000. It shows that out of 76 countries, most country’s level of democracy links with their survival/self-expression scores. China, Iran and Vietnam are notable outliers which have a lower level of democracy than their societies’ values would predict, and Hungary shows a higher level of democracy than their society’s values would predict.





Based on the findings, Inglehart assumes that economic development brings about higher levels of self-expression values which in turn leads to higher levels of democracy, although this study does not explicitly demonstrate this. This assumption concludes that culture seems to shape democracy more than democracy shapes culture, although Inglehart admits that arguments can be made against this and that further research is needed.
It is not clear how many people were interviewed in each country, and it is not clear whether the people interviewed were an accurate representation of their society as a whole. This leads me to question how accurate the results are. Furthermore, the conclusion that the survival/self-expression factor scores are a more accurate predictor of long-term democratic stability is based off the answers to only five questions. These questions are not necessarily a good predictor of the given value in a society. For example, tolerance was found to have the highest correlation with long-term democratic stability out of the five values with a correlation of 0.804. This was based on a question which asks whether homosexuality is justified. I would argue that tolerance for homosexuals does not necessarily mean tolerance in a society is high for other groups e.g. political opponents or religious minorities. Inglehart uses tolerance towards homosexuality as the test since he argued that homosexuals constitute the most disliked group in most societies. I would argue that this is not accurate enough to determine a society’s overall level of tolerance. More questions would be required to get an aggregate score for tolerance. The other values also were measured with just one question, which raises suspicions that they too are also not accurate representations of society’s actual values. I think more studies would need to be done with multiple questions for each value in order to achieve an accurate study.

Keep in mind that this study was published in 2003. The data was taken from the 1980s and 1990s. It would be interesting to see how the results would compare if the study was repeated today. I would assume that the findings would be similar, but new democracies have emerged and existing democracies have declined towards authoritarianism since the turn of the century which could produce interesting findings.

Source:
Inglegart, R. (2003). How solid is mass support for democracy – and how can we measure it?. Political Science and Politics, 36(1), 51-57. https://doi-org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/10.1017/S1049096503001689

Further links:

1 comment:

  1. Excellent summary and discussion, Simon (despite some minor censorship violations!). The findings remain similar in later research by Inglehart and Welzel. Though your point about how these values are determined is well-taken, the index of self-expression values typically has I think 4 questions?

    One question here is why might we expect self-expression values to have an impact on democracy, while an explicit preference for democracy itself does not?

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