Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability- EBP 1: Ella Geris

This article explains the reason for the stability of particular patronage-based authoritarian regimes compared to the breakdown of others. The main argument of Levitsky and Way is that although elite access to power and patronage machines may ensure elite cooperation in authoritarian regimes in normal times, it often fails to do so during crisis. The main source of stability the authors focus on is whether the system has a history of violent struggle. The authors argue that these regimes are less prone to defection and often emerge from the crisis with enhanced authoritarian durability.

The article focuses on countries post- Cold War, a time that was challenging for single-party regimes across the world as a wave of democratization hit. In most regimes, the economic crisis suffered after the war “triggered defection and regime collapse”(Levitsky and Way). However, some authoritarian regimes seemed to not only survive, but emerge stronger than ever.

Zimbabwe and Mozambique are two systems that were able to enhance durability after the economic crisis and where both ruling parties had gained power through violent struggle. The authors identify a few main ways that origins in violent conflict enhance regime cohesion. ZANU and Frelimo, the ruling parties of these systems ascended to power through a violent independence struggle. This meant that when responding to the crisis, they could use violent means to maintain control through security forces made up of people involved in this initial violence. The cost of defection to an opposing party was very high. When faced with a transition to multiparty rule, both of these systems were able to use their violent history to trap potential defectors and ultimately gain even more power than before.

Zambia and Kenya are the two examples used of authoritarian regime breakdown. Both rely on patronage systems to stop defection. Each regime was born through a similar non-violent anti-colonial strategy, due to “Britain’s openness to independence” (Levitsky and Way). In Kenya, there was a violent anti-colonial rebellion, however, unlike in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the veterans involved played little part in the country's transition to independence. KANU in Kenya represented a “coalition of diverse ethnic and ideological groups” similar to UNIP in Zambia. Similarly, the defense forces in Zambia and Kenya were initially made up of British Officers and gradually transitioned over time, unlike in the stable countries where the defense forces were made up of elite supporters of the ruling parties and those involved in initial violence. Therefore when faced with the economic crisis, the governments lacked the will or means for repression and the cost of defection to an opposition party was low.

Fundamentally, the authors prove that where there are strong links between party members, security forces, coercive apparatus and violent struggle, the ruling party of a country is able to emerge from the economic crisis in a much more durable position than those without. Patronage begins to fail if the regime does not have violent roots as there is a lack of incentive for members to stay. Patronage is not enough if not combined with violence.

The purpose of the authors here is not to provide a rigid explanation and outline as to why some authoritarian regimes are more stable than others, but rather that during times of crisis these regimes are at their most vulnerable and durability depends on the roots of the regime. They identify problems of the patronage system using a historical account of multiple regimes to suggest it isn’t enough for regime durability to keep their elite supporters happy faced with a crisis. The key element of an authoritarian regime is the way it consolidates power, and the authors point out that one of the most popular techniques (patronage) used to gain power, can actually be the cause of the loss of power. To establish the trust of their claims the authors use four very similar countries with authoritarian regimes as case studies to pinpoint the main reasons for stability or breakdown during a crisis.

The argument presents strengths and weaknesses. The authors do not suggest their argument is a conclusive analysis of the durability of authoritarian regimes, but rather they simply wish to highlight an important area for further research.

However, they do not extend and develop an explanation of how the regimes have developed since then which could add depth of understanding as to whether their claim is correct. An interesting problem I picked up is that this argument may only apply to the first generation after the crisis and the next generation will have to figure out whether it can continue in this way.

Moreover, an interesting question to ask of this argument is whether it is actually viable to call a regime durable simply due to its lack of defection to other parties. It may be interesting to look at how citizens really view the regime to get a clearer understanding of how durable it actually is rather than focusing on physical aspects. Low defection may not necessarily mean high support. Similarly, does this argument only apply to less developed countries such as those looked at in this article? Perhaps to have a more conclusive answer we need to look at more developed countries. However a similar study done by Leonardo Arriola concluded that the argument made for Africa is not region-specific and can be applied to European countries. Overall, the authors do a good job of looking at answering questions many scholars ask such as ‘why do some dictators succeed in building effective coercive institutions while others fail’.

This article fits in well with the course content around how some regimes are able to transition into democracy a lot easier than others. We are able to identify aspects of these regimes that are relevant to the criteria we have come up with to identify an authoritarian regime in class. The article contrasts the idea of a crisis being the beginning of a transition to authoritarianism mentioned in class, suggesting it can also be the downfall of authoritarianism.

Similarly, the understanding of patronage is that “the main interests of patrimonial rulers is their preservation in power rather than any of separately define public interest… their self-centeredness can be striking” (Marquez, Non Democratic Politics, 78). However this article extends this idea to argue that although power preservation may be the main interest of patronage leaders, it may not always be the reality. Similarly, “patrimonial rulers appear to endure in power for incredible lengths of time”. The article takes this idea and criticizes it.

Ultimately, Levitsky and Way argue that it is the way violent conflict in the creation of authoritarian regimes creates enduring party identities, hardens partisan boundaries, heightens the legitimacy of leaders and enhances the capacity of the regime to repress, that means regimes that result from it are able to emerge from the crisis much more stable than those who rely simply on patronage.

Levitsky, Steven R., and Lucan A. Way. “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 4 (2012): 869-89. doi:10.1017/S1537592712002861

Arriola, Leonardo R. “Patronage and Political Stability in Africa” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 10 (2009): 1339- 62.

Xavier Marquez, Non Democratic Politics: Authoritarianism, Dictatorship and Democratization (Palgrave, 2017).