Turkey: How the Coup Failed
Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu
The purpose of this article is to explain and evaluate the reasons that the Military Coup against Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed in 2016. The coup was led by a group known as the Peace at Home Council. It was led by mid-level military officers, lacking involvement from top officials. Their aim was simple; to overthrow Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) who have maintained a single party rule in Turkey since 2002. Those leading the coup wanted to protect democracy, human rights and freedom.
Turkey has grown increasingly authoritarian under Erdogan’s rule. In 2013 the Gezi Park protests (Turkey’s Arab Spring) attracted hundreds of thousands of protestors across almost all 81 of Turkeys provinces.[1] There seemed to be a movement building in Turkey of opposition to the AKP, however, the military coup failed to build on this momentum.
Why did the coup fail to mobilise the masses?
Esen and Gumuscu attribute this to four key factors:
1. The control and manipulation by the AKP over public and private resources.
2. Their utilisation of conventional and social media to reach and mobilise the population.
3. The popularity of the AKP amongst the citizens of Turkey.
4. The failure of those leading the military coup to successfully mobilise the masses and garner support from the opposition parties.
In order to understand the reasons that the AKP have managed to hold on to power for the past 18 years, and their ability to come out of a military coup seemingly unscathed, first it is needed to understand the power and influence that the AKP possess.
Turkey has a population of 80 million people, 10 million of which are members of the party. They have such a stronghold over the population that in response to this military coup they were able to respond with their own citizens. As can be seen in the video attached. Members of the party along with ordinary civilians stormed the streets, even placing their own bodies in front of tanks.
AKP control over public and private resources
The AKP’s influence was proved when they exploited the Diyanet. The Diyanet is the Directorate of Religious Affairs, established by the Kemalist elite in 1924 with the function of overseeing administration and maintenance of mosques in Turkey. While being a state institution the Diyanet had always maintained a high degree of political separation from the government of Turkey. However, this history of separation of the Diyanet from the state ended on the night of the coup when Erdogan called for help. The Diyanet officials told imams in more than 86,000 mosques to say the Salah prayer, a prayer often said at funerals as a condemnation of those attempting to overthrow Erdogan. Many of these were played over loud speakers in neighbourhoods so that the AKP was effectively reaching millions. This exemplifies how far from a secular state modern day Turkey is.
The Utilisation of Social Media
Social Media was used as a tool for mobilisation throughout the Arab Spring protests in the region. It was an affordable and efficient way to reach the masses through a tweet or a post. In his response to this military coup Erdogan appeared to adopt this technique. On the night that the protests started Erdogan appeared to the nation on broadcast via facetime, he called on loyalists to rally for the AKP and gather in public squares across in Istanbul and Ankara and to take back the Ataturk airport. Social media was also used to send out messages to all members of the party and reach them instantly. Supporters of Erdogan were so quick that they managed to halt the protesters before they had even begun. In Mamak, Ankara the tanks never made it out of the army base as there were thousands of people blocking the way.
Failure to sway the opposition
One of the most significant factors that led to the failed coup according to Esen and Gumuscu was the lack of participation from the opposition parties. The reason that opposition parties within a competitive authoritarian system do not participate in military coups aimed at overthrowing the leader is that this takes away any from the authenticity that the democratic process of that country has. At the time of the coup there were three opposition parties with seats in parliament, not a single one chose to bandwagon on the coup despite all parties having criticised the AKP in the past.
The biggest opposition are the Republican People’s Party (CHP), who have based much of their critiques of the government over the lack of rule of law and corrupt democracy under the AKP. It, therefore, would have been hypocritical for the CHP to have participated in the overthrowing of the elected officials.
The appearance of being seemingly democratic and hosting “competitive” elections has continued to work in the favour of the AKP. The AKP greatly benefited from the opposition parties condemning the efforts of the coup as they used this as further leverage to unite all of the country against the minority engaged in the military coup.
The AKP has also received considerable support from democratic countries and the European Union (EU). To the outside Erdogan and the AKP are seen as the elected representatives and therefore their rule should be supreme over the military. The promotion of democracy by the EU is one of their main priorities. However, it is also interesting to note that in 2016 all hopes that Turkey had of gaining entry into the EU were squashed. This was likely partially due to Erdogan’s response to the coup which saw further silencing of critics and detaining of academics, journalists, lawyers, police officers and politicians.[2]
This also ties into what we are discussing this week in terms of armies and military organizations struggling to garner support from elites and mobilize citizen support. Parties are in a much stronger position to influence and mobilise citizens outside of the ruling elite. The failed coup in Turkey has shown that military coups might no longer be strong enough to see the collapse of a system. Throughout the Cold War military coups were frequent however, the collapse of governments in the modern era has become increasingly due to support from parties. Following a successful coup, the trend now appears to be to go straight to an election. [3]
The Future of Turkey and the AKP
As this article was published shortly after this attempted coup it would be interesting to further examine the popularity of the AKP in 2020. According to polls in 2020 Erdogan’s popularity has plunged to 41%.[4] However, even with polls predicting that Erdogan has lost the people’s support the chances of another party succeeding in elections against the AKP are slim. As we have discussed throughout the course, competitive authoritarian regimes create an environment where the playing field for electoral competition is not in favour of the opposition. Following the publication of this article, Erdogan won a five-year term in 2018 under a new presidential polling system, following a switch to a presidential system in 2014. His new powers include the ability to intervene in the countries legal system, directly appoint top public officials and declare a state of emergency.[5]
This also makes me wonder what it will take for Turkey to see a change in government. The 2016 attempt reduces the likelihood that any other group within the military will attempt another coup. As the AKP and Erdogan continue to become increasingly authoritarian the hold on democracy and competitive elections will continue to slip.
References Used
Amnesty International. (2013). Gezi Park Protests; Brutal Denial of The Right to Human Assembly in Turkey (pp. 5-61). London: Amnesty International Ltd. Retrieved from https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/eur440222013en.pdf
Erdogan’s popularity drops to lowest level. Arab News. (2020). Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://www.arabnews.com/node/1624571/middle-east.
Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president. BBC News. (2020). Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679.
Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2017). Turkey: How the Coup Failed. Journal Of Democracy, 28(1), 59-73. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0006
Tansey, O. (2017). The Fading of the Anti-Coup Norm. Journal Of Democracy, 28(1), 144-156. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0012
[1] Amnesty International. (2013). Gezi Park Protests; Brutal Denial of The Right to Human Assembly in Turkey (pp. 5-61). London: Amnesty International Ltd at p.5.
[2] Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president. BBC News. (2020). Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679.
[3] Tansey, O. (2017). The Fading of the Anti-Coup Norm. Journal Of Democracy, 28(1), 144-156. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0012
[4] Erdogan’s popularity drops to lowest level. Arab News. (2020). Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://www.arabnews.com/node/1624571/middle-east.
[5] Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president. BBC News. (2020). Retrieved 11 May 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679.
Excellent summary, and discussion, Mathilde. Could the COVID19 crisis provide a new opportunity to the opposition in Turkey?
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