EBP 1: 'Turkey: How the Coup Failed'

The main point in the article ‘Turkey: How the Coup Failed’ by Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu is the 2016 failed coup of Turkey’s government under President Erdogan was completely different to other failed coups in contemporary Turkish history. This is because ‘a civilian government was able to call on its own mass following to stop a putsch in its tracks.’ Therefore, there is strong support for the government from the people, making it more legitimate and giving more power to Erdogan’s rule. However, it is important to note that the military coup was weaker than other coups in Turkish history and that could have impacted the success (59). This article illustrates the main reasons the military coup failed, one of these was the impact of the media. Erdogan used mainstream and social media to communicate with his supporters in to prevent military action from the leaders of the coup through supporters protesting and standing in front of the military attempting attack. An important action that was highlighted was Erdogan’s appearance on CNN Turk that ‘had been a frequent AKP target in the past’, which allowed Erdogan to communicate outside his main base of supporters and rally more people to his cause (64). Another reason outlined in the article was the organisation of the Diyanet (Directorate) of Religious Affairs in mobilising citizens against the coup. This is important because ‘the Diyanet until recently was above mixing in day-to-day politics and had played no role in any previous coup (65).’ Therefore, religious groups supported Erdogan and were used as a way to solidify government and Islam values to protest the coup. Furthermore, Erdogan used the party’s massive edge to the access of resources that was gained due to be an authoritarian regime to help stop the protests. This is illustrated by using tricks and heavy equipment to block the movement of the attempted coup. Moreover, the coup failed because ‘in contrast to previous coups, the putschists seem not to have made contact with opposition parties prior to the coup, nor did they try to round up opposition leaders once it started (66).’ This led to the major opposition parties denouncing the putschists and publicly supporting Erdogan’s party for democratic reasons. This reinforces the point in lecture 10 with the most important factor for the success of a military coup is control over information, not fighting force. This is evident in this case with mass mobilisations occur because of the lack of control over information from the putschists.

Towards the end of the article, the author argues that the failed coup helped Erdogan consolidate power and as a result, Turkey is heading down the authoritarian route. This is done through the use of Levitsky and Way’s analysis of regime types to conclude that Turkey is moving to authoritarianism with some competitive features. Erdogan has used the failed coup as an excuse to purge opponents under the grounds of suspect Gülenist leanings. Surges of arrests and firings occurred with the government removing and suspending slightly more than a hundred-thousand state officials. This allows Erdogan to recruit new staff that is loyal to his regime and increase instability in the state. Furthermore, many journalists, academics, and businessmen have been detained as well because they were accused of having Gülen ties. This relates to course content on competitive authoritarianism because it explains the removal of opposition in fears of losing votes and consolidating power. Furthermore, universities, many different media companies and civil society organisation have been closed based on suspected links to the Gülenists. According to the authors of this article ‘sweeping purges of the civilian and security bureaucracy will undermine state strength, a critical element of any viable competitive authoritarian regime (69).’ These restrictions relate to course content, showing that Turkey is becoming less-democratic and is shifting closer to authoritarianism but is not quite there yet. The failed coup and authoritarian-like politics are extremely problematic to hopes of Turkish democracy because the AKP ‘amass[ed] an unprecedented level of support and legitimacy (69-70).’ This is reinforced with the overwhelming support post failed coup being used to make the changeover to presidental despite having a poor polling success rate in the past, further consolidating power for Erdogan.

Overall, this article is mainly an informative piece on the failed coup in Turkey, July 5, 2016. The writers’ main goal is to explain the causes and the predicted consequences of the failed coup and its relevance to the political history of Turkey with considerations of future implications. The writers do this by both providing a historical account of the event and using political scientist’s Levitsky and Way to provide a political scientist view on the causes of the event and to analysis Erdogan’s political actions based on the style of the regime he is trying to impose. Towards the end of the article, the claims become somewhat controversial because Turkey is mostly seen as a competitive authoritarianist state, and as a result, debates are made on the degree to which Turkey is authoritarian. This is because elections are run and there is some degree on political pluralism. However, as mentioned in the above paragraph, these effects are waning. However, since the article was made in 2017, it is important to question if things have changed because things may have stabilised slightly after the crisis has been averted.

The claims in the article based on the causes of the failed coup seem credible. This is because they were based on the official events and used a lot of primary sources from people involved in the event. For instance, a lot of the evidence provided came from media sources and official statement about the event. Furthermore, the authors provide context on Turkey’s political history and the standing of the current AKP party regime. This further legitimises the claims and makes their information seem more credible. Moreover, their claims more or less line up with another article on this topic: ‘The Turkish Coup Attempt: The Gülen Movement vs. the State’ by MH Yavuz. This is because both articles address more or less list the same causes for the failed coup attempt. Thus, providing more legitimacy. However, there is one important difference, this being that Esen and Gumuscu fail to provide context on the Gülenist movement and their power in the Turkish government because of the previous alliance and sharing power that occurred with the AKP. Thus, ignoring ‘the symbiotic relations between the Gülen movement and the AKP deteriorated significantly as a result of ongoing conflicts over control of key government positions and the allocation of resources (139).’ Therefore, ignoring the cause of the coup attempt itself and the intricacies of the AKP relationship with the Gülenists. This also provides additional insight into Erdogan’s post-crisis actions based on rooting out corruption from the Gülenist groups. However, Yavuz ultimately comes up with similar conclusions but to a lesser extent, arguing that Erdogan is consolidating power but is not yet authoritarian.

Sources:

Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2017). Turkey: How the coup failed. Journal of Democracy, 28(1), 59–73. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0006

Yavuz, M., & Koç, R. (2016). The Turkish Coup Attempt: The Gülen Movement vs. the State. Middle East Policy, 23(4), 136–148. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12239