EPB #2: How Saudi Crackdowns Fail to Silence Online Dissent

How Saudi Crackdowns Fail to Silence Online Dissent 

Jennifer Pan and Alexandra A. Seigel 

This article outlines the reasons that Saudi Arabia has failed to rein in and control dissent against the regime online. Jennifer Pan and Alexandra Seigel conducted an extensive research experiment which involved analysing millions of tweets from a variety of their perceived “online opinion leaders” in Saudi Arabia. Both those who had been arrested and detained and those who had avoided any direct repression were included. All of who have a record of tweeting critiques about the Saudi monarchy. The authors also analysed the impact that the arrests had on followers of the online opinion leaders and whether this reduced the amount of support of those who had been arrested. 

History of Protest and Dissent in Saudi Arabia 

For context, Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. The royal family controls all important posts in the country, including within the army, which reduces the likelihood of a military coup ever taking place. There are a lack of social movement organizations resulting in a lack of physical offline protests. During the Middle East’s Arab Spring, which saw hundreds of thousands of people protesting and attempting to overthrow regimes. Saudi Arabia’s streets were comparatively empty. In 2011 there were a series of protests led by the Shia minority in the oil producing Eastern Province. Before these protests could gain momentum, the regime responded by immediately banning all protests and marches.[1]

How Saudi Arabia have attempted to eliminate online dissent 

The primary method that the Saudi regime have attempted to use to eliminate online dissent was through the use of repression. This repression included arrest and detainment of the individuals, torture, and threats of violence. 

This repression strategy can be broken down into three categories. 

1.     Direct Deterrence – This occurs when the individual who has been directly targeted by the repression will change their behaviour. 

2.     Indirect Deterrence – Those who observe the repression will alter their behaviour out of fear that they are at risk.

3.     Downstream effect – as the influential individuals change their behaviour their followers will alter their own through a trickle-down approach. 

The main risk that any regime who uses repression as a deterrent is that it will backfire and generate backlash amongst other leaders and their followers. 

Results from the Research 

Direct Deterrence 

Overall the study found that the Saudi regime was not successful in eliminating dissent online by using offline repression. 

The only group that the study saw a real change in was from the online opinion leaders who were imprisoned. The study found that their online activity overall decreased following their release from prison. The content that they continued to post was also substantially different to what they posted prior to incarceration. For the most part they no longer critiqued the state and halted calls for reform of the regime. Some stopped posting entirely while others began to post pro state propaganda. Those who began to post positive content of the Saudi regime also say some downstream effects towards their followers who continued to engage with their online presence. 

The finding that direct deterrence was successful in preventing online dissent is in contrast to findings within democratic contexts whish shows that repression will generate backlash from the target. The authors believe that this is likely a consequence of Saudi’s high level of repression, there are no social mobilization organisations for individuals to hide behind, the established culture and social norms go against criticising the regime. The future risk of repression is high, much more likely than in a democratic context where we can presume rights to freedom of expression are more widely available. There are also likely threats not just towards the individual but to family and associates. 

The failure of Indirect Deterrence 

However, the overall trend of supporters and followers of the imprisoned online opinion leaders remained opposed to the regime. Repression increased criticisms of not just the Saudi monarchy but their religious authority, institutions and policies. The regime experienced a large degree of backlash of people online calling for political and social change with people calling for a change in regime from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy or a democracy. The research reported that there was a spike in tweets referencing the individual who had been arrested right after they were imprisoned. The data also found that of the 32,504,397 million tweets engaging with the imprisoned leaders, 28.4% engaged only after their arrests which is likely a result of public outrage following the arrest. This exemplifies that the repression has only increased the exposure of the problem to a larger audience creating more backlash for the regime. This increase in engagement and backlash amongst supporters is attributed by the authors to the fact that posting on social media is deemed low risk. The risk of repression for a single supporter is very low. This is a positive aspect of social media in that it creates an accessible platform on which all people have the ability to voice opinions without fear of the consequences. 

The study also analysed google searches within Saudi Arabia. The authors believe that this may show a more accurate portrayal of how the public view the regime as they are not worried about their perception or safety from posting controversial and potentially illegal views publicly. There was a large increase in the popularity of Saudi google searches following the imprisonment of leaders. 

The study also found that other online opinion leaders who had a similar platform to the imprisoned leaders were not deterred. Despite being the group most at risk after seeing the arrests of their peers they continued to tweet and publicly call out the regime voicing support for political and social reforms. The content and quantity of the tweets remained the same. Activists and clerics frequently denounced the arrests of their friends and colleagues and did not appear to be scared or deterred from online dissent. 

Can this apply to other non democratic regimes? 

The ability of Saudis to dissent to the Saudi monarchy and regime online may not necessarily be available to all other dictatorship regimes. 

For example, in China, Chinese social media platforms carry out censorship requests for the Chinese government to prevent online movements from going viral. In Saudi Arabia Twitter does not necessarily comply with censorship requests. In 2013 the Minister of Information admitted that they do not have the capacity to monitor twitter due to the large number of users. 

Future of Saudi Arabia 

The authors believe that the use of repression may have been just one strategy of the monarchy to silence online protestors. There is a chance that they will invest in establishing a censorship system as thorough as China, they certainly have the monetary ability to fund this. 

They may also adopt other methods to deal with the problem. In late 2017 there was a purge of around 500 businesspeople, princes, government ministers and activists; an increase in death sentences and targeting of those living abroad.

As we have discussed throughout the course, the general trend for change in regime and leaders under nondemocratic regimes comes from within the ruling elite.[2] However, as shown in this study the regime still views outsiders and the general public as a threat. The masses have power and when acting collectively have a real ability to create change. While Saudi Arabians continue to use twitter and other forms of social media to dissent to the regime there is hope for change. 

However, there are other potentially bigger issues at play for Saudi Arabia which are standing in the way of social and political reform. Many Saudis are content with the current system. They may have restricted rights, but the regime provides free education, healthcare and in 2018  $13 billion was distributed among the population to appease the people after taxes were lifted .[3] All policies aimed at keeping the population placated. Saudi Arabia also fits the mould of Michael Ross’ “oil curse”. Ross claims that countries which are rich in oil have the ability for authoritarian regimes to succeed for longer.[4] The monarch in Saudi Arabia are able to use their resources to control the population easier than can be done in lower income states. 

Another problem that Saudi Arabia faces is that the monarch’s power is transitioning to a system of personal rule. 2020 has seen a purge of many high-level members of Saudi Arabia’s royal family.[5] As we have discussed in the course a purge of other high-level officials who could be threats is a sign of Personal rule. With even greater accumulation of power at the hands of the monarchy the ability of the population to overthrow the regime decreases. It will be interesting to see if this increase in personal power will turn others against King Salman, generating further opposition online. 

References Used

Chulov, M., & Kirchgaessner, S. (2020, March 8). Saudi Arabia releases images of King Salman after purge of royals. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/08/saudi-arabia-releases-images-king-salman-amid-purge-royals

Márquez Xavier. (2017). Non-democratic politics authoritarianism, dictatorship, and democratization. London: Palgrave, an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited.

Pan, J., & Siegel, A. A. (2019). How Saudi Crackdowns Fail to Silence Online Dissent. American Political Science Review, 114(1), 109–125. doi: 10.1017/s0003055419000650

Perper, R. (2018, January 8). Saudi Arabia is giving many of its citizens thousands of dollars for free. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com.au/saudi-arabia-giving-citizens-13-billion-hand-out-2018-1?r=US&IR=T

Ross, M. L. (2015). What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? Annual Review of Political Science, 18(1), 239–259. doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359

Saudi Arabia imposes ban on all protests. (2011, March 5). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12656744

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[1] Saudi Arabia imposes ban on all protests. (2011, March 5). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12656744

[2] Xavier Márquez. (2017). Non-democratic politics authoritarianism, dictatorship, and democratization. London: Palgrave, an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited at 171. 

[3] R. Perper. (2018, January 8). Saudi Arabia is giving many of its citizens thousands of dollars for free. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com.au/saudi-arabia-giving-citizens-13-billion-hand-out-2018-1?r=US&IR=T

[4] Michael L. Ross  (2015). What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? Annual Review of Political Science, 18(1), 239–259. doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359

[5] M. Chulov, & S. Kirchgaessner, (2020, March 8). Saudi Arabia releases images of King Salman after purge of royals. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/08/saudi-arabia-releases-images-king-salman-amid-purge-royals