EBP: An Autopsy of Managed Democracy

Ivan Krastev & Stephen Holmes

This article gives an insight on the unravellings of "Managed Democracy" in Putin's Russia. Krastev and Holmes provide a detailed account of how Putin's corrupt regime has impacted Russian social life and the citizen's democratic rights. 

Putin violates the terms of his managed democracy in various ways. Some of these include the Kremlin's intentional work in providing unappealing candidates to run against Putin, making him seem like the better (only) presidential alternative; ballot stuffing (caught on tape in the most recent election); absurd usage of propaganda, portraying Putin as "heroic", to encourage support from the Russian people (and to reinforce the concept of power); and finally, Putin holds periodic "elections" to 'exaggerate Russia's unity and dramatize the coherence and solidarity of Putin's nation'.

Reasons why Putin puts his faith in rigged elections include that they grant him the ability to exercise control on the country's elite. It is also less of an inconvenience for him to "engineer" elections than to 'build roads or socialize the Chechen youth.' Although, economic disparities (“60 percent of Russian households either no better off or poorer than they were twenty years ago) and an increasing morality rate (“European birth rates and African life expectancies”) show weakness in his methods. Rigged elections conceal Putin's gain of power and revenue through the exploitation and selling of Russia's natural resources. Lastly, doctored polling allows Putin to control the country without physical intimidation of the masses (unlike many authoritarian regimes).

Scholars have speculated that Putin's regime is a careful blend of democratic and authoritarian principles: it does not fit the description of a democracy due to its blatant lack of free and fair elections (among other things), and it is not classically authoritarian, as the foundations of Putin's governance are not built upon repression.

The authors disagree with other scholars (several are specified in the text, including Lilia Shevtsova and Vitali Silitski), in that Putin's regime is an "imitation democracy”, or a "pseudo democracy" (to name a few). Krastev and Holmes also report that rigged elections are only "decorative" or "vestigial", in that they are not used to convince anyone of democratic intentions, and have been used as a useful tool in the survival of the regime. They have this effect as Putin has never tried to convince anyone differently of how unfair and undemocratic the system is; that no Russian citizen has ever been deceived into thinking they actually had a say in the blatantly predetermined elections.

Concerning the riots, Putin really brought them on himself. This happened by allowing the public to see how transparent his goals for Russia's political future were. The lack of impersonal institutions authorized under Putin's rule deprived the both himself and the anti-Putin forces of necessary support, and the revolutionist organisations (many assembled via the internet) still haven't managed to gain a stronghold within in the Duma, or develop a political party. People of the Russian 'middle class' were inclined to take to the streets when they came to realise that there was no stable political future beyond Putin, no alternative to their current meglomanical leader, and that there wouldn't be without strong intervention.

The only reason the protests have quietened since the 2011 elections, is that Putin realised his position in power was threatened, and began to show support for the less-modernized capacities of Russia, gaining support from more rural citizens of the country (those less influenced by the technological outreaches of the anti-Putin advocates).

The article namely focuses on the analysis of Putin's dying regime, an autopsy of his previously managed democracy. The author's did not make any particularly controversial or far-fetched comments on Putin's political blunders, but as previously noted, they noted disagreement with other scholars on the extent of how the fixed elections impacted his country and government.
The interpretations of Russia's political future seem fairly accurate, in that at this point, there is no ideal/perfect candidate to take Putin's place in government. This idea is also touched upon by scholars like Dale R. Herspring in his edition of the book “Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain”, which provides insight on the predictions of experts as to what is to come for Russia’s political future.
The sources used to back claims in the article are seemingly genuine, citing figures from recognized institutions (i.e. Moscow Higher School of Economics), and reference the work of other scholars throughout the piece. Conclusions drawn from their findings are common throughout the field of political science, especially those in agreement of Putin’s complete disregard of democratic liberty for his people (i.e the lack of free and fair elections), yet his blatant indifference in trying to hide this fact.

As further thought, I would be interested to know people's thoughts on whether, with a new and much improved president, the country could successfully operate with a truly democratic government, or if the corruption of Putin's former reign would influence more foul play to take place within the Kremlin, given how easily Putin got his own way for as many years as he did.

Additional Sources

Dale R. Herspring, third edition. Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain. United States of America: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers inc, 2007.