Shattered Illusions Remain [EBP]

[EBP 1]

Reading: Young, Crawford. 1994. Zaïre: the Shattered Illusion of the Integral State. The Journal of Modern African Studies 32 (02): 247-263

From Belgian colonialism, through independence, violence, and nationalist strife of the Lumumbist years, to the downward spiral of Mobutu’s kleptocratic despotism for thirty-two years, Crawford Young accounts the seeds, rise, and ruin of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). Young focuses on the nature of the integral state examining historical transitions of different models in Zaire, the interwoven influences of colonisation and nationalism, and politico-economic structures that constructed and deconstructed Zaire. The tumultuous rise and decline of Zaire is Young’s case study to conclude the integral state a ‘flawed notion’, evident in the spectacular decomposition of both the Leopoldian and Mobutist states.

THE INTEGRAL STATE is a notion of rule. A reformative project of “acting more directly upon civil society through its ‘hegemonic apparatuses’” (Young, 249), the integral state seeks to supplant the ‘soft state’. The soft state, coined by Scandinavian economist Gunnar Myrdal, is characterised by a “general lack of social discipline in underdeveloped countries… [with] deficiencies in their legislation and… law observance and enforcement… [and] corruption”. Contrarily, the integral state is perfected hegemony of unrestricted state domination over civil society” (Young, 249). It requires autonomy from civil society gained by widespread political apparatus for control and monopoly over socio-economic domains of accumulation. The colonial legacy of previous state and governance structures dictates “exclusion rather than incorporation” (Young, 249).

Young separates the transition of integral state types into three historical models: the Belgian, Lumumbist, and Mobutist model.

1. Belgian Model

The Congo was a Belgian colonial project constructing a “skeletal framework of hegemony” (Young, 251) in order to claim it’s stake in the Congo. Congo, abundant in natural resources of, initially, ivory and rubber (and later mining), was appropriated by taxation and conscription imposed through brutality and intimidation (p. 251). However, a theory of hegemony only emerged through formalised Belgian rule in 1908 (p. 252). A provincial grid of European administration systematised central infrastructure, judicially enforced after the Decree of 24 July 1918 that assigned provincial agents with unconditional power for discipline (p. 252).Direction and control of African labour was crucial for state purposes, obtained through violence and forced labour. Male civilians were mere “functional unit[s] of labour” (Young, 253). The undoing of the Belgian model rests on the 1959 rioting in Kinshasa, resulting in a “discredited colonial regime [that] suffered a spiralling deflation of its authority” (Young, 256). With stark division between the state and nationalist parties, the imperative was aggressive and clear; immediate independence.

2. Lumumbist Model

The Mouvement national congolais-Lumumbad, deemed the “most consequential of nationalist parties” envisioned an integral state which fused “the centralised, bureaucratic force of the colonial state with a political over layer” driven by “radical populist nationalist thought” (Young, 227).  1956 onwards, nationalism strove for independence, which the Lumumbist party saw itself a necessary core structure of envisioned independent state (p. 258)  However European leadership remained for the newly-constructed political superstructure that was over existing colonial state apparatus (p. 258). Mutiny soon ensued from the army’s soldiers, fuelled by the probable unrewarded status in this new construct. Consequentially, the post-colonial state structure crumpled, with an “instant deflation of its power and authority” (Young, 259).  Many of Lumumbist nationalism and corresponding political structures would be appropriated by Mobutu under his reign. But Lumumbism never itself came into fruition, remaining a decaying idea.

3. Mobutist Model

Civil unrest after the Lumumbist model collapse precipitated Mobutu’s solution: “a restoration of the powerful unitary state” since the “very existence of the Nation was threatened” (Young, 260). The Belgian model provided a “doctrinal vessel” (Young, 260);  provinces closely resembled their colonial counterparts, and administration, stemming from presidency, reintegrated as a single hierarchical apparatus [260-261]. Theoretically Zaire possessed most conventional organs of a modern republic: separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. However the reality of function was different. Mobutu’s system was patrimonial; a traditional political system where government is personal with administration extending from the ruler. The individual national leader controls political and economic life, and personal relationships with the leader play a crucial role in amassing personal wealth or in the rise and decline of members of the political elite [1]. By 1967 Mobutu gave the country a new constitution (passed by 98 percent of voters in a 1967 referendum), which centralised executive powers in the president (who was head of state, head of government, commander in chief of the armed forces and police, and in charge of foreign policy) [2].

Mobutu’s party was the Popular Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution [MPR]) founded in 1967, and held political monopoly as the “supreme instrument” (Young, 261). It marked the emergence of "the national politically organized”. Rather than originating from the state, the state originated from the party. Consequentially, party and administrative responsibilities merged into a single framework, extending the party’s role to “all administrative organs at the central and provincial levels, as well as to the trade unions, youth movements, and student organizations” [3]. The MPR became “the sole legitimate vehicle for participating in the political life of the country” [4].

Mobutu embodied a “political trinity” of state, party and doctrine, manifesting nationalism and patriotism. The phenomenon of Mobutism arose. The three main tenets of Mobutism were nationalism, revolution and authenticity. Nationalism signified economic independence, revolution the rejection of capitalism and communism, and authenticity, which derived from the party’s doctrine of "authentic Zairian nationalism and condemnation of regionalism and tribalism" [5]. Change to reflect these ideological shifts - commonly termed zaireanisation - included switching the country’s name from Congo to the Republic of Zaire, and mandatory change of Christian to Zairan names for all citizens [6]. Mobutu, previously Joseph Mobutu, became Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu Wa Za Banga ('the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, sweeps from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake') [7].

Rise of Mobutu - Spotlight on ascent to power

CIVIC INSTABILITY and secession movements where fear, violence, and corruption ruled were key socio-political factors in Mobutu’s rise to power. It sowed the seeds for a leviathan-like state resurrection, promising a way out of the conflict and a unified rally of nationalism still fresh from Congan independence in 1960. Mobutu himself called the first republic pure "chaos, disorder, negligence, and incompetence" [8] in justification for his 1965 coup, offering an alternative vision (Mobutism), promising stability, which he provided for the people in his first few years.

1960 Coup d’etat

With Congan independence in 1960, the coalition government of President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba ruled, with Mobutu appointed Army Chief of Staff [9]. During the Katangan secession, tensions arose quickly between President and Prime Minister. The dispute presided over Lumumba’s recommendation of force for central government to regain control over Katanga. After consistent opposition from Kasavubu, Lumumba appealed “to the Soviet Union for logistical assistance to send troops" [10], fusing  the Congo with East-West tension of the Cold War. Fragmentation and a struggle for power between Lumumba and Kasavubu resulted in Mobutu seizing power in a coup d’état, declaring the army would rule aided by a caretaker government [11].  

1965 Coup d’etat

In 1965 however, Commander in Chief Mobutu staged another coup, deposing President Joseph Kasavubu, “ending a power struggle that had been going on since independence” [12]. He was aided by the CIA with “guns, money, jet fighters and pilots during and after the coup, according to CIA veterans. "During the 1960s, there were projects in the CIA that were, in essence, the Mobutu project," said a former U.S. official who studied Mobutu for 15 years. "We bought or rented him. He was paid for his loyalty and paid others for their loyalty… The entire political framework that created Mobutu was one of corruption" [13].

FOREIGN INTERVENTION began in Brussels 1959, when the CIA met 29-year-old army sergeant Mobutu. From 1960, Mobutu (who was seen as favorably disposed to U.S. policy) began work with the CIA to kill the new prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. The CIA wanted Lumumba, a perceived 'Soviet pawn' because of Lumumba’s appeal for Soviet help, gone. What resulted were two CIA failed attempts to kill Lumumba. Only through the aid of the CIA did Mobutu arrest Lumumba and initiate his coup.

Rule of Mobutu - Spotlight on power maintenance

Mobutu went on to “court and win the support of western leaders, and financial institutions, who saw him as a convenient anti- communist leader” [14]. For the next three decades however, Mobutu robbed his country, taking government revenue for personal pleasure. His personal fortune peaked $5 billion. Mobutu's legacy is a bankrupt country.

Mobutu’s ECONOMIC GAIN was incredible. Zaire's political history is steeped in kleptocracy. Belgium’s King Leopold II lined his pockets with export profits from natural resource. Mobutu’s wealth was achieved through CIA and UN funding during the Katangan secession and expropriation by “blurring the distinction between public and private funds, dipping often into the national treasury” [15]. One main source was the Gecamines, a nationalised mining resource. This wealth played a critical political role in buying out both allies and enemies.

POLITICAL ADEPTNESS of Mobutu is evident in his divide and conquer tactics. He continuously rotated top political personnel and purged army officers, generating insecurity and compliance in political circles. Even when he was pressured by international democracies like the USA to democratise, Mobutu created an electoral formula that “permitted a noisy and expensive electoral campaign” [16] but was a facade and a sham. It only served as a distraction for the public and political elite, making no change on the distribution of power.

ARMY SUPPORT was drawn through money and freedom. Mobutu either paid them out [17] or allowed freedom of actions, like “the right to plunder whole regions of the country and certain sectors of the economy” [18]. The threat of constant purge was ever present for officers, which kept them compliant.

POVERTY AND FEAR ruled the majority population, with severe food shortages, economic ruin, and social instability and periodic violence. Anarchy ensued. Yet these conditions were effective for Mobutu, where this deliberate destabilization discredits “movement toward democracy and… [undermines] the capacity of the people to mobilize against him” [19]. This, coupled with Mobutu’s monopoly on guns and money, kept the people at bay. Commonplace features of Mobutu’s reign were jailing and torture of political enemies.

Is Zaire an integral state?

By historical account, yes. Mobutu achieved a complete autonomy of the political system from civil society, centralising the power by his one party and 1974 constitution, which excluded the nation. Mobutu also monopolised the social domains by having party presence at all levels, and direct control over regional governance, and by centralising and nationalising natural resource pools. Mobutu even took it one step further to deny the people much of the accumulation of national wealth, using it for himself and his own purposes. However Zaire lapsed into a soft state form towards the end and after, Mobutu. The soft state’s nature Myrdal blamed predominantly on colonial power, which displaced local power centres and influence with no alternative during colonisation and implementation of strong central government. Thus “the soft state was incapable of imposing the necessary priorities for development and was generally unwilling to act decisively against corruption at any level” [20]. Mobutu, at least for much of his reign, didn’t implement necessary developmental policies and in himself was corrupt, let along tackling corruption. Zaire, from the end of colonial rule was a soft state, flickering in and out of that form until Mobutu took charge, and then in and out again during the second half of Mobutu's reign until the end. This could be put down to the fundamentally flawed notion of the integral state, and the poor relationship between state and civil society.

Is the integral state a good form of government structure?

Young states that the integral state is a flawed notion. It certainly didn’t work out for Mobutu. Interestingly though, Young supports his idea by noting the “astonishing collapse of regimes in the former Soviet bloc whose design, although in some respects more far-reaching, none the less bore a family resemblance to the integral state” (Young, 263). If this is true, then perhaps other case examples support this idea. Examining the tumultuous history of Zaire and with indication from Soviet states and their current troubled state, it is at least initially right to agree with Young.

Bibliography

Berkley, Bill. 1993. Zaire: An African Horror Story. The Atlantic Monthly 272 (02): pp. 20-28 http://www.theatlantic.com/past/unbound/flashbks/rwanda/zaire.htm

Exeter. Politics and the Role of the State. Lecture 9: The Role of State Development. Issue V. http://people.exeter.ac.uk/aebooth/dev_world_lect09/dw_lect9_politics.htm

Gascoigne, Bamber. 2001 ongoing. History of The Democratic Republic of Congo: Congo Free State: 1885-1908.   HistoryWorld.  http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad34#ixzz3UOdtEhht

Library of Congress. 1993. Zaire: The Second Republic, 1965-90: The Rebirth of Bula Matari http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cstdy:1:./temp/~frd_bxg7::

Library of Congress. 1993. Zaire: The Party-State as A System of Rule. Country Studies. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+zr0147%29

Utley, Garrick. 1997. The Root's of Zaire's Unrest. CNN http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/02/zaire.essay/index.html#mobutu

Weiner, Tim. 1991. America's Ally Mobutu Thrives on Corruption as his Nation Crumbles. Inquirer Washington Bureau. http://articles.philly.com/1991-10-30/news/25812893_1_president-mobutu-sese-seko-zaire-kinshasa-last-week

Wiese, Bernd Michael. 2014. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Mobutu's Regime . Encyclopaedia Britinnaca http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132363/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-DRC/40815/Mobutus-regime

Young, Crawford. 1978. Critical Countries:  Zaïre: The Unending Crisis. Foreign Affairs 57 (01) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/29939/crawford-young/critical-countries-zaire-the-unending-crisis

Young, Crawford. 1994. Zaïre: the Shattered Illusion of the Integral State. The Journal of Modern African Studies 32 (02): 247-263

Videos

1. African Film Library. 2009. Mobutu, King of Zaire https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCJ1x_If8mw

2. Democracy Now! Archives. 2011. Patrice Lumumba: The U.S.-Backed Assassination of Congo's First Democratically-Elected Leader https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1fJckuXzpc

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[1] 1993. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structure of Government. http://www.photius.com/countries/congo_democratic_republic_of_the/government/congo_democratic_republic_of_the_government_structure_of_governm~51.html

[2] Library of Congress. Zaire: The Party-State as A System of Rule. Country Studies. December 1993 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+zr0147%29

[3] Ibid

[4] Young, Crawford. 1978. Critical Countries:  Zaïre: The Unending Crisis. Foreign Affairs 57 (01) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/29939/crawford-young/critical-countries-zaire-the-unending-crisis

[5] Library of Congress. Zaire: The Party-State as A System of Rule. Country Studies. December 1993 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+zr0147%29

[6] Ibid

[7] Gascoigne, Bamber. 2001 ongoing. History of The Democratic Republic of Congo: Congo Free State: 1885-1908.   HistoryWorld.  http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad34#ixzz3UOdtEhht

[8] Library of Congress. 1993. Zaire: The Second Republic, 1965-90: The Rebirth of Bula Matari http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cstdy:1:./temp/~frd_bxg7::

[9] Wiese, Bernd Michael. 2014. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Mobutu's Regime . Encyclopaedia Britinnaca http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132363/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-DRC/40815/Mobutus-regime

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] Utley, Garrick. 1997. The Root's of Zaire's Unrest. CNN http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/02/zaire.essay/index.html#mobutu

[13] Weiner, Tim. 1991. America's Ally Mobutu Thrives on Corruption as his Nation Crumbles. Inquirer Washington Bureau. http://articles.philly.com/1991-10-30/news/25812893_1_president-mobutu-sese-seko-zaire-kinshasa-last-week

[14] Utley, Garrick. 1997. The Root's of Zaire's Unrest. CNN http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/02/zaire.essay/index.html#mobutu

[15] Young, Crawford. 1978. Critical Countries:  Zaïre: The Unending Crisis. Foreign Affairs 57 (01) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/29939/crawford-young/critical-countries-zaire-the-unending-crisis

[16] Ibid

[17] Berkley, Bill. 1993. Zaire: An African Horror Story. The Atlantic Monthly 272 (02): pp. 20-28 http://www.theatlantic.com/past/unbound/flashbks/rwanda/zaire.htm

[18] Wiese, Bernd Michael. 2014. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Mobutu's Regime . Encyclopaedia Britinnaca http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132363/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-DRC/40815/Mobutus-regime

[19] Berkley, Bill. 1993. Zaire: An African Horror Story. The Atlantic Monthly 272 (02): pp. 20-28 http://www.theatlantic.com/past/unbound/flashbks/rwanda/zaire.htm

[20] Exeter. Politics and the Role of the State. Lecture 9: The Role of State Development. Issue V. http://people.exeter.ac.uk/aebooth/dev_world_lect09/dw_lect9_politics.htm