Hi everyone,
This isn't an EBP, I was just curious to see what people thought about this article in from Foreign Affairs from last July titled 'Coup-Proofing for Dummies'. The main thrust is that Iraq's last PM, Nouri al-Maliki, actively undermined the Iraqi army for fear that if it became too strong it could overthrow him in a military coup.
Specifically, I was interested in the idea of accountability mechanisms. We've learned in class that democratic political competition means rulers worry about certain mechanisms of accountability (ie voting) while non-democratic political competition leaders worry about other mechanisms much more (ie military coups).
In fledgling/transitional democracies (is that even what Iraq is?), do leaders have to worry about a combination of the usually separate accountability mechanisms? Ie do they have to worry both about voting but also coups?
What implication does the suggestion that the army in Iraq has been/maybe still is being undermined by the leader of the country have for its ability to transition to democracy?
This is obviously an important question in the context of New Zealand sending troops to train the Iraqi Army.
Excellent question, Cameron!
ReplyDeleteThere are several examples of rulers undermining their own army because they fear coups; Zaire is the classic example, where Mobutu so undermined his own army that he had to be rescued several times by foreign forces when small insurgencies threatened to unseat him, since his army became so useless. (We'll talk about Mobutu next week).
In Iraq the problem might be that al-Maliki was pretty certain of dominating any elections (since Shias are a majority in Iraq) but not so certain of surviving a coup. So he might have focused on army accountability at the expense of electoral accountability.
I am not sure that Almaliki's fear of coup had lead him into undermining his own army,but he was afraid of fellow suni minority.Almaliki deliberatily undermined the army turning it from national army to secterian.
ReplyDeleteAnother factor for Iraqi army fragilness was that all the senior Shia clerkis were allowed to have their own mini army(militants),these militants were involved in kidnapping and killing Iraqi citizens especially Sunnis,which force Sunnis to respond through uprising.
Almaliki responding through chasing and crashing those who stood up,but finally the army couldnt hold its ground instead it was collapsed within few days in clashes with tribal millitants and finally ISIS took advantage perfectly and filled the vacume.
Good point Ibrahim - though he could be afraid of both things - making the army too powerful, and giving too much weight to the Sunnis. The more Sunnis in the army, from his perspective, the higher the risk of a coup. Having multiple security agencies -militias, etc. - it's standard procedure for rulers afraid of their own army.
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