Authoritarian Durability and Democratic Institutions

[Contributory BP] 

This Washington Post article by Dr Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Assistant Professor Erica Frantz is a useful summary (with good links to academic works) to previous and ongoing questions presented in this paper, namely:

1. “How should we think about these elections – and the presence of other seemingly democratic institutions like political parties and legislatures – in non-democratic regimes?”
2. “Why do leaders of authoritarian countries allow pseudo-democratic institutions?”

The article’s thesis is “that democratic institutions are not just features of regimes that sit closest to democracy on the democracy-autocracy spectrum. Democratic institutions are now almost universal, and the ways in which authoritarian incumbents use them are contributing to the increased durability of contemporary dictatorships” (emphasis added). In short, democratic institutions are being used and manipulated by authoritarian incumbents in ways that increase the durability of their regimes.

Kendall-Taylor and Frantz provide links to a recent article in the Washington Quarterly containing data on autocracies globally from 1946-2012 to back up their thesis. The figure they provide exhibits “increasing durability of authoritarian regimes, particularly in the post-Cold War period. From 1946 to 1989, the average authoritarian regime lasted 12 years.” At the Cold War end, the number increased to 20. “Today, the typical autocracy has been in power for 25 years”.

They go on to state a few reasons why, most of which have been presented in our class; that “these institutions create a democratic façade, enabling authoritarian leaders to maintain international and domestic legitimacy”, and by adopting democratic institutions like “elections and the legalization of opposition parties” they can attract “international aid and investment, both critical to keeping their regimes afloat”. Part in parcel as well is the post-Cold War political climate where the fall of communism precipitated a political shift, instigating “authoritarian regimes’ assessment that the adoption of democratic institutions is essential to maintaining domestic legitimacy.” Further, “leaders understand that institutional manipulation offers greater advantages and fewer liabilities than reliance on traditional tactics like overt repression, which forces compliance with the regime through brute force, but risks creating popular discontent that can lead to destabilizing unrest.” I would add that increasing advancements in technology and access to the web and through it, greater information and understanding of their own situation comparatively, as well as increasing instances of geopolitical influence (both give and take), contributes to the environment of greater liability with overt repression. Kendall-Taylor and Frantz state, “incorporating seemingly democratic institutions mitigates some of these risks by providing a leader with alternative methods of control” promoting citizen participation on the authoritarian regime’s terms.

The repercussions politically are the likely negative affect on “the trajectory of democracy worldwide”; a consequence of longer-lasting autocracies is the potential proliferation of the number of authoritarian regimes “as some countries inevitably backslide from democracy to autocracy” due to a cross-border diffusion of the regime types. An “’autocratising’ momentum” could occur.

Kendall-Taylor and Frantz recommend that, equipped with a better understanding of dynamics underpinning authoritarian durability, “policymakers can devise more targeted approaches to enhance the potential for these institutions to serve the democratic functions for which they were created.” Further to this I believe it would be fruitful to look at how these democratic institutions are manipulated; the sort of political and civic administrative/policy-based/functional corruption that occurs, contributing to the manipulation of the system, and measures to prevent them. If, as it is suggested, pseudo-democratic institutions that are being manipulated contribute to authoritarian regime durability, then it seems to me that the issue is systemic, and should be treated accordingly, with systemic considerations like political corruption explored and addressed. An interesting further question is, are there any other instances where democratic institutions or, (linked to our recent discussions) values and culture helps to support authoritarian durability?