Export Revolution: CANVAS [EBP]

[EBP 2]

Reading: Tina Rosenberg, ‘Revolution U’, Foreign Policy, February 17, 2011 http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/17/revolution-u-2/

Tina Rosenberg’s Foreign Policy article, Revolution U, begins with a lesson from the Egyptian revolution on the limitations of developing mass mobilization means - the Internet and Social Media. Botched first protests resulting from social media’s limits inspired a trip and subsequent connection with the Serbian group CANVAS (Centre for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies), who sprung out of the Serbian revolution. Rosenberg looks at the Serbs own experience of nonviolent action and revolution, as well as interaction with Burmese activists. But underlying all this activity is the work and ideas of Gene Sharp, prominent nonviolent social change strategist. Sharp’s ideas are the basis of CANVAS’s work, which took them on board and put them into practice, forming it into a handbook for nonviolent action. Rosenberg’s article looks at some of CANVAS’s theoretical tools like power graphs, ideas like pillars of support, and practical strategies like dilemma actions. To better understand these ideas, I expand on them and introduce supplementary ideas like political power and its sources, and obedience, drawing from CANVAS’s own core curriculum. I illustrate the ideas with examples Rosenberg includes about the Serbian revolution group Otpor.

Page 26 of the Egyptian revolution action plan.

Early 2008, government-owned textile factory workers announced they were striking in protest of high food prices and low wages. Young tech-savvy people started a Facebook group to organize the April 6 protests throughout Egypt. But despite a massive and sudden following on Facebook, “what worked so smoothly online proved much more difficult on the street” [1]. Police occupied the factory and headed off the strike; demonstrations turned violent. Though people knew they wanted to act, no one was clear about what action to take, and the Facebook organizers never agreed on tactics. This was an “object lesson in the limits of social networking as a tool of democratic revolution. Facebook could bring together tens of thousands of sympathizers online, but it couldn’t organize them once they logged off. It was a useful communication to call people to – well, to what?” [2] This prompted Egyptian activist and blogger Mohamed Adel to travel to Serbia and meet CANVAS. Tools like the Internet can increase the amplification of ideas and provide new ways for people to mass mobilize. But for all its speed and efficiency, the Egyptian example illustrates the limits of the Internet and that, without proper planning, meetings, or movement coherency and clarity, no amount of will changes anything. Further, sites like Facebook can also alert the regime to planned actions and events. Clearly there’s more to a successful revolution.

CANVAS “has built a durable blueprint for nonviolent revolution: what to do to grow a vanload of people into a mass movement and then use those masses to topple a dictator” [3]. It “stresses unity, discipline, and planning” [4]. They “prefer to work with rookies” [5]; the theory being that “established parties and organizations under a dictator are usually too tired and tainted to be able to topple him, and that hope rests instead with idealistic outsiders, often students” [7]. CANVAS has gone on to export revolution by training activist enthusiasts living under authoritarian regimes globally. What they engage in are contentious politics. That is, interactions where “actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests” (contention), “leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interest”, (collective action) “in which governments are involved as targets, initiators… or third parties” [8] (Tilly, p. 4) (politics). The presence or absence of governments is key because “people who control governments gain advantages over people who don’t” [9] (Tilly, p. 5), “governments always make rules governing contention: who can make collective claims, by what means, with what outcomes” [10] (Tilly, p. 5), and “governments control substantial coercive means: armies, police forces, courts, prisons” [11] (Tilly, p. 5) etc. CANVAS then creates effective strategies in which to successfully engage for reform. To effectively act and plan, it is important to understand political power sources that support rulers and their regime, obedience – since a regime stays in power through its subjects’ obedience – and why people obey, and an important theoretical analysis tool – a power graph – to help visualize power and where it’s concentrated in societal groups/areas.

The ultimate aim is POLITICAL POWER. Sharp defines political power as “the totality of means, influences, and pressures — including authority, rewards, and sanctions — available to achieve the objectives of the power-holder, especially those of government, the state, and those groups in opposition”. [12] (CANVAS, p. 25) This power is dependent on people. Rulers depend on the six sources of power (below); pillars of support; and people’s continual obedience in order to rule. [13] (CANVAS, p. 58) The six sources of power are authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, material resources, intangible factors, and sanctions. Authority is “the position to give orders, combined with people’s belief that those orders” are sanctioned.  Human resources are “persons and groups that obey, cooperate with, or assist the ruler.” Skills and knowledge are “needed by the ruler and supplied by cooperating groups and citizens.” Material resources are things like “control of or access to property, natural resources, financial resources, and means of communication and transportation. A ruler’s power is related to the amount of material resources that are under his/her control.” The larger the sphere under the ruler’s control containing these resources, the more power a ruler has. Intangible factors are “the group of habits, attitudes, traditional values, and psychological, cultural, religious and sometimes ideological factors that may induce people to obey and assist the rulers.” Sanctions are “the enforcement of obedience through punishments, either threatened or applied, to ensure the submission and cooperation that are needed for a ruler to carry out his/her policies and to maintain control.” Fear “that sanctions create in others is often more powerful than” actual sanctions’ use. The “possibility or threat of sanctions, such as being fired, arrested or physically abused for disobedience” can be the source of power. [14] (CANVAS, pp. 29-30) 

OBEDIENCE is the “most important single quality of any government, without which it would not exist.” and “is at the heart of political power” [15] (CANVAS, p. 46). To motivate people to withdraw their consent from it, it’s crucial to understand the source of people’s obedience. CANVAS cite ten possibilities (found in full [16] (CANVAS, pp.46-50)). I look at the most important four: habit, fear of sanctions, absence of self-confidence, and majority. Most people are conditioned to obey authority in society from childhood; obey parents in the home, teachers at school, superiors at work. It becomes habitual; “we obey the laws, and the people in uniform who represent them. We even obey symbols of authority”. So, “breaking the obedience habit is a difficult task... Both the decision to stop, and reiteration about why it is so important to stop, are constantly required.” [17] (CANVAS, pp. 46-47) A “strong reason why people obey is fear of punishment. Violation of a law or rule can result in a variety of sanctions like paying fines, harassment, losing one’s job or position, imprisonment or even execution. Having a’criminal record’ can obstruct obtainment of standard citizen benefits. The “most powerful function of sanctions is often the fear that they produce in others” [18] (CANVAS, p. 47) which keeps others obedient. After continuous oppression, people can lack self-confidence in their ability to make change. Through a lack of decision-making experience and limited opportunities for developing alternative leadership, oppressive regimes often use this to promote the incumbent leadership as the ‘best qualified’ to make decisions for the people. However, a long history of making decisions does not equate to ‘best qualified’. A movement’s key success-factor is to “restore the public’s confidence in its abilities to make logical, sound decisions and to take effective actions that can bring positive change. It is also important that the nonviolent movement continuously remind the public that it is the people who provide political power and therefore they can take it back.” [19] (CANVAS, pp. 48-49) Lastly, because people see the majority behaving in a certain way, others might conform. If “peer and social pressure can be a powerful influence on behavior” [20] (CANVAS, p. 50) it is important to create a solidarity of the people in the movement.

Illustration from CANVAS on pillars of support.

One way to visualize a government “is like a building held up by pillars.” [21] These PILLARS OF SUPPORT are “institutions and sections of the society that supply the existing regime with sources of power required for maintenance and expansion of its power capacity.” [22] (CANVAS, p. 34) They create and carry out social functions. So, “to influence society, identify and focus your efforts on the institutions and organizations (pillars of support) that support the existing power structure and social functions.” Then you can influence people’s behaviour within these pillars by “eroding their loyalty to your opponent(s)” and “persuading them to deny their skills and knowledge, material resources, and time to your opponent(s)” [23] (CANVAS, p. 35). 

Serbian Case 1

Two important Milosevic pillars were old people and the police. Old people “had always been Milosevic’s base of support, but the constant arrests of Otpor’s 16-year-olds – and the government’s hysterical accusations that the students were terrorist – were getting grandma angry.” Otpor treated the police as allies-in-waiting from the beginning. Members “delivered cookies and flowers to police stations (sometimes with a TV camera in tow). Instead of howling at police during confrontations, Otpor members would cheer them” [24]. These are two instances show intelligent action to erode pillar support.

A POWER GRAPH “analysis is a method of macro-analysis” providing a “quick, general assessment — a “snapshot” — of comparative power relationships in your society. It provides a broad analysis of strengths and weaknesses of your opponent and your movement. This assessment can assist in directing your focus towards more favorable courses of action for your movement.” [25] (CANVAS, p. 96) The idea is to “list various groups with influence in society, and then chart each group’s level of loyalty to the regime over time.” By doing this, you can see “which groups had fluctuated – and what events… in recent history provoked the change. From that they could glean clues about whom it was most profitable to woo” [26].

Serbian Case Study of a power graph analysis. (CANVAS)

Serbian Otpor's dilemma action. 

Otpor departed from traditional opposition tactics like marches and rallies and instead did “street theater and pranks that made the government look silly and won coverage from opposition media” [27]. One example is a DILEMMA ACTION. Dilemma actions “put an opponent in a situation where it must either a) grant a nonviolent movement’s demand, or b) act in a way that sacrifices some of its own support and damages its public image.” [28] (CANVAS, p. 144) They “can target an oppressive ban, law or social practice. It attempts to create “a “lose-lose” framework for their opponent. Three major components of a dilemma action are:

1.     Creating or identifying an issue meaningful to the public around which people will rally. The “most effective issues are usually related to government prohibitions or policies that intrude in people’s personal lives, or widely spread rumors and personal provocations about unpopular individuals that support your opponent.

2.     Designing the action.

3.     Performing the action and benefiting from its outcome.” [29] (CANVAS, p. 144) 

Serbian Case 2

Otpor “took an oil barrel, taped a picture of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic to it, and set it up in the middle of Belgrade’s largest shopping district.” They placed a baseball bat next to it. “Before long, dozens of shoppers lined the street, each waiting for a chance to take a swing at "Milosevic" — the man so many despised, but whom most were too afraid to criticize. About 30 minutes in, the police arrived. “What would the Milosevic’s police do? They couldn’t arrest shoppers — on what grounds? And they couldn’t arrest the culprits — since we were nowhere to be seen. So what did Milosevic’s police do? The only thing they could: They arrested the barrel. The image of the two policemen dragging the barrel to their police car was the best photo shoot in Serbia for months. Milosevic and his cronies became the laughing stock of the nation, and Otpor became a household name.” 

- Srdja Popovic, Mldaen Josic, Why Dictators Don’t Like Jokes, Foreign Policy, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/05/why-dictators-dont-like-jokes/

A great video under 2 mins summarizing this dilemma action. 

A TEDx video by Popovic on Laughtivism and how a funny message mocking a regime, created by a single man, can have a stronger effect a thousand-men protest, here.

To conclude are two general points CANVAS cite important, which Rosenberg introduces through a dialogue between CANVAS and Burmese activists. One is a relevancy of tactics to the context. First is to understand what societal groups like police, workers, women, and others want. The idea is to make the movement’s actions about things that matter. To make it relevant so that people have an investment. Secondly, to understand that “context matters. A very closed society… [that] desperately needs a strong democracy movement, is the place least able to grown one” [30]. Culture is a challenge; while the style needs adaptation, the (CANVAS) curriculum stays the same. [31] The “less developed the democracy movement, the longer it takes for the gears to start turning”, so “the most formidable challenge facing CANVAS in countries without a history of effective opposition: the passivity, fatalism, and fear of their citizens” [32]. Second point is building self-esteem and removing fear. Apart from recruiting and training people its important to “keep them constantly active. You hit, proclaim victory – and get the hell out” [33]. It is revolution in incremental steps. One way to remove fear is, through “participating in small successes, you build self-confidence. Nonviolent struggle changes the way people think of themselves” [34]. If the pillars of the regime support the regime out of fear, “the moment the fear factor disappears and people are fearless with the police and hugging the military, you have lost your main pillars” [35]. Otpor “made it OK for Serbs to say publicly that the regime was not invincible, that many Serbs shared a sense that change could come” [36]. 

Sources

Note: All citation numbers that are linked to the sites aren't individually listed here below. Any that aren't have the author's name and relevant page number beside it. The source names are also listed here. 

Popovic, Srdja, Djinovic, Slobodan, Milivojevic, Andrej, Meirriman, Hardy, and Marovic, Ivan, CANVAS Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent (Student’s Book), http://global.wisc.edu/peace/readings/cambridge-canvas-core-curriculum.pdf

Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2006) pp. 1-23, 45-16, 66-67.

Further Links:

An interesting Foreign Policy article that looks at why the colour revolutions failed, here.

An Atlantic article on the Egyptian activists' action plan here.

An Interview with Gene Sharp on non violent action and his book, here.