EBP 2: Why do Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country?

Introduction:

This article’s central argument highlights why Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable. Benstead argues attitudes towards democracy are shaped by beliefs about its political, economic, and religious consequences. These attitudes are not primarily determined by cultural or structural factors outside of individual’s control, but by expectations of the consequences of democracy. This finding offers new insight into challenges of building widespread support for democracy, particularly after the Arab uprisings, when economic problems, corruption, and instability in transitional countries continue to inform, often negatively, how citizens assess the consequences of free elections.

This is relevant to the course as we are currently discussing benevolent authoritarian regimes and whether they are better suited to some cultures. Although this article highlights that Arab citizens support democracy they are hesitant about applying it within their country. One factor could be because they live under a benevolent authoritarian regime.

Existing literature explaining attitudes towards political regimes:

These arguments are based on existing literature for supporting democracy, for example, cultural arguments contend that Arab culture and Islam are less compatible to democratic values and that democratic political culture is unlikely to develop in Muslim societies. However, Gelvin argues that there is no reason to assume that Islam is any more or less compatible with democracy and human rights than Christianity or Judaism, for example. There is also no reason to assume that all Muslims approach their Islam in the same way, read the same meanings into their Islam, or even apply at all principles derived from Islam in their daily lives. Then there are counterexamples, such as Indonesia and Turkey which are both democracies, although with flaws.

Modernisation theory argues that with economic growth, urbanisation, education and literacy individuals engage in more complex interactions and as a result develop liberal values, political participation, and secular views. Many public opinion studies support modernisation theory. Jamal finds higher income is related to democratic values in Egypt and Jordan, while Ciftci finds that support for gender equality, tolerance, and a belief in a separation between religion and politics, as well as higher income, predict support in 10 Muslim nations.

Other studies test political, political-economic, or contextual determinants of support for democracy. Jamal and Tessler find that seeing democracies as capable of maintaining order predicts support for Islamic democracy. In Algeria where elections resulted in violence groups are less likely to reject a strong, authoritarian leaser. In Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan, those with higher economic satisfaction under current regime are less likely to demand a democratic alternative.

Social Capital explanations show that those who have closer links to the regime are less supportive of democracy, even though they trust others, an outcome usually associated with civic culture.

Benstead and Atkeson argue that democracy can be demanded if there is dissatisfaction with the current authoritarian government and perceptions of corruption control. Corruption undermines civil society and leads to questions of whether the situation would improve with free elections.

Contesting existing literature-a consequence-based theory of political attitudes:

These studies do not assess the role of beliefs about the consequences of democracy in shaping attitudes towards political regimes. Benstead argues that attitudes towards regimes are shaped by assessments of the security, economic, or cultural impacts of democracy, including those related to sectarianism. Citizens are concerned about safety and stability, meeting basic needs, as well as promoting economic interests and safeguarding cultural authenticity. Since changes in political regimes can affect quality of life, social standing, economic opportunity, and identity and because transitions are uncertain Benstead argues that attitudes towards democracy are affected by beliefs that consequences of freer elections as much as assessments of the economic and political performance of the current regime.

Method used:

Benstead used 6900 interviews from the Arab Barometer conducted in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, and Yemen between 2006 and 2008.  She had three hypotheses

1.     Respondents who believe democracy will jeopardise their security will see democracy as more unsuitable

2.     Respondents who believe that democracy will harm them economically will see democracy as more unsuitable

3.     Respondents who believe that democracy will negatively impact social values will see democracy as more unsuitable

Findings:

There are three major implications. First, they suggest that while Arab citizens view democracy favourably, many are hesitant about applying it at home. The proportion rejecting democracy is small only 7%, with 60% supportive of democracy. However, 27% approve of democracy but see it as unsuitable for their country. Arab citizens have internalised negative beliefs about the potential consequences of freer elections and these perceptions shape views as much as the political and economic performance of the current regime.

Second, the findings show that beliefs about the consequences of democracy including those related to sectarianism are missing variables in models of support for democracy. Yet, when consequence based variables are included, existing government performance and modernisation explanations remain statistically significant. Perceptions of poor government performance consistently predict attitudes and modernisation theory receives support in Morocco, Yemen, and Lebanon. In partial support of cultural theory, in Jordan, Muslims are more likely than Christians to see democracy as unsuitable, while in Palestinian Territories, Muslims and Christians do not systematically vary in their attitudes. In Lebanon, Shi’a Muslims see democracy as more suitable, on average, than Druze and Christians. These groups may have different values about democracy’s consequences for their group within a specific sectarian context.

Third, the results suggest that, perhaps more than in other regions, Arab citizens are uncertain about the consequences of free elections. After the Arab uprisings, concerns about instability and economic problems dampened support both within, as well as outside, countries experiencing instability. The importance of beliefs about democracy’s consequences is likely to apply across the region and remain significant as countries such as Egypt falter in their transition and Syria and Iraq experience continued instability. However, a government performance model suggests that when governments control corruption, hold freer elections, and develop more responsive service provision, satisfaction with the government will increase and belief that democracy is unsuitable will decrease.

Weaknesses in the argument:

Although this article posed clear implications and findings the data relied on public opinion which meant there were some limitations. For example, the citizens could have different meanings of democracy and therefore have different answers when applying this to the questions. They might have defined democracy in economic terms like the standard of living rather than freedom of speech or freedom to change leaders. Therefore, the findings need to be taken with a grain of salt.

Benstead, Lindsay J. 2014. Why do some Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country? Democratization: 1-26.

Gelvin, James L. 2012. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press: America