Thursday, 3 October 2013

Explanatory Blog Post 2- Enough!



"Electoral fraud doesn't cause protest, but the belief that it has happened does."

Joshua Tucker, Associate Professor of Politics at New York University, uses this paper to essentially explain why elections and their processes are good environments for regime change to occur, with particular reference to the Colour Revolutions of Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. It essentially describes the 'collective action problem' with regard to major electoral fraud and linking protest against this with the costs of participation, the benefits of achieving the goal and the likelihood of achieving that goal.

Tucker states that individual incentives prevent some from participating in collective action. While he clearly establishes this point, it seems that this, along with other aspects of his paper, is very blatant and simplistic and stems from fear of consequence. It seems to be a flow-on effect: one individual, who has most likely been grieved by the state on a large scale, protests for his own personal reasons. These reasons may reflect a more general opinion held by a collective of people, particularly in states who have suffered electoral fraud. More and more citizens join the protest, all with different levels of grievance, and as they do, the incentive changes from individual to collective, creating the collective action.

Perhaps a recurring theme throughout this paper is the idea that revolution can incur high costs taken by those citizens who are protesting in some way. These costs can become higher or lower depending on the situation. However, it is the risk of these costs that cause some of the public to choose not to protest, regardless of how strong their grievances against the state are. Tucker highlights the fact that despite these fears, if one brave citizen begins to protest and the grievances are strong enough, more will eventually follow. The idea that the more people there is, the less intense the cost will be, is particularly noted by Tucker. Other ways for citizens to believe there is a reduced risk stem directly from past events in other countries. As the immediate costs while protesting can be violent and therefore will be considered risky, if other countries have undergone a regime change due to protest without incurring violent consequences, it encourages other hopeful states to do the same and assess that the risk is therefore lower. The more people there are, the less likely one is to be punished individually.

More specifically, Tucker describes that in cases of electoral fraud, citizens are less likely to worry about costs. Major electoral fraud is widely considered to provide a means of solving collective action problems for government-grieved citizens as it changes individual assessments of costs and benefits of participation in protest. Additionally, in states where they are abusive or unrestrained and therefore commit electoral fraud, citizens would prefer not to tolerate that type of corruption. Tucker details the focal points of elections, limited time frame, the attraction of an international audience and occurrence at regular and repeated intervals, to be an ideal background for protest against electoral fraud. However, Tucker doesn't particularly delve into the reasoning as to why electoral fraud is such a 'sore point' for citizens as he analyses the framework specifically for the collective action problem. 

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the Coloured Revolutions that Tucker suggests in passing is the surprise of the international community. Here were four states, all with very high levels of corruption, who were all capable of revolution. If one looks at history, three out of four states were involved in the Soviet Union and therefore would have been not only accustomed to the winds of change that revolution brings but also held the tools needed to effectively protest to bring about change. Despite being familiar with extremely violent protests, this would have provided them with knowledge of how to protest more effectively in future, which they did. Tucker describes a similar point by singling out the origin of Ukraine's very organised protest; civil society and opposition groups had been working since the  Kuchmagate Crisis of 2004 to ensure that the predicted future protest was "orderly and peaceful." It seems that states who are grieved by their states can improve their revolutionary tactics and learn from other events and off each other, as seemed to happen with the Colour Revolutions. This is particularly highlighted by the fact they occurred one after another and seemed to give other states courage to induce their own regime changes. So should the international community really be surprised that THESE people sought regime change?

Implications are assessed in light of Tucker's research. Firstly, the success and national support for the emergence of new regimes tend to be overstated. The reason for this can be derived for the reason for the outrage over the Ukrainian elections, where it was the abuse of power that allowed Yushchenko's failure, rather than the failure itself, that caused complain and as a result, Ukraine remains dissatisfied with its regime. Secondly, the assumption that as dissatisfied, post- communist states tend use the support of more democratic states, policies that are favoured by these states are likely to be implemented in the dissatisfied states new regime. Despite this, Serbia has still been able to oppose democratic interests and maintain its interests with Russia, whereas Ukraine now wishes to join the European Union. More obviously, the grieved states tend to be more fragile than first expected and not all who have undergone major electoral fraud and attempted regime change will be successful.

Future research areas are discussed, however, one question in particular stood out. It asks, why are some countries able to carry out fraudulent elections with little response from the citizenry, despite the fact that fraudulent elections can make protest more likely for the reasons described previously? I believe that this could be answered if Tucker had looked more closely at why citizens are grieved in particular by electoral fraud and looking more generally at history, culture and the people of each country.

Sources
"Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions" by Joshua A. Tucker.
https://www.google.co.nz/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CD0QFjAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Ffiles.nyu.edu%2Fjat7%2Fpublic%2FTucker_EFCA_2005.pdf&ei=73tMUteXKu2WiQei7YCwCQ&usg=AFQjCNFFPdTcrqEx0XDwLeSdFCMG2Mcihg&bvm=bv.53371865,d.aGc

3 comments:

  1. NB: There are some aspects of his paper that I didn't cover as it was 40 pages long. These points are those that I found to be most important.

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  2. Thanks for the summary of a fairly long piece, Rhiannon. Good job extracting the key ideas. A couple of comments and questions:

    1) You say: "While he clearly establishes this point, it seems that this, along with other aspects of his paper, is very blatant and simplistic and stems from fear of consequence" How would it be less simplistic? What is wrong with the assumption that people have different levels of tolerance for risk, and they protest in part by looking at the consequences of action? What other things might make this less simplistic? How might the argument change if we took into account other things?

    2) Why do you think electoral fraud is a sore point for citizens? I may not be understanding your point here, but are you saying that you think sometimes citizens don't care about electoral fraud, or that they care but that it's important to know the exact reasons why they care? Tucker's point is that electoral conditions make the risks of protesting against a government lower - because elections happen frequently, so people can learn because international attention is focused on the event; because there is a common event that focuses citizen grievances; etc. - so long as they are upset by electoral fraud.

    3) "If one looks at history" History is a tricky guide. History would have predicted that the population of the GDR was passive and quiescent, and would not have revolted; and history would have suggested violent revolt rather than peaceful electoral protest in Ukraine. It is not so much history that was important as, e.g., connections with other groups elsewhere in Eastern Europe, such as the OTPOR group in Serbia that participated in the protests against Milosevic, pressures from the EU, the need to keep international support, the defections from the regime, etc.

    4) "I believe that this could be answered if Tucker had looked more closely at why citizens are grieved in particular by electoral fraud and looking more generally at history, culture and the people of each country" This is clearly true, but it is too easy; everything, of course, goes back to particular cultures and conditions. But what exactly about these might be relevant? For example, it could be that in some cases there are no connections with groups that can teach people how to run effective protests; or the governments might be too repressive; or people might be too used to electoral fraud, and resigned to its continuation. But would any of this mean that the collective action problem Tucker identifies would not be there?

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  3. Thank you, Xavier. I'll address your comments/ questions...

    1) It would be less simplistic if he incorporated more details into his assessment. It is very objective- citizen has state grievance, more citizens share this view, electoral fraud occurs which may or may not incite protest and as a result they protest. To me it seems very straightforward and somewhat obvious. I agree with his assumption that people have different levels of tolerance for risk, however, he doesn't exactly use this assumption in his assessment. Rather, his framework states that electoral fraud creates a good environment for protest in general. To me, it would be better to assess the subjective view of their levels of tolerance and therefore taking into account the extent to which electoral fraud has occurred (how bad it was) and how often this has occurred. Possibly using some kind of tool that assesses the time and extent of electoral fraud and how this correlates with levels of grievance (I imagine it would increase, for example.) I believe that any corruption by the state, whether it be electoral fraud or suppression of various freedoms, can incite protest if it is severe enough and has carried on long enough. His framework is very narrow.

    2) The second point you make- citizens care but it's important to know the exact reasons as to why they care. For example, electoral fraud may be occurring in a state where citizens may not be grieved by the government or may accept that the regime they live under isn't worth protesting over and vice versa.

    3) I completely agree with your point. With reference to history, I try to point out why difference in culture as a result of this history may prompt some countries to protest rather than others, rather than the way that they protested.

    4) I was not attempting to prove Tucker wrong with his collective action problem, more attempting to suggest ways that he could improve his framework. History, culture and people of each state would provide researchers with the opportunity to assess the likeliness of protest, possibly for predictions of future protest in states who suffer electoral fraud and other types of corruption. As per your points, it may be beneficial to refer to history, culture and the people to assess whether or not they would still see the benefits of protest and how they would assess the risk of protest, which looking at these aspects, along with others that I may not have thought of, would be useful to Tucker's existing framework.

    In a nutshell- keep Tucker's framework but establish further depth.

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