Why do Countries Democratise?

Why is it that a country can languish for decades under a military dictatorship, before suddenly setting out on the path to democracy? What conditions are necessary in order to make a transition to a democratic regime? Does change primarily arise due to inequality, emotional responses, or the shifting loyalties of army officers? This post investigates this question by examining the writings of Zoltan Barany ("Armies and Revolutions"), Yu Liu and Dingding Chen ("Why China Will Democratize") and Wendy Pearlman ("Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings.")

Zoltan Barany argues that the support of the regular armed forces is crucial in perpetuating a government's regime. If army officers defect to back the opposition rebels the cause is lost and the regime will fall. Barany argues that political scientists wishing to make predictions on the success of a revolutionary attempt would be wise to consider the army's structure, past responses and composition in order to determine what course the armed forces would take and thus, whether or not the regime would be overthrown. He lists four main influences on the army: its internal establishment, the state, civil society and the external environment.

To oppose or not to oppose - that is the question.

In terms of the first influence, the internal workings of the army, the key question is whether or not the armed forces are unified. Numerous factors can contribute to a feeling of disunity, for example, divisions based on soldiers' ethnic background, their age and level of experience, whether they chose to join the army or were recruited, their political orientations and educational backgrounds. In general, it seems that younger soldiers, particularly young "draftees" or volunteers, are more likely to defect and support the opposition in the event of an uprising. The level of freedom given to officers can also have a bearing on the outcome. For example, officers who have been given less independence in making their own decisions may be too anxious and hesitant to take decisive action if there is a revolution. The second influence is that of the state. How the state treats its army (both in material and non-material terms) is of great importance; if soldiers are badly paid and under-resourced they are more likely to turn against the regime. But if they are well-esteemed by the general population and given political authority, they will be much more supportive. Conversely, the second factor investigates how the army views the regime. If officers and soldiers believe the regime is strong and popular with the citizens, they will endorse it; but if the regime is faltering they may remove their support. The clarity of communication given to the army by the state plays a crucial role in this aspect. In Egypt, Mubarak's regime was viewed negatively by the army, with soldiers condemning the way Mubarak's son was being prepared to succeed his father, as well as Mubarak's inability to manage the unemployment and violence rife in his country. It was therefore foreseeable that the army should rise up against the regime at the first whiff of revolution in 2011.

The third influence is that of society. Members of the armed forces will observe demonstrations and will have to try and ascertain whether or not to support those protesters. In deciding this they will take note of the composition of the protest (are people from many different groups of society represented?), its nature (are the protests non-violent?) and its popularity amongst the general public. Opposition groups will try to win over the army's support, by launching information campaigns, fraternising with the army and promising political benefits of forging a new regime. Those army officers who benefit the least from their involvement in the armed forces (e.g. if they are young and poorly paid) are more likely to be won around to the rebel's cause. The fourth influence is that of the international community at large. If international intervention on the part of the opposition is imminent, soldiers may re-evaluate their loyalties to the regime, not wanting to end up on the losing side. In Libya, with the promise of a NATO invasion at large, many soldiers defected to support the opposition. Political events in surrounding states has a significant impact. Members of the armed forces in countries in Eastern Europe from 1989 and the Middle East and North African states from 2011, upon observing, the opposition successfully overthrowing long-standing regimes in neighbouring countries, would have felt compelled to reconsider their allegiances. Whether or not officials have been influenced by liberal ideologies, for example, by studying in the USA, will affect their levels of sympathy for an opposition cause.

In Ukrain's Orange Revolution, women stood in highly visible positions at the edge of crowds of protesters. The armed forces deployed to control the protests would have seen them and realised that the protests were representative of the Ukrainian society at large.

Barany gives a number of concluding case studies to illustrate his point, of which I will conrast the mini studies of Tunisia and Bahrain. Tunisian soldiers were not well-paid and they realised that President Ben Ali favoured the police force over the army. They had a negative view of Ali's regime and of Ali himself - an unpopular figure - so they were swayed by the opinions of protesters in the 2011 demonstrations. It was unsurprising then, that members of the armed forces should defect and support the opposition in toppling Ali. In Bahrain, however, the soldiers were well paid and respected. In addition, they were Sunni loyalists supporting a Sunni regime, whereas the majority of the population - and those wishing to overturn the government - were Shia Muslims. Since the soldiers faced only a bleak alternative to supporting the regime, and since they were benefiting from their positions, they continued their loyalty for the government and helped crack down on the opposition.

Yu Liu and Dingding Chen made a prediction in their article that China will democratise in the coming years, and that the race for democratisation is already on. They argue that civil society is on the rise in China, whereas the ruling CPP Communist Party is stagnating and having difficulty controlling the voices speaking out against it and in favour of liberal democracy. Chinese citizens are, they say, "increasingly dissatisfied with a growth-first model and now seek social and economic change." China's economy is still growing and the authors point out that this could lead to more of the same (the 'performance legitimacy' theory which is the mainstream view taken by scholars) or that it could lead the Communist Party to be the "victim of its own success." This latter view is the one shared by Liu and Chen.

The 2010 suicides of Chinese employees of Foxconn (the company producing Apple and Dell products) were extreme examples of the despair many Chinese experience in the wake of rising levels of inequality.

In their argument that change is impending, the authors note that Chinese citizens today have high expectations for their country and that they know that further improvements are possible. Inequality is increasingly rapidly (China's Gini Co-efficient was an appalling 0.48 in 2010) and is becoming more visible now that great numbers of rural Chinese are moving to the cities, where they see with their own eyes the towering skyscrapers and hotels - symbols of great wealth so incongruent with their own economic conditions. Only ten years ago, people thought of this inequality as a natural consequence of meritocracy, now people are voicing dissatisfaction with government corruption and elitism which they see as having caused this social phenomenon.

The authors challenge the view that Chinese cultural values prevent people from actively seeking change. It is true that a high proportion of Chinese express their trust in government and that protesters make safe local demands rather than criticising the state, however, cultural values can change as institutions change and evidence suggests values are already changing today. Significantly, younger people have lower levels of trust in government and the number of civil society demonstrations and organisations has increased rapidly over the past few years. In response, the government has needed to increase its spending on maintaining stability, to little effect. The authors argue that the most influential members of society - the people whose opinions matter the most - are young students and the members of the middle-class. These groups of people are becoming increasingly influenced by dissenting views and are becoming increasingly outspoken. Celebrities are among those calling for change and their involvement troubles the government, for it means that "political liberalism is increasingly associated with glamorous figures, rather than marginalised political exiles or Falun Gong practitioners."

Another "cool" figure is Han Han, China's most popular blogger, who is outspoken in his criticism of censorship and injustice in China. Han Han had 500 million hits by the middle of 2011.

Media has a huge impact on the opinions of ordinary Chinese. Many more newspapers are expressing liberal viewpoints and the internet provides a wealth of ideas concerning liberal democracy. The internet has been an important tool in this process; providing a means to organise political action and enabling people to air their views on political topics. Chinese people have found innovative ways to surpass the Great Chinese FireWall to express their views on social media and blogging sites. Leaders have also become more open to the possibilities of incorporating liberal elements into the existing regime. Some officials have openly promoted democracy and have emphasised the "rule of law, social equality, judicial independence and anti-corruption initiatives." Even if this talk hasn't yet led to concrete action, the authors argue that this is a promising starting point, showing that some members of the party are genuinely interested in issues of democratic reform.

Chinese society does not exist in a vacuum and events happening in China are undeniably affected by other events around the world. The fact that democracy is the dominant form of government around the world and that several other Asian countries are already prospering as democracies, or are gradually becoming more democratic, should influence the political environment in China. Gloalisation speeds the process of democratisation by spreading global norms through overt means (such as the promotion of democratic values by non-governmental organisations) and more discreet means (such as through economic liberalisation.) The authors are confident for the reasons which I have summarised (international pressure, changing cultural values, expression of liberal values in the media and changing expectations of equality) that China is on the path toward democracy and that we will see further promising change in this direction over the next few decades.

Mohamed Bouazizi's act of self-immolation spurred Tunisian's anger and hope for a better future.

In her article investigating the causes of the Arab Spring uprisings, Wendy Pearlmann suggests that more importance needs to be given to the emotions which are responsible for making revolution possible. She argues that value commitments and strategic thinking are not themselves the only factors determining whether people will protest or not; at the end of the day a lot is determined by the sheer emotions that people experience. Emotions influence how people access information, they can tip or balance conflicting emotions and motivate action. Pearlmann distinguishes between "dispiriting" emotions, characterised by fear, sadness and shame and "emboldening" emotions, characterised by anger, joy and pride. Whereas dispiriting emotions will only convince people to avoid risk, prioritise their own security (a material value) and submit to authority, emboldening emotions will convince them to accept risk, prioritise dignity (a non-material value) and engage readily, even when other variables make it doubtful that change is unlikely to be won. In addition, in order to successfully achieve change, emotions must move from being simply "reflex," meaning that they pass quickly, like at the end of a protest when the group disperses - to being "affective," meaning that they continue to influence people long after one protest has ended.

Mass-rebellion is most likely when people are emboldened and when their emotions are affective. This is what happened in Tunisia at the end of 2010 at beginning of 2011. For years Tunisians had been languishing under an oppressive regime characterised by fear and fultility. Ben Ali's dictatorship was able to use fear as a "tool for survival" to prop up its regime, held in place by a strong security apparatus and restrictive state discourses. Living in a climate characterised by fear, the Tunisian people had little motivation to fight back; the best option was simply "seeing nothing, hearing nothing and saying nothing." However, small actions of rebellion - protests, strikes and expressions of outrage in the media - made people increasingly emboldened over time. Mohamad Bouazizi's act of setting himself on fire in December 2010 was, according to his sister, one of "rebellion against insult" influenced by "oppression, injustice and depotism." Bouazizi was desperate and angry, and when other Tunisians found out what he had done, they empathised with him and shared his anger.

Anger: an incredibly powerful emotion we may not give enough credit to.

Anger is a powerful and deadly emotion. An Arabic newspaper commented after the incident that, "anger is the primary producer of the power that every oppressed person lacks. Anger brings the oppressed together to discover that they are capable of repudiating injustice. The problem with collective anger, however, is that it requires continued provocation. That is usually provided by the stupidity of oppressors, as they intensitfy abuse and cruelty, and overindulge in modes of oppression." A repressive reponse having the opposite reaction to what was intended was exactly what happened in the case of Bouazizi. Instead of people being scared, they were angry. The same day, more people protested in Bouazizi's town. Again, they were met with a violent response by police. This provoked more anger and indignation, and protests quickly spread to surrounding towns. Suddenly, people were enraged and focused on the question of their dignity and how to reclaim it. As one blogger commented, "Tunisians, who have been accustomed to being silent, afraid and obedient for decades, are finally taking their destiny in their own hands." What Pearlmann hopes to show by writing her article, is that emotions are crucial in the success of an uprising, and that commentators should not dismiss their importance. It was at the tipping point - when dispirited emotions of fear turned into emboldended ones of hope - that change occurred in Tunisia. Likewise people in other countries around the world who are suffering in oppressive regimes can be called to overcome fear and concentrate on hope and a better future as they act for change.