Second Explanatory Post: The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?

The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848? What started it all? We all know the story of the market vendor, Mohamed Bouaizizi, who, in reaction and in protest to the confiscation of his livelihood as a fruit vendor by the Tunisian government in 2011, lit himself on fire. This act quickly became a catalyst triggered uprisings across Tunisia, and “the demise of Tunisia’s authoritarian regime in January 2011”(Weyland, 2012, p. 917), rapidly spreading unrest throughout the Middle East and parts of Europe.

Weyland acknowledges the parallels drawn by academics between the Arab Spring revolutions and the spread of revolution in 1848, sparked by the overthrowing of King Louis Philippe of France that February. The two revolutionary periods, “far apart in world-historical time- share important features, especially the speed and breadth of horizontal diffusion.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 918). Weyland states that both waves “also achieved similar outcomes, namely a low rate of successful advances toward political liberalism and democracy.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 198) The author argues that people “overrated the significance of the Tunisian success, overestimated the similarities with the political situation in their own country, and jumped to the conclusion that they could successfully challenge their own autocrats.” Given that there are parallels between the two revolutionary waves, Weyland asks what can explain these parallels. This brings us to ask what is needed for a widespread, rapid revolutionary wave to occur, as did in these two cases? Weyland states that although it is commonly argued that for a revolutionary uprising to occur there must be strong and focussed leadership, this was not the case, “the Arab Spring lacked clear organizational leadership that could authoratively guide and speak for the protesting masses- precisely as during the revolutionary wave of 1848.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 923)

They question how it was possible for the Arab Spring to occur how it did, and why this appears to have had little effect on the realities of life for many people. Weyland puts forward the theory that, with a group with no centralised power, “spontaneous masses need to win now if every; they therefore rapidly move to full-scale conflict to achieve this victory.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 924). They also suggest that “the absence of disciplined organizations also caused popular mobilization to recede quickly and the temporary unity of opposition forces to fray even more quickly.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 924). Weyland notes that “some types of regimes and states [are] particularly vulnerable to mass challenges, whereas others are more firmly grounded and have greater stability. Neopatrimonial, Sultanistic dictatorships, built around the person of the ruler and deficient in institutionalization, have proven especially fragile.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 927). The uprising in Tunisia against Ben Ali’s autocracy, an example of power built around a single personality, crumbled quickly, whereas events inspired by this success, in states “such as the traditional monarchies of Bahrain and Morrocco and the theocracy of Iran”(Weyland, 2012, p. 927), were less successful.

“Like the eviction of King Louis Phillppe in Paris, the overthrow of long-ruling autocrat Ben Ali in Tunis immediately grabbed people’s attention and made a disproportionatly strong impression. Indeed, this single success prompted the rash, unthinking belief that the same feat could be replicated in a variety of other countries. Under the influence of the representativeness heuristic, people stressed the apparent similarities in these diverse settings and overlooked or downplayed the actual differences.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 928) “this comparison of 1848 and 2011 suggests that beneath and beyond the peculiarities of space and time, political contention is molded in part by basic cognitive mechanisms that people commonly apply for information processing and decision-making.”(Weyland, 2012, p. 929) Weyland suggests that “it would be interesting to examine, for instance, what role inferential heuristics played in other waves of contention, such as the world-wide eruption of student protest and societal activism in 1968 or the ‘occupy’ movements”(Weyland, 2012, p. 929) of 2011.

This brings us to ask, if Weyland was successful in drawing these parallels between two uprisings which occurred 163 years apart, what else can we learn from previous revolutions, and what other connections can we make through time? Perhaps there is a likeness between the June Rebellion of 1832 in France, and the 30th June uprisings in Egypt. In both cases a previous uprising had ended a regime. France’s June Rebellion occurred as reaction to the result of the French Revolution of 1930, which resulted in the replacement of one monarch with another (oversimplification of what fully happened but….) monarch. Similarly, Egypt’s June uprisings occurred in response to the results of the previous revolution. While these parallels can be drawn, this is where the likeness may end, the major difference being the response by the people. Masses of people turned out in support of the uprisings (and against) in Egypt, whereas, in 1832’s France the people did not arise as was expected (Which was the inspiration for Hugo’s ‘Les Miserables’, read it, or, if you prefer your emotional trauma in musical form, watch the movie). I would also like to point out that Turkish protesters performed a great rendition of ‘Do You Hear the People Sing’ Weyland, K. (2012). The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848? Perspectives in Politics, 10(04), 917-934.