Explanatory blog
post on the reading "Forced to be free? Why foreign imposed regime change
rarely leads to democratization." By Alexander B. Downes and
Jonathan
Monten.
Downes and Monten
explores the issue of forced intervention and the likelihood of successful
democratisation. With successful examples such as Japan and West Germany after
World War II, and very unsuccessful examples of Iraq and Afghanistan more
recently, there is concern in the international community that forced
interventions are no longer effective.
When exploring
past studies, Downes and Monten criticise past studies for not taking into
account favourable conditions. Therefore, an important question in their work
is "when democratization outcomes after intervention are the product of
deliberate policy choice by interveners or a function of how hospital local
conditions are to democratic change?"
Empirical finding
suggest that there is little benefit of intervention and that successful
democratisation depends on both strategy of the intervening country and
domestic conditions. The conclusions on these findings are as follows:
1. The targeting of
individual leaders is not sufficient for democratisation
2. Interveners need to focus on concrete, pro-democratic reforms with sponsored elections,when the state is in good conditions for democratisation to be successful
3. It is almost impossible for democratisation in unfavourable conditions when the state is "economically underdeveloped, ethnically heterogamous, or lack prior experience with representative government"
2. Interveners need to focus on concrete, pro-democratic reforms with sponsored elections,when the state is in good conditions for democratisation to be successful
3. It is almost impossible for democratisation in unfavourable conditions when the state is "economically underdeveloped, ethnically heterogamous, or lack prior experience with representative government"
Downes and Monten
look at three viewpoints regarding intervention and the spread of democracy.
These are optimists, pessimists and conditionalists.
The optimists are
associated with people like George W Bush and a neoconservatist idelogy.
Neoconservatism suggests that intervening states have a 'moral imperative' and
'strategic interest' in democratisation. Further there is a belief that
democracy is transferable onto any culture. This has been criticised by the
authors as democratisation has a 25% success rate.
The pessimists
are associated with studies bone by Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and George Down.
They argue that there has been no "meaningful degree of
democratisation" because interveners have no incentive to build
democracies and it is cheaper and more efficient for interveners just to impose
dictators that suit their needs. The authors criticise this argue by saying
that there is plenty of incentive for democracy, and in this study intervention
definition was too broad so their results were skewed.
The
conditionalists argue that there are factors for successful democratisations.
This is supported by a study by James Dobbins who argues that the most
important variable is the effort by the United States and the international community.
He cited the case of Germany who had the most troops per capita during the
democratisation process. A study by James Meernki also states that
pro-democracy intentions lead to higher success rates. Many different works
cite target state conditions as also being important, focussing on wealth,
social divisions, prior democracy and internal and external threats. These studies have also been criticised by
the author for being too short, US focussed or too focussed on a single study
like Iraq.
The core of Downes
and Monten's argument is summarised as "interveners ... must undertake
democratic reforms, but these steps will falter where important preconditions
for democracy are absent." They outline this argument into a two-step
theory.
1. There must be
favourable conditions. These are economic growth, lack of social and ethnic diversity and tension and experience
with representative government.
2. Intervener's
strategy must be to overthrow and replace the state's institutions.
Downes and
Monten, with in depth research and data analysis came to a few conclusions.
Currently, policy makers are too optimistic about the democratisation process.
They found that leadership foreign imposed regime change (i.e. changing the
leader of the target state) had no effect on democratisation whether or not the
conditions were favourable for democracy. They also found that institutional
foreign imposed regime change (i.e. changing the institutions of the target
state) was reliant on the favourable conditions of democracy. This conclusion
is in line with 'the conditionalists' viewpoint outlined above.
Downes and Monten
state that decapitation is an ineffective strategy that interveners should not
use. This is because data proves it does not lead to democratisation and may
increased chaos or trigger civil war. The authors refer to Syria as an example
where this should not happen. 'Quick and easy regime change' does not happen by
overthrowing a leader. There really is no quick and easy regime change.
Further, Syria is in a bad position for institutional regime change because there
are strong social divides and Syria has had no previous experience with
democracy. This study should be evidence to the international community that
leadership overthrows are ineffective for democratisation.
The authors also
promote foreign imposed regime change for countries that have previously been
democratic. This is because they are more likely to succeed because they have
'favourable conditions'. Therefore the authors suggest intervention is a more
useful tool for 'safeguarding democracy' that has already been well-established
in the past instead of using it as a tool to promote democracy elsewhere.
Finally, the
authors emphasise the importance of both the interveners and the conditions of
the target state. Interveners must be committed to actions to change the
institutions but only when the conditions are favourable. No matter how
committed the interveners are if the conditions are not favourable it is likely
democratisation will fail. The authors conclude stating that when democracies
are not in these favourable conditions, countries are better off trying to
build a civil society through foreign aid and development assistance that try
and proceed with democratisation.
Thanks for the summary Jessica. A couple of comments:
ReplyDelete1) "With successful examples such as Japan and West Germany after World War II, and very unsuccessful examples of Iraq and Afghanistan" Are Iraq and Afghanistan really that unsuccessful as democracies? They have lots of problems, to be sure - but Iraq for one is certainly far more democratic than it was under Saddam Hussein (which was as bad as anything in this course). One may argue that these regimes are hybrids - competitive authoritarian regimes, like the ones we discussed earlier in the term - but the predecessor regimes were even less democratic. (It's another question to argue whether intervention was "worth it" - seems like a foolish venture, complete with lots of dead people).
2) On previous experience with democracy: doesn't every country lack such experience at some point? Why would experience matter?