EXPLANATORY BLOG POST 2: ‘DEMOCRACY,
DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM’
SHAUN PIERCY
In this article for the American
Political Science Review, Carles Boix explores the potential existence of
a causal relationship between a country’s economic growth (particularly in
regards to an increase of income per capita), and the establishment of democracy
and democratic processes. In the context of the data he presents, Boix
determines a country as democratic primarily based on whether the government
was elected through competitive elections. (Boix, 810)
Boix initially claims that there does in fact appear to be
an identifiable relationship between economic growth and democratisation,
however he adopts a balanced approach when analysing the graphical evidence he
presents by stating that this correlation is more conditional than what others had
previously inferred. He continues on to explain that the causal link between
income growth and democratisation is also subject to past significant,
political events.
Therefore, Boix refutes the simplistic conclusion that a
country’s economic development solely corresponds with the establishment of a
democratic regime, by identifying that factors such as social/political
inconsistencies during different time periods similarly contributed to the
effects income growth had on democratic processes. (813)
He also adds that the data suggests that countries with a
lower income were marginally less-likely to successfully adapt to democratisation,
whereas countries that were already enjoying a significantly higher level of income
were very likely to retain/establish a more democratic political climate,
indicating that while the level of a country’s income per capita certainly may
help reinforce the process of democratisation, it does not always establish a
shift towards democracy. (813)
Boix then moves on to identify and contrast the different
approaches implemented by both democratic and authoritarian regimes in the
context of what he terms ‘unconstrained’ and ‘constrained’ political
environments. (815) The context of an ‘unconstrained’ political climate recognises
a single, dominant power/regime operating within international politics (the
United States for example); whereas a ‘constrained’ environment implies that
several great powers all equally compete for the role of hegemon.
In an unconstrained world, Boix argues that authoritarian
regimes are more likely to support the spread of authoritarianism for two
reasons: firstly, dictators are in a greater position to retain, maintain and essentially
guarantee the preferred status quo of the hegemon (seeing as they are free from
the democratic bonds of fair electoral competition). And secondly, small
democratic nations could potentially act as a base for the spread of
democratisation, threatening the autonomy of the single, great authoritarian
power. (815)
Similarly, Boix believes that great democratic powers are
more likely to support the spread of democracy because the costs of a
democratic collapse are low in this environment, seeing as there are no other
competing hegemons present to challenge the existing order through say, a
revolutionary government. (815)
However he then goes on to explain how democratic regimes in
this unconstrained international environment face a dilemma: they support the
spread of democracy due to the generally strong opinion of a democratic public
regarding the benefits of free and fair elections (as well as developments in
equality and human rights). However, poorer democratic countries are more often
prone to fall to revolutions and dictatorial powers more readily than
wealthier, developed countries. Therefore, in areas that are less well-off, great
democratic powers may instead support the establishment of authoritarian regimes
over democratisation because, once again, the status quo is more easily
established and maintained ‘peacefully’ within the constraints of authoritarian
orders as opposed to democratic ones. (815)
Alternatively, in a system containing multiple, competing
powers (or as Boix calls it; ‘constrained’), the incentives for these powers to
intervene in the politics of smaller countries are higher due to the increased potential
of regime changes leading to an adjustment of foreign policy. (816)
In the context of the more modern era of international
politics, Boix also states that since the fall of the Berlin wall, the United
States has enjoyed uncontested supremacy and autonomy atop the current,
unconstrained environment of international operations, and as a result there
has been an increased and more robust wave of democratisation throughout these
last two decades. (827)
Personally, I found this article to be a rather challenging
read. The multiple graphs detailing information regarding GDP levels, income
data and log variables were often dense and hard to follow. However, I accept this
difficulty probably resulted from my considerable lack of understanding and
knowledge regarding these economic principles. I did find it interesting when
Boix discussed the differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes/powers,
and particularly when he compared and contrasted them in regards to whether
they existed within either constrained or unconstrained political environments.
I had never really considered before these types of situations, specifically
where democratic powers may favour the establishment of an authoritarian regime
in an effort to establish a consistent and manageable order. Boix certainly
explained the contexts of the different potential circumstances clearly,
allowing the reader to adopt that position of a particular ‘power,’ view
different options from a fresh ideological position and therefore better understand
the mechanisms behind how contrasting regimes operate.
The one question I would like to pose to everyone concerned
Boix’s comments about the United States. Are they really such an ‘uncontested’
global power? Or is there still (to a degree even), a hegemonic struggle for
dominance raging amongst a number of different international players?
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Excellent summary of a very difficult article, Shaun! The challenge I think is mostly in the methods used to test the hypothesis, which are very cutting edge and mathematical. But you correctly summarize the main theory: richer countries are more likely to become democratic, richer democracies are more stable, but all of this depends on the international system. In essence, Boix is saying that the behavior of great powers (US and USSR) during the cold war tended to produce anti-democratic interventions, whereas now it is more conducive to democratization. What do you think of this last point?
ReplyDeleteRe your question: which other powers can really challenge the US in any significant way today? And if we see the rise of other powers, say, China, what would that imply for democratization? Since China is an authoritarian regime, would the rise of China and the polarization of the international system depress democratization (leading to more pro-authoritarian interventions)?
In response to your question, I totally agree with Xavier here. China as a powerful economic state is beginning to prove a threat to the USA which I believe in time may be the beginnings of an ideological war.
ReplyDeleteFrom a Development/Democracy point of view, Boix seems to get it the way I do - the lower the GDP the less stable the country is. I feel sometimes that democracy becomes the rich man's system of politics and non-democratic states are simply the poor and the working class who cannot achieve such a status. So in thinking about our other focus at the moment of culture and democracy this kind of goes against that theory (in a Boix point of view), economics depicts a political system more than culture.
But then I think about the rise of China again and I'm not so sure... what do other people think?
Xavier - I completely agree with your point as to how Boix identifies that during the period of the Cold War, both the US and the USSR appeared to equally support regimes that would best secure them potential allies, therefore strengthening their hold on the international political scene over one another (and many of these regimes certainly upheld systems that were significantly anti-democratic).
ReplyDeleteI found that (as JayThom points out), the spread of democratisation seems to fluctuate depending on how beneficial/costly it proves for the more dominant powers (for example, USA supporting authoritarian regimes during Cold War, and then alternately preaching global democracy after the fall of the Berlin wall).
And if China does rise to the similar international 'status' as the US, I feel as though a similar democratisation trend may appear as to the Cold War period; with China and the US equally supporting regimes of both sorts (democratic and authoritarian) in order to develop alliances with both developing/developed countries in a two-horse race to dominate the global political environment.
An interesting area to look at this competition between the U.S and China would be Africa. The U.S today still being the world hegemon, refuses to give aid or give massive development funds to corrupt and less democractic regimes in Africa. For example, they attach mandatory human rights conditions that countries must meet if they want U.S aid or development money. This is done by the U.S in order to coerce more dictatorial and corrupt regimes in Africa to improve the situation.
ReplyDeleteHowever, in the last decade China has heavily increased the influence in Africa. They have massively expanded their trade and development relations with many african countries by in large part not attaching any strings to their trade and development agreements. Many african leaders have thus pivoted from seeking better relations with the U.S to better relations with China. The more dictatorial African leaders see no point in reforming their political situation if they can go to China.
If the new cold war does occur, it would be interesting to see if the U.S switches it's stance on these matters.