Non-Violent Revolution and Modular Action

In his essay Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions, Mark Beissinger states that modular action is “action that is based in significant part on the prior successful example of others”. This presents a challenge to social science because “the cross-case influences that in part drive their spread violate the assumption of the independence of cases that lies at the basis of much social scientific analysis” (p. 259). Beissinger believes that the implications of cross-case influence in democratisation are widely neglected by social scientists who are more prone to treat cases independently and tend to emphasise structural disadvantages in post-Soviet regimes. He argues that modular action and the power of example can substitute structural disadvantages to some extent and uses the example of democratic transitions in post-communist regions. Beissinger stresses the role played by radical youth movements using unconventional protest methods, their emulation in other regions, and the influence of Gene Sharp’s non-violent resistance tactics. In particular, Beissinger notes the important work of the Serbian youth movement Otpor (Resistance) in helping to shape the course of action that lead to the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, and their influence in democratic movements in countries such as Russia, Albania, Egypt and Zimbabwe. These movements and revolutions were not entirely independent—they were “an interrelated modular phenomenon in which opposition groups borrowed frames, strategies, repertoires, and even logos from previously successful efforts and gained inspiration from the acts of others” (p. 263). This modular phenomenon is said to reach two tipping points: the first is when accelerated movement formation and action takes place and the second is when the effect of example diminishes and fades. In addition, modular behaviour “is not simply a matter of the pull of example; it is also in part a matter of the push of mutual empowerment by those who have already succeeded” (p. 266). Modular processes were also evident in the Arab Spring and the communist revolutions throughout the 20^th century (e.g., the domino theory). 

In the article Revolution U, Tina Rosenberg also notes the influence of Otpor and Serbia’s Center for Applied Non Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) on the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Otpor was a Serbian youth movement credited for their role in the overthrow of President Slobodan Milošević. CANVAS itself was an organisation founded by former members of Otpor who prefer to work with rookies and idealistic students willing to be trained in the methods of non-violent revolution. Rosenberg discusses their influence on Egypt’s April 6 Youth Movement and the subsequent spread of CANVAS-style protest tactics among Egyptian protestors. CANVAS advocates non-violent methods, especially prank-like tactics that embarrass the government, and subscribe to Gene Sharp’s ideas published in his book From Dictatorship to Democracy. According to Sharp, a regime can only remain in power by commanding the obedience of the people. Thus, democracy movements should aspire to persuade people to withdraw their obedience. However, Rosenberg tends to exaggerate the influence and successes of CANVAS in the Egyptian Revolution. In addition, if we are to believe Rosenberg’s description, CANVAS seems to suffer with student idealism and lifestylism inherited from Otpor and severely restricts its own success by focusing on students and not other interested classes. This idealism is also evident in the April 6 group’s protest tactics, which are said to have included winning over the police and army, carrying roses, and chanting positive slogans. Otpor and its offshoots also seem to resemble the Youth International Party in the US—another student lifestylist movement that was active primarily from the 1960s-80s and who also preferred non-violent pranks and theatrical demonstrations similar to those described by Rosenberg.

Yet, far from demonstrating the efficiency of non-violent resistance tactics these articles show the poverty of Gandhiism in bringing about real change and Beissinger’s praise of the US government’s “democracy promoting” efforts would be almost tantamount to idiocy in 2013. Calling the revolutions that took place in the post-Soviet region “modular democratic revolutions” is a bit misleading—they may have certainly been modular but none of them produced an actual democracy. Moreover, the violence immediately following the Egyptian Revolution and Egypt’s current US-financed military dictatorship also shows that the authors were a bit hasty in their claims. It seems more likely that non-violent resistance, modelled on the work of Otpor, is an excellent method for undermining obedience to repressive regimes and perhaps even to make small civil gains. But considering that elites rarely concede their privileges willingly it must be admitted that Otporism is a poor method for bringing about political power and actual revolutionary change. In fact, Beissinger admits that modular action leads to only one of two political outcomes, particularly among later risers: elites co-opt modular processes or they impose additional institutional constraints to prevent their success. Both of those seem to have taken place in Egypt recently.