Tipping Point Vesus State Breakdown Revolutions

Randall Collins article discusses the reasons he believes a revolution succeeds or fails. However, he does not deal in absolutes, rather he thinks that there is a spectrum of success and failure revolutions achieve. He points to two distinct types of revolutions, one he calls the tipping point revolution, which is the “the righteous mobilization of the people until the authoritarians crack and take flight” and the other is the state breakdown revolution which “brings about big structural changes (the rise or fall of communism, the end of feudalism ect.).” His argument is that tipping point revolutions are often times only moderately successful and can even lead to more conflict, such as civil wars or the quick return to undemocratic rule.

1848 French Revolution

Beginning with a short synopsis of the 1848 French Revolution, Collins points out that revolutions which quickly overthrow a government are often times not as productive as they look. In France it took three days for the revolutionaries to overthrow the royalty, but the honeymoon period was short, and within three weeks the groups that caused and joined the revolution splintered. In the following months, the public sentiment moved against the revolutionaries, and towards the conservatives. They elected Napoleon’s nephew president, and eventually made himself emperor and overturned all the democratic reforms. The revolution for democracy was over almost as quickly as it had begun. While there was a tipping point, the easy success did not conjure up enough support for the cause, making it very easy to tip back to an undemocratic regime.

Tiananmen Square

            Collins focuses on the Chinese movement for democracy as an example of a tipping point revolution that completely failed. He looks at the seven-week period in 1989 when the Chinese protesters occupied Tiananmen Square as tipping point to change the Communist regime. However, after weeks of protesting, “the tipping point did not tip,” and on May 19^th, the Communist elite declared martial law.  The peaceful protest and hunger strike were no longer the focus, and violence became much more common.  The protesters themselves began to unravel, some looked at themselves as moderates, while others were militant. The militants became very violent; “crowds fought with stones and gasoline bombs, burning army vehicles, by some reports, the soldiers inside.”  The violence would come to an end on June 4^th, when the militants were allowed to leave Tiananmen Square, and the revolution came to an end.

            The revolution did much more harm than good for those who wanted to see major changes in China. Sympathetic CCP members were jailed, dissenting workers executed, and any freedom media had gained during the reform period in the 1980’s was revoked.  Collins explains the consequences succinctly, “a failed tipping point revolution not only fails to meet its goals; it reinforces authoritarianism.”  He believes that an authoritarian regime can retain power as long as “it can keep momentum on its own its own side by making sure no bandwagon gets going among the opposition.”  Revolutions will not be effective if they cannot get the masses to overwhelm their opponents, and the revolutionaries cannot do this unless the regime commits atrocities so arousing that virtually everyone agrees they must go. China was able to keep some control over what was happening in Tiananmen Square and did not let the protesters mobilize the nation.

Tahrir Square

            Collins turns to the recent Egyptian Revolution as an example of a contested tipping point, where it is still not fully clear what the outcome for the people of Egypt will be. He points out that since quick 18-day revolution, those who deserted Mubarak and joined the revolution have found that their interests are not the same. Violence between Muslims and Christians has broken out, and “structural reforms have not gone very deep.” The elections posed a distinct problem as an Islamist government came to power, moving the secularists and liberal who most wanted the revolution to a minority status.  While they all wanted to see Mubarak out of power, the recent violence towards Christians is an indicator that the outcome is not as revolutionary as it aimed to be. I feel this is an important example, because the Arab Spring revolutions pose many difficult questions about their effectiveness for long-term change.

            Focusing on what he believes are better, more permanent revolutions, Collins explains the three things necessary for state breakdown revolutions. First, he believes that the state has to go through a crippling fiscal crisis where it can no longer pay its own officials. That way “the army, police and officials nor longer can enforce order because they themselves are disaffected.” Second, there needs to be a major divided between the ruling official elites and the economic elites. This deadlock will ensure that the fiscal crisis cannot be resolves because the two most privileged groups are split. Lastly, after the state crisis and elite deadlock happen, there needs to be a mass mobilization of the dissidents. He believes that with all of these things happening, at once “the revolutionary movement is radical enough to attack the fiscal (and typically military) problems, to reorganize resources so that the state itself become well-funded,” thereby breaking down the state to make deep, historical changes. The deep crisis is the key to a state breakdown revolution because the reformers must go to the root of the problem to bring the state back.

            Collins goes on to explain how tipping point revolutions often cause imitative revolutions in other states. Most recently this happened with the Arab Spring, as the tipping point revolution in Tunisia caused a wave of revolutions effecting Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and not Syria. His concern is that “if tipping point revolutions themselves are not very decisive for structural change, further attempts to imitate tipping points in other countries have even less to go on.” The big concern here is that once the regime is overthrown there will be no direction for the country, this will cause ongoing conflict that will eventually lead to a failed state. 

            This article gives us an interesting insight into a specific view of what is necessary for a long lasting, positive revolution. While it is easy to think that there just needs to be a mass dislike for the current regimes to overthrow the government, Collins first two premises of a state breakdown point to the current regime going through a deep crisis as important. The substantive changes that would have to be made are what make some revolutions more than just tipping point revolutions. This article will be interesting to refer back to after the dust has settled with the Arab Spring and we can see the consequences of the newest set of tipping point revolutions. If the Arab Spring revolutions end positively and there is substantial changes in these states, this article may no longer hold true.