Libya: Tipping Point or State Breakdown?

Collins’ article defines ‘tipping point’ revolutions as the “righteous mobilization of the people until the authoritarians crackand take flight”. He is sceptical about the possibility for these revolutions to bring structural change, as they tend to result in superficial changes, such as the removal of the regime’s leader.

Collins uses Egypt as an example of a tipping point revolution, where demonstrations caused the military to step in and remove Mubarak. However, the military had featured prominently in the old regime – i.e. not much changed. The military “dragged their feet on some of the uprising’s central demands” (Gelvin p. 64) and began to intimidate protestors. As in Tunisia, protests brought down the autocrat, but failed to bring down the autocracy.

Collins claims that ‘state breakdown’ revolutions, such as the anti-Soviet revolutions, have a basis in structural factors. These involve:

1. Fiscal crisis and state paralysis

2. Deadlock between state faction and economic privilege faction

3. Mass mobilization (after the above has occurred)

Although Collins classes all the Arab uprisings as tipping point revolutions (successful or otherwise), I think this is too simplistic. Although Tunisia and Egypt may be archetypes of tipping point revolutions, the uprising in Libya went quite differently – as James Gelvin points out. Due to the weakness of state institutions in Libya and Yemen, Gelvin argues that “it is in these two countries that the best possibility exists that the uprisings will lead to true revolutionary change”.

This is because before the uprising Libya was a ‘weak state’; government had little bureaucratic control over the territory. There was no unified military, evident once the uprising began and some military and tribal elites sided with the revolutionaries while some remained loyal, leading to stalemate and civil war. This fragmentation and lack of institutional chains of command meant superficial change couldn’t be enacted by the military as in Egypt and Tunisia.

Hence in Libya, contestation between rebels and regime loyalists led to change which was more than superficial. Libya meets at least the first criterion for a state breakdown revolution: Gaddafi’s erratic leadership had led the country into financial crisis, and state organisation was in shambles, fulfilling the requirement that “the army, police and officials no longer can enforce order because they themselves are disaffected.” However, it is unlikely that the second was fulfilled – in a kleptocracy, the state faction essentially is the economically privileged faction. Gaddafi eliminated threats from wealthy elites through routine purges, ‘cleansing committees’ and sending rivals to posts overseas.

Does Libya fit into either category? Unlike Egypt and Tunisia where the state remained with many of the same people in power, the rebels in Libya had to establish their own government. It was triggered by mass protests like a tipping point revolution, but the weakness of Gaddafi’s institutions (and some help from NATO) meant the revolution led instead to state breakdown.