Political competition in poor countries

Is political competition in very poor countries, and in particular elections, counterproductive? Paul Collier, a professor of economics at Oxford University, argues that it is:

Collier’s primary conclusion: democracy, in the superficial, election-focused form that tends to prevail in these countries, “has increased political violence instead of reducing it.” Without rules, traditions, and checks and balances to protect minorities, distribute resources fairly and subject officials to the law, these governments lack the accountability and legitimacy to discourage rebellion. The quest for power becomes a “life-and-death struggle” in which “the contestants are driven to extremes.”

Collier’s data show that before an election, warring parties may channel their antagonisms into politics, but that violence tends to flare up once the voting is over. What’s more, when elections are won by threats, bribery, fraud and bloodshed, such so-called democracies tend to promote bad governance, since the policies needed to retain power are quite different from those needed to serve the common good.

Ethnic identification in the multiethnic societies that predominate among the bottom billion is a particular impediment. Leaders have no incentive to perform well, Collier explains, if voters cast ballots according to ethnic loyalty rather than governmental competence. Nor should we be fooled into thinking that democracy is working just because voters turn out in large numbers. Where identity politics prevail, “voting is likely to be primarily expressive,” like “wearing a football scarf.” It doesn’t mean voters have faith that their ballots will lead to more effective government. Besides, because news organizations in these countries are weak and objective information scarce, citizens probably don’t even know how well or how badly their leaders are performing.

To flourish among the bottom billion, Collier says, democracy must “gradually erode ethnic identities and replace them with a national identity.” Economic development helps, but in societies riven by ethnic divisions, it can simply increase the stakes to be parceled out among the different groups. According to Collier, what is essentially needed are visionary leaders who can build identification with the nation as a whole.

The West’s mistaken fixation with elections, according to Collier, has mainly to do with lingering cold war habits. The Soviet dread of the ballot, he writes, “confused us into thinking that achieving a competitive election is in itself the key triumph. The reality is that rigging elections is not daunting: only the truly paranoid dictators avoid them.”

What do you think of this argument? How does it compare to the argument of Bueno de Mesquita et al.? Is there a contradiction between what Collier is saying and what Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators are saying? Does the argument imply that non-democracy is better than democracy in some places?

(cross-posted)