Igor Yurgens is at it again.
Back in February, the senior adviser to President Dmitry Medvedev rattled the Moscow political elite when he told the "New York Times" that Russia's implicit social contract -- in which citizens sacrificed political freedoms in exchange for rising living standards -- was being rendered null and void by the deepening economic crisis. Political liberalization, he said, was necessary if Russia was to emerge from the deepening recession.
Defenders of the current system wasted no time pushing back. Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the regimes unofficial ideologist, ridiculed Yurgen's comments and insisted that "the system is working."
Gleb Pavlovsky, a pro-Kremlin analyst who heads the Effective Politics Foundation, went as far as to suggest that comments likeYurgen's were an indication that a small "pro-crisis party" is lurking inside the Russian elite and might be plotting "a new little coup.
Apparently the push back has not deterred Yurgens.
In an interview with Britain's "Daily Telegraph" published today, Yurgens took aim at the authoritarian system of "sovereign democracy," saying it was holding back Russia's development:
The present system shows signs of overextension. It shows signs of over centralization and fragility because it is based not on institutions but on the mythological vertical of power. The reform process stumbled halfway. We have to push very hard to restart those reforms otherwise we will not be ready to catch up with the G8. We will remain on the level of leading emerging nations.
Other officials have echoed Yurgen's views in recent months, including Arkady Dvorkovich, the head of the Kremlin's experts directorate.
The ongoing public debate has naturally raised questions about whether Medvedev is trying to break free from the influence of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Russia's de facto ruler and the president's political mentor and patron. Those speaking out against the current system, after all, tend to be close to Medvedev, while those defending it are almost always members of Putin's inner circle.
Do you think the current economic situation in Russia is likely to favor hardliners or softliners? What are the prospects for liberalization/democratization in Russia, given these divisions?
(cross-posted)
It seems to me that it could swing either way. Crucial to the outcome is a whole lotta stuff that we don't know, and can't realistically know. For example how exactly is the power split up between Putin and Medvedev? Its obvious that Putin is a heck of a lot more than simply a figurehead and its obvious also what Putin favors. How long is he going to let Medvedev influence things if Putin does indeed hold the real steering wheel?
ReplyDeleteTo take a historical view, economic crises have long been a catalyst for a rise in support for hardliners. Think how the Nazis came in to power in Germany! Its widely acknowledged that the economic meltdown at the beginning of the 30s made Hitlers strong, clearcut, decisive vision for a great, powerful Germany a more attractive one and was an important factor in what we all know happened next.
But I wouldn't go so far as to compare Putin to Hitler. For one thing Putin doesn't have a moustache. But I did a quick google search and found some other opinions.
One point is that Putin came to power as a succesful bureaucrat as opposed to a popular leader like Hitler. Relevant? I don't see that this point matters too much, and that relative popularity now is the more important thing.
This commentator certainly Russia is moving towards a fascist outcome: http://dzutsev.wordpress.com/2008/02/21/is-putin-hitler/
They cite as evidence the narrowing of political freedoms and no freedom for the media.
One important thing I would note is the similarity between the two in terms of the cult of personality being built up around Putin. He is the saviour of the fatherland, the paternal figure who wants to restore greatness to Russia. To me, this ambitious vision is all the more inspiring in this time of economic crisis. I think the hardliners have the advantage.
TheRothmanator, Hitler would not be a "hardliner" in O'Donnell and Schmitter's terminology, since he was not part of the regime at the time. A "hardliner" in an authoritarian regime is someone who thinks the regime should continue to be authoritarian and requires no liberalization (as presumably Putin believes), unlike apparently Medvedev (who appears to think, or at least people close to him think, that the regime should be liberalized).
ReplyDeleteEconomic crisis have sometimes brought the softliners to power in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Gorbachev in the Soviet Union). But your point about how ths depends on information that we realistically cannot know is well taken.
I was definitely wrong in my labelling Hitler as a "hardliner", more fair to say is that I think stronger government can be more attractive in times such as these. However I was not thinking about the opposite reaction such as Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Furthermore I just read an article written at the end of last year (so after the financial crisis had begun) about the myth of Putins popularity. Perhaps he is not as well supported by the Russian people as it appears:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-coalson/the-myth-of-putins-popula_b_154209.html
However, having said that, how reactive is the current Russian administration to the delicacies of popularity? Russias elections aren't rigged (though whether they are fairly 'contested' is another question) and so votes do count. But of course Russia's internal politics are a lot more complicated than that. It might be that Putin has more capacity and capability to shape policy than we even realise. Wouldn't it be interesting to know how that dynamic really works?