Wednesday, 18 September 2013

Chile 1990 - Present

As Valenzuela’s article outlines, Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin was elected to be the first president after Pinochet, heading a centre-left alliance of 16 parties called the Concertación de Partidos por La Democracia. Valenzuela states that the institutional guarantees stipulated by Pinochet’s regime were critical to the democratic transition, ensuring majority rule would not threaten elites (in support of Acemoglu and Robinson on the importance of pandering to the elite for stability in an emerging democracy).

In 1993, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle was elected to succeed Aylwin. The centre-left alliance won against the right 69.4% to 30.2%, but during Frei’s time the centrist Christian Democratic Party lost support. The Socialists replaced the Christian Democratic Party as the most popular party in the Concertación, and demanded Socialist Ricardo Lagos be the Concertación’s candidate for the 1999 presidential election. The Christian Democrats were highly reluctant to have a Socialist candidate. Valenzuela’s piece (written in the late 90’s, I think?) suggests this division “raise[s] the spectre of demise of Chile’s successful governing coalition,” threatening a return to the shifting minority coalitions of the past. Politics after Pinochet is said to have been “heroic”, uniting the left in a fight for democracy, but as politics returns to “normal”, Valenzuela thinks the coalition may begin to disperse.

I now take up where the Valenzuela article left off - Socialist Lagos did indeed take the presidency in December 1999. Before the next election (2005), another “bitter internal struggle” over presidential candidates took place in the Concertación.  Christian Democrat Soledad Alvear lost to Socialist Michelle Bachelet Jeria, who went on to win the presidential election. Analysis from 2008 suggests Valenzuela’s prediction was correct: cohesion was necessary in the transition to democracy, but “since thedeath of Gen Pinochet in December 2006, the ties that have bound the coalitionparties together have been loosening”.

In 2010, Conservative Sebastián Piñera narrowly won over Frei, marking the first time the centre-right was elected since the end of Pinochet’s rule.  Why did the centre-left lose? Mauricio Morales Quiroga suggests severalreasons. Piñera expanded the right’s voting base further into the centre, overcoming the persistent divide between the two. Also importantly, the right were able to unite under a single candidate, unlike the left.

However, Piñera has lost popularity since – he complains that “Latin America has always been centre-left” and “socialism is about handouts so people like left-leaning presidents more”. Article here, English explanation/analysis here.

Bachelet has won the primaries and will run for president this November. Interestingly, she has been seeking the backing of the Communists in addition to the Concertación alliance which has thus far excluded them. Is this a sign of Chile's return to economically irresponsible leftist politics? The centre-right has reminded voters of the risk of Chavez-style rule in Latin America. However, Greg Weeks states that “this is 2013, not 1973”, implying that the Chilean left has learned from their mistakes under Allende. What do you think - are we likely to see strongly leftist politics return to Chile?

3 comments:

  1. Erika, what do you think the theory suggests? As the memory of the dictatorship fades, and inequalities remain high, should we expect more efforts from the left to redistribute wealth, especially since there is less of a sense that the military would intervene again as in the 1970s? Or does Chile's greater wealth today moderate these pressures?

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  2. Acemoglu & Robinson argue that “institutions that place limits on pro-majoritarian policies in democracy are likely to help consolidation”, so as constraints on pro-majoritarian policies from the Pinochet era are eroded this may make it easier for the left to redistribute wealth.

    A & R suggest the middle-class may act as a buffer, as they demand less redistribution of wealth. According to 2010 OECD statistics, Chile now has a large middle class – 49.14% of the population (disadvantaged 18.67%; wealthy 32.19%). But Chile’s middle class may not be affluent enough to perform this role as the gap between middle class and working class is small, and middle class is defined by the state as earning above minimum wage – so many of them feel economically vulnerable, which we see in protests around the unfairness of the education system.

    I think Valenzuela mentions that ‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘centre’ have taken on less polarised meanings, which should lessen the likelihood of extreme leftist pro-majoritarian policies or a coup by the right. This could be partly a result of overall higher income, as inequality has only lessened slightly since Pinochet, judging by GINI index.

    Information on the middle class from http://www.dw.de/chiles-middle-class-survives-on-shaky-ground/a-16527618 and http://www.oecd.org/chile/middleclassinlatinamericaeconomicallyvulnerable.htm

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