EBP 1

 EBP 1 

How Dictatorships Work, Power, Personalisation, and Collapse

Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz

How Dictatorships Work is an objective political account published by the Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 discusses the basic facts behind how dictatorships form, and the main motivations behind elite groups to overthrow a democracy. This chapter rejects the popularised notion that dictatorships are typically initiated by worries of resource distribution, but rather personal interests, such as ethnic differences. This chapter, Autocratic Seizures of Power, discusses the interests of a dictator, how they must partake in elite bargaining in order to maintain their power, and how it is impossible for a dictator to come into power alone. There is the possibility that a dictator may not even be the most politically wary or charismatic. The chapter brings form an interesting idea that a dictator is actually one of the weakest political positions to be in, as achieving the position of a dictator requires a large amount of effort. 

Rejecting Popularised Ideas 

The authors provide systematic data in order to reject the common misconception that the majority of dictatorships of the modern era began from a direct over-throwing of democracy. However, less than a third of post-World War II dictator regimes began by directly replacing democracies. 28% of this third were of a democratically elected government that “authoritarianised” itself. This means that it began by making the opposition void, banning the executive and closing the legislature. The authors outline six ways in which the empirical record shows that modern dictatorships began; 

1. Coups, replacing the previous government with one in favour by the military

In the majority, coups are completed by military officers. Occasionally, the military group may have civilian supporters, however this is not a guarantee. 

2. Insurgency, where military leaders are replaced by their own.

The majority of insurgencies are conducted by parties, and most commonly occur at the end of colonisation. 

3. Foreign conquest, which has the possibility to result in a dictatorship or a democracy 

Foreign conquest can occur as the foreign forces are outgoing, or when their forces are entering a country. Outgoing powers can create dictatorships when handing a civilian regime complete autonomy over a state.

4. Autocratic elitism, which alters any “checks and balances” which decides what groups have the ability to enter the inner circle of the regime

By the leading party altering what groups are permitted inside the elite centre, the dictator creates an echo-chamber. This does not typically occur in states where there is a non-personalist dictator.

5. Popular uprising, which typically begins with the promise to restore democracy within a country, and;

6. Competitively elected elites altering election rules to permit an opposition group from running effectively

Popular uprisings and elite rule changes are the two least common formations for a dictatorship, the authors state. This is because both of these require democracy as a starting point, which is not always possible. 

Installing a new dictatorship is typically done in an opportunistic manner, and the authors state how the nature of the seizure of power is heavily reflective of the capacity of the state at that time. 

Entering a Dictatorship

The authors chronologically discuss what takes place in the lead-up towards the seizure of power. It is theorised that in order for a seizure group to be successful, and maintain the discipline required in order to secure power, there must be a lack of consequences for those wishing to leave. This highlights the key difference between a dictator who is immediately coming into power, directly after the seizure group, and a successive dictator. In Part II of this book, Elite Consolidation, the authors propose an interesting notion that a successive dictator does not need to be particularly strong-willed or possess major leadership qualities in order to succeed, they can just partake in the act of “elite bargaining”, which heightens their popularity. However, the authors state, for a dictator who is directly coming into power, they are far more likely to succeed when they are effectively able to articulate their goals in a manner which is accessible to everyday civilians, which attracts the civilian population, rather than just the elite which is demonstrated through the process of ‘elite bargaining’. 

The authors use primarily anecdotal evidence in order to examine the success rates of the differing ways to enter a dictatorship. The authors draw a key distinction between non-incumbent seizure groups, and incumbent seizure groups. It is objectively easier for military groups to stage a coup, due to the authority and jurisdiction they have over part of the state previously. However, during a party-led seizure group, this is harder. Instead of ordering civilians to participate, they must genuinely attract citizens to fight for the cause alongside them, which can prove to be a difficult task. Particularly for non-incumbent seizure groups, their policies, and what instruments they are using to implement them, must be at the forefront of their plan, but they may have to promise differing policies to differing groups of people, in order to attract a sufficient amount of support. 

Conclusion 

An issue with this reading is that it is quite generalising of the process of dictatorships, and even though primarily anecdotal evidence is used towards the second half in order to try and give an effective account into the process of seizure of power, whilst leaving it largely abstract. The authors did provide a small amount of examples to justify their claims, for example when stating that incumbent parties promise differing policies to differing people, mention Didier Ratsiraka in Madagascar, who introduced a socialist regime without ever exerting leftist views. 

One of the most interesting points within this chapter is the rejection of common misconceptions when it comes to the most basic facts of a dictatorship, and that an incoming authoritarian regime is largely opportunistic. The authors also emphasise the distinction between incumbent dictators, and others.

Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2018). Autocratic Seizures of Power. In How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse (pp. 25–43). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.