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Who decides what is democratic? - Adam Przeworski 

Democracy is not easily definable. Even when it is, the meaning of democracy has various nuances in the way it can be understood. This is the idea that Przeworski explores in this reading, whilst explaining in depth how attached values and meanings of democracy by the people may be linked to the efficiency of democracy itself. 

One of the ways in which Przeworski illustrates the idea of the ‘people’ is through the idea that even in a purely democratic society, every possible decision is bound to displease someone. Przeworski therefore accounts that the ‘people’ can’t be referred to in a singular term considering the wide variety of interests different people hold. This shows that Przeworski is skeptical in stating that it would be down primarily to the people when it comes to deciding what is democratic or not – purely because different people attach different value to democracy. This means that however democracy may be expressed within a system will be counter to how one individual may value democracy. This ongoing narrative by Przeworski seems to suggest that the general population would not be of assistance in deciding what is democratic and begs the even bigger question as to which entity does decide what is democratic and how. This seems to be the main dilemma of this article – how do we navigate the different values and interpretations of democracy when any expression of democracy couldn’t possibly meet everyone’s different values?

Przeworski’s analysis of democracy is very helpful in understanding how the people’s (subjective) perception of the government helps determine how the government itself is likely to operate. For example, for an authoritarian government to successfully be ‘authoritarian’ it would be reliant on the people perceiving this government as the sole eternal source of authority – e.g. people awareness of lack of competing parties, no elections, questionable constitution. However, the people may still perceive a government as authoritarian yet not necessarily ‘undemocratic’ because the people may value democracy in a way that correlates with authoritarian regimes. This seems to be the gist of Przeworski’s argument – it can only be undemocratic if determined to be undemocratic and the people may not necessarily always perceive something as undemocratic, even if it is. 

His skepticism regarding how much capacity the people have in valuing democracy is also further described when he goes on to discuss delegative populism to which he refers to as occurring when people want the government to govern despite them potentially dismantling constraints on power e.g. removing the law ending the governing term. This may occur in a situation where the current government is so unbelievably unfavorable that the general population could be much more drawn to a party that is inherently anti-democratic but better appeals to their perceived needs. Przeworski does not seem to be under the impression that the people will always advocate for what’s inherently democratic, but rather for what may suit their best interests. Przeworski notes that while populism may appeal to some with their anti-establishment rhetoric, there is still a form of governing over others that populists brush over which proves that any form of government, democratically elected or not, is bound to disappoint someone. Przeworski’s ideas about democracy suggest democracy as being more subjective than it seems. Because of this, it is very much possible you may have antidemocratic governments that are incorrectly perceived as democratic, simply because of the way the people may interpret that government. 

We see through Przeworski’s minimalist/maximalist categorization of democracy, how Przeworski truly believes that this categorization can be of assistance in determining whether something would be interpreted as antidemocratic or not. The minimalist definition of democracy, as put by Przeworski,  is very basic and direct – simply that citizens are to be able to freely choose governments and that all correct procedural requirements are met during this process. On the other hand, the maximalist definition alludes to interests and ideals that people hope to get out of democracy and tend to be more extrinsic. It makes sense why Przeworski would find this categorization effective, this is because his acknowledgement of people willing to vote for undemocratic parties when their interests are better met describe a maximalist categorization. This is because it counts on individuals valuing democracy in a way intended to serve their desires and ideals. Some people may prefer to vote for undemocratic parties simply because the party promises to produce more desirable results. It appears only a maximalist categorization of democracy would lead to the people being inclined to vote undemocratically. Przeworski’s argument seems to suggest that people don’t tend to view democracy in way that a minimalist categorization of democracy describes – adequate constraints on law-making powers and value democracy in the way that it should serve them thus voting for parties that appeal to their interests despite potentially being undemocratic.

This article is useful for understanding how differently democracy can be perceived and depending on how someone wishes to define it, it could lead to people being comfortable with anti-democratic parties if they’re perceived to be beneficial in any way. This may show insight as to how authoritarian regimes come into fruition, as it doesn’t ever seem likely that the people could subconsciously wish for something undemocratic unless they perceive it as helpful in another regard, which Przeworski brilliantly explains.

https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/democratic-vs-undemocratic