EBP #1

Weyland, Kurt, 'Populism’s Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 18, no. 2, June 2020, pp.389-406.

Introduction

Kurt Weyland, in ‘Populism’s Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States’ provides analysis of the breakdown of democracy to authoritarianism. Weyland discusses Donald Trump’s populism and compares his authority with other populist regimes. The study enables Weyland to conclude US democracy would not regress to authoritarianism without two features; institutional weaknesses and an exogenous crisis. Through comparisons, Weyland conveys that without the combination of these features, authoritarianism will not replace democracy. Consequently, Weyland critiques arguments that Trump’s populism will lead to authoritarianism, instead offering the thesis that his presidency “revitalize[d] and energize[d]” US democracy (Weyland 2020, 402). 

Populism as an Enabler of Authoritarianism

Populism advocates for ordinary citizens against elites, who are viewed as manipulating establishments. Therefore, populists are opposed to democratic establishments which shape laws, economic systems, and social contexts. Although often connected to elites, the leader portrays themselves as ‘ordinary’. Such a depiction of ordinariness increases the leader's support as “vulnerable people” feel politically represented (Keppens, Spruyt & Drogendroeck 2016, 334). Therefore, populists are viewed as capable of positive economic, cultural, and political change. Moreover, populists tend to be charismatic – a factor that is significant in a crisis when voters seek resolution (Algan et al 2017, 309). Weyland argues populism “resists institutionalization” as democratic establishments innately “constrain the leader’s latitude and impede their quest for unchallenged predominance” (Weyland 2020, 391). The attempted breakdown of democratic institutions that constrain leaders therefore erodes democracy itself and a consequential authoritarian regime may be established.  

Donald Trump, the President of the US between 2017 and 2021, is a right-wing populist (Conley 2020, 54). Trump uses exclusionary language to create a sense of unity amongst supporters. The ‘opposition’ in Trump’s campaign is immigrants, elites, the ‘fake news’, and the Democratic party (Silverman 2018, 27). Trump’s appeal is significant with Americans residing in the Rust Belt, where economic downturn and traditional Christian-based values play acute roles (Chang et al 2020, 104-120). Weyland, therefore, analyses the claims that the “rise of populism has aroused concern about democracy’s survival, even in the United States” (Weyland 2020, 389). 

The Breakdown of Democracy into Authoritarianism by Populist Leaders

Weyland argues that two factors must coincide for populist leaders in democratic states to successfully regress into authoritarianism.

1. Institutional Weakness

2. Exogenous Crises

Authoritarianism occurs when institutional weaknesses allow “populist power grabs” following the erosion of checks and balances (Weyland 2020, 395). Such erosion occurs through high democratic instability and the state’s openness to institutional and para-legal change. The lack of embeddedness of democratic values in newly-formed democracies means the foundations of institutions may be unstable. Furthermore, the social and economic lives of citizens may be unstable as they are directly affected by democratisation (Boccia, Mohammadi, & Tohidi 2023, 1). Therefore, democratic frameworks may be easily manipulated by populists. Furthermore, the instability of institutions leaves the state vulnerable to changes. Parliamentarianism is inherently more susceptible to legal law changes, however, proportional representation through coalitions limits the ability of populists to concentrate power. Para-legal changes occur more frequently in presidentialism as leaders claim unsubstantiated powers, then “deter[ing] other branches of government from challenging” their authority (Weyland 2020, 394). From this position, the authoritarian redefines institutional frameworks and, often, removes term-limits to concentrate power. Consequently, the state falls into authoritarianism.  

Although weak democratic institutions provide opportunities for the state to slide into authoritarianism, exogenous crises enable populist leaders to gain omnipresent support. The crises must be acute, yet resolvable. Weyland states economic and security crisis allow for democratic backsliding. Economic and security crises do not only affect these specific areas – they have knock on consequences to other aspects of lives, thereby intensely impacting citizens. Therefore, resolution by the populist can drastically improve the lives of voters, increasing trust in the leader. The article notes that the mass support for populists harnessed through the resolution of crises enables them to create an authoritarian state as they are less likely to face opposition when para-legally changing state-wide frameworks. 

For authoritarianism to be implemented, institutional weakness and exogenous crises must coincide. Weyland offers exemplars of the successful enactment of authoritarianism and instances where the factors failed to occur simultaneously. Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela combined both factors to implement authoritarianism. Fujimori “closed Congress and the courts”, redesigned the constitution to allow re-election, and resolved hyperinflation and guerrilla insurgencies (Weyland 2020, 394-396). Chávez, like “Bolivia’s Morales, and Ecuador’s Correa”, used hydrocarbon windfalls to their advantage, creating social benefit schemes to fight oil prices (Weyland 2020, 398). Similarly to Fujimori, Chávez redesigned term limits after overriding legal barriers. Unlike Fujimori and Chávez, Álvaro Uribe of Colombia and Carlos Menem of Argentina were unable to implement authoritarianism. Weyland states both Uribe and Menem resolved crises – guerrilla warfare and hyperinflation respectively – but failed to sufficiently change democratic frameworks (Weyland 2020, 396). Therefore, the institutions had sufficient strength to prevent backsliding. Weyland uses a table to condense his findings:

The data was formed using the equation: Suffocation of Democracy = (Hyrdocarbon Windfall & High Instability) or ((Economic Crisis & Security Crisis) & Paralegal Change) or (Economic Crisis & Easy Change). Trump, found at the bottom of the table, received 0s in every category. Therefore, Weyland argues that the US does not suffer from institutional weakness, nor has it faced an exogenous crisis. 

Weyland states the US has “strict separation of powers and high hurdles to constitutional reform” (Weyland 2020, 400). The US has three branches of government – legislative, executive, and judicial – which prevents the concentration of power, and the manipulation of foundational laws. The importance of the long-lasting Constitution makes it difficult to amend; extreme circumstances must occur and must see omnipresent legal approval before changes. The duration of US democracy has embedded democratic values within citizens, making it challenging to regress to authoritarianism (Weyland 2020, 400-401). The US has not faced a significant crisis that would create omnipresent support for Trump. The US has the largest economy in the world, making it difficult for an economic crisis to affect the state, and the little political instability means guerilla warfare is unlikely to breakout. Consequently, Weyland concludes it would be challenging for US democracy to backslide to authoritarianism. Instead, the article argues Trump’s populism has strengthened US democracy. In recent decades, the US has seen decreased political engagement with dwindling voter turnout (Weyland 2020, 402). However, groups that Trump marginalised, as well as those strongly opposed to him, were motivated to support Democrats (Cox 2024). Consequently, the 2020 US Presidential Election saw the largest voter turnout in recent decades (Daniller et al 2023). Therefore, Weyland rejects the argument that US democracy is under threat, and instead proposes that populism has revitalised US democracy. 

Has the US Since Faced a Crisis?

As Weyland’s article was published before the escalation of COVID-19, it has since been argued that the US faced a health crisis. Deborah Lupton and Karen Willis state that COVID not only a health concern, but “is a crisis on every level: social, cultural, environmental and economic” (Lupton & Willis 2021, 3). The US had 1,123,836 COVID-related deaths, making it a crisis specifically within this state (Johns Hopkins University & Medicine 2023). Would a revision of the article conclude the Trump presidency faced a crisis, or was COVID ‘unresolvable’, thereby not aiding the rise of authoritarianism?

Conclusion

In conclusion, the article ‘Populism’s Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States’ by Kurt Weyland stresses the regression of democracy into authoritarianism under a populist leader when two features coincide; institutional weakness and exogenous crisis. Without the simultaneous occurrence of both, democracy will not backslide into authoritarianism. Wayland uses data from a variety of countries to justify his argument, including Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, and Bolivia. These states, under populist leadership, offer comparative lessons to the United States, where democratic values are embedded within the state by strong institutions. A further examination of US democracy following the COVID-19 crisis would provide an interesting study since the global pandemic affected Americans in everyday life. 

Sources

‘Coronavirus Resource Center’, Johns Hopkins University & Medicine; https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/united-states; accessed 22 July 2024.

Algan, Yann, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioannou, & Evgenia Passari, ‘The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2017, p.309.

Boccia, Flavio, Hosein Mohammadi, & Amirhossein Tohidi, ‘The Relationship Between Democracy and Economic Growth in the Path of Sustainable Development’, Sustainability, Vol. 15, no. 9607, 2023, p.1.

Chang, Arturo, Jie Chen, Thomas Ferguson, Benjamin I. Page, Jacob Rothschild, 'The Roots of Right-Wing Populism: Donald Trump in 2016', International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 49, no. 2, 2020, pp.104-120.

Conley, Richard S., Donald Trump and American Populism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020), p.54.

Cox, Kiana, ‘An Early Look at Black Voters’ Views on Biden, Trump and Election 2024’, Pew Research Center; https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2024/05/20/an-early-look-at-black-voters-views-on-biden-trump-and-election-2024/; accessed 22 July 2024.

Daniller, Andrew, Ted van Green, Hannah Hartig, & Scott Keeter, ‘Voter turnout, 2018-2022’, Pew Research Center; https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/07/12/voter-turnout-2018-2022/; accessed 22 July 2024.

Keppens, Gil, Bram Spruyt, & Filip Van Drogendroeck, ‘Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It?’, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 69, no. 2, June 2016, p.334.

Lupton, Deborah, Karen Willis, 'Covid Society', in Deborah Lupton, Karen Willis (eds.), The COVID-19 Crisis: Social Perspectives, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2021), p.3.

Silverman, Jacob, 'Is There a Deep State, and If So What Is It?', New Labor Forum, Vol. 27, no. 3, Fall 2018, p.27.

Weyland, Kurt, 'Populism’s Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 18, no. 2, June 2020, pp.389-406.