On Democratic Backsliding EBP

Article link https://muse-jhu-edu.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/article/607612

 Introduction

"On Democratic Backsliding" is an article by Nancy Bermeo in the Journal of Democracy that aims to analyze the techniques, institutions, and actors which lead to democratic backsliding. It discusses the change in how non-democratic regimes establish themselves in the post-Cold War era and why that change has taken place. To this end, it examines six different types of democratic backsliding: “open-ended coups d’état,” “promissory coups,” “executive coups,” “executive aggrandizement,” “election-day vote fraud,” and “strategic harassment and manipulation.” The article looks at each in turn and whether they have become more or less present in the post-Cold War era. The central point the article aims to prove with this analysis is that the solidification of the international system around democracy has forced changes in the ways non-democratic regimes come to power, forcing them to be more subtle about their end goal.

What is Backsliding
One of the first things this article does is briefly examine the meaning and origin of the word "backsliding," talking about its presence in the KJV Bible (Jeremiah 3:22) when a prophet is calling on Israel to abandon “faithless” habits. It's from this passage we get the term "backsliding" to mean willfully turning away from an ideal, hence democratic backsliding meaning formerly democratic countries turning away from the ideals of democracy. This can be through a gradual process of undermining democratic foundations or it can be as rapid as a coup taking power overnight. Both are forms of backsliding, but both have quite different outcomes.

Open-Ended vs Promissory Coups
To support its argument that the international system’s focus on democracy has changed the nature and origin of non-democratic regimes, the article points to the worldwide decline of coups and coup attempts. Using a graph (Figure 1), it shows that the probability a democracy will be targeted by a coup has declined significantly. Furthermore, the probability that any coup will be successful has also decreased. In addition to this decline, the nature of coups has changed. Coups have moved away from the open-ended coups common in the Cold War era towards so-called promissory coups, where the faction taking power promises a return to democracy. The percentage of coups that could be called promissory has risen from 35% before 1990 to 85% afterwards. The article says that this increase is due to the pressure from international democracy promoters to at least take on the appearance of democracy to avoid or ameliorate sanctions that would otherwise be imposed. The article sees this decline (of coup attempts) as evidence of the success of the international order. While this is undoubtedly a factor, what it does not mention is that many coups during the Cold War were backed by either the USSR or USA, and with the end of the Cold War, it is now very unlikely for any coup to have the support of a major power, which could be another factor contributing to their decline that goes unmentioned by the article.

Figure 1 COUP FREQUENCY IN DEMOCRACIES, 1950–2014 source 1 

Executive Aggrandizement
Executive aggrandizement is the most common form of democratic backsliding and happens when the executive branch of government seeks to suppress or subsume the other branches of government, thereby removing checks and safeguards in order to stay in power or increase its ability to legislate. This form of backsliding generally has popular support, at least at first, and generally occurs after a populist party wins a large victory and is therefore able to alter laws regarding the separation of powers, generally under the guise of dealing with corrupt elites or national security. The article uses the AKP in Turkey led by Recep Erdoğan as an example of how executive aggrandizement takes place: “Erdoğan led his party to a resounding victory in the 2002 national elections <…> The AKP’s strength in parliament provided the infrastructure for the “quiet revolution” that Erdoğan promised his supporters, enabling the passage of a record number of new laws (including more than five hundred during his first two years in office). Many of these laws undercut institutions of accountability. Media freedoms and judicial autonomy became prime sites for democratic backsliding.” Erdoğan’s actions in Turkey are the textbook example of democratic backsliding through executive aggrandizement. While on the surface they do have popular support and a mandate to pass such legislation, in doing so, the AKP has significantly undermined Turkish democracy by increasing the power of the executive while simultaneously lowering its accountability. While the article does discuss executive aggrandizement and some examples of it at length, it fails to reckon with a key question: Is it right to oppose executive aggrandizement when the government behind it has a popular mandate to do so? If a party has campaigned on increasing the power of the executive branch and the citizens have overwhelmingly voted for that party, is that not what they should do? This question brings up a democracy paradox: Is it undemocratic to prevent citizens from voting themselves out of a democracy?

Strategic Election Manipulation vs Election Day Fraud
Strategic election manipulation is the third form of backsliding discussed in the article. Nancy Bermeo describes it as “a range of actions aimed at tilting the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents” and gives examples like “packing electoral commissions, changing electoral rules to favor incumbents, and harassing opponents,” but importantly, “all done in such a way that the elections themselves do not appear fraudulent.” The article attributes the rise of this strategy (which can be seen in Figure 2) to the rise of international election monitoring and notes that while blatant election fraud is becoming less common, electoral misconduct “is not declining in the aggregate” (Source 2). One idea not explored by the article is that this observation suggests that international election monitoring may need to take a more holistic view of the entire election cycle rather than just the day itself.

Figure 2 Opposition Harassment and Leader Disqualification, 1991–2010 Source 1

Conclusions and Relevance to POLS 209
The first conclusion of the article has direct relevance to POLS 209 as it is an appeal to political scientists to pay more attention to how democratic backsliding occurs, particularly in its more subtle forms like strategic election manipulation and executive aggrandizement. It asks scholars to see democracy as “a collage of institutions crafted and recrafted by different actors at different times.” This view is directly relevant to POLS 209 as it provides guidance on how we should view democracy in order to contrast it with non-democratic regimes and highlights the importance of examining the strength of the various institutions in a democracy, even those that may not seem directly relevant to the democratic process.

The second conclusion of the article is a warning about the danger of more subtle and insidious forms of democratic backsliding. Things like strategic election manipulation and executive aggrandizement are much harder to mobilize popular support against compared to more direct and public forms of democratic backsliding. It notes the particular issue that civil groups advocating for those disadvantaged by losses of civil liberties can easily be discredited as foreign interests, particularly as they often do receive funding from abroad. Furthermore, executive aggrandizement and strategic election manipulation take place when the opposition is already weakened and generally have popular support, at least in the beginning, further increasing the difficulty of mobilizing popular support against these techniques.

The ultimate conclusion and main thrust of the article is that the mix of democratic backsliding we have today is ultimately more positive than it was during the Cold War. Generally, direct seizing of power by authoritarian forces is no longer the threat it once was. Instead, the main threat now is leaders who do have a popular mandate seeking to expand and solidify their power by eroding some of the foundations of democracy rather than outright removing it. The article attributes this change to democracy-promoting nations’ primary place in the international order as well as systems like international election monitoring. While this is largely correct, I think the article fails to mention an important point in its omission of the fact that some of these democracy promoters used to fund or actively arm coups and could do so again if they felt it necessary

Refences

1 Regime data are from Polity IV, supplemented with Polity IV data modified by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch https://muse-jhu-edu.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/article/607612 Figure 1 & 2

2 Donno, Defending Democratic Norms, p56