EBP 2

 

The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?

                                                        by Kurt Weyland

In his book "The Arab Spring: An Attempt to Examine the Striking Similarities between These Two Different Periods of Revolution, Their Mechanisms and the Situations They Faced," Kurt Weiland wrote. Although the two revolutions took place in very different times and contexts, they bear striking similarities, especially in how leaders launched revolutions, spread ideas, and ultimately failed. This paper aims to analyze the similarities between these two revolutions, explain the reasons for their failure, the critical role of cognitive shortcuts in both revolutions and their influence on the direction of the final outcome. By dissecting this article, we can relate it to our revolution, dictatorship and ideology curriculum, and help us learn this course.

What both revolutions have in common：

Weyland points out that the most apparent place between the revolutions of 1848 and the Arab Spring is in the root causes that facilitated the outbreak of the revolutions, the way information was disseminated, and the initial illusion of success. First, both revolutions were inspired by foreign success (with one pioneer as the banner of "success" that others followed): in 1848, the February Revolution in France quickly set off a new wave of revolutions in other countries, leading to a 'magnitude 10' revolution across the European continent in just one year; After protests in Tunisia toppled a dictator in 2011, a similar series of uprisings broke out across the Arab world. In retrospect, the other thing they have in common is that they all show the waves of revolution across national borders, where revolutionaries can connect thousands of miles apart. This ties in with the pattern of revolutionary transmission that we discussed in class.

What followed was that the speed and manner in which the revolution spread matched perfectly. 1848, revolutionary information exploded in newspapers and letters, prompting uprisings in other countries. During the Arab Spring, social media became a primary conduit for information, allowing protesters to connect and share strategies. The essence of using information and communication to get a more significant response is the same, only with the progress of technology, from newspapers to the Internet, which is undoubtedly more convenient and fast.

Although such similarities seem lovely in theory, they reflect the revolutionaries' neglect of complex realities in practice. Revolutionaries have always been overly optimistic about revolution, believing that a new one will naturally be established once the old regime has been overthrown. This idea and the specific practice are incredibly naive and need more preparation.

There's one more thing that Kurt ignores that they have in common: the revolutionized class, the royalty and the authoritarian rulers. This group has different interests and even conflicts and disputes in ordinary times, but their reactions and counter-measures are surprisingly consistent in the face of revolution. It would also come to the rescue in solving its own problems, as in the revolutions of 1848, when the allied forces of the Austrian Empire, Prussia, and Russia quickly crushed the revolutions in Hungary and Italy. These ruling classes were so tacit and briefly formed an alliance of life and death interests to quell the revolutionary tide at all costs. Something similar happened in the Arab world in 2011 when the Arab Spring began. In the face of power and life and death, they put aside their past prejudices and grudges and unanimously suppressed the flame of the revolutionaries.

Why revolutions fail：

The European revolutions of 1848 and the Arab Spring of 2011 failed to achieve their intended democratic goals, causing social disharmony, large numbers of refugees, and slow development and poverty. One of the similarities between successful and failed Arab societies is that things are getting worse rather than changing the status quo (employment, etc.).

In the Arab Spring, military forces and remnants of old regimes in many countries have regained control through various means and even strengthened their rule. As I mentioned earlier, the ruling classes of the various countries supported each other and sent troops to help suppress the rebellion to achieve common goals and interests.

These revolutionaries always panic after defeat, causing problems in the external environment, completely ignoring their strategic mistakes and disagreements during the revolution. This avoidance of one's own responsibility and the impulsive emotion of indulging in emotion did not work but pushed the future revolution to the abyss. At the same time, the preparation was insufficient; even directly copied the text, transferring the European model to the Arab world. It does not analyze the different variables and the power that the audience can control. Secondly, there was no unified organization. In the early stage, there were many resistance organizations in Tunisia, but they were not very strong. Later, many countries had no unified resistance organizations, so there was no flag. After the blood had run out, the tide of the rebels faded. For example, in the late days of the Arab Spring, I am still troubled by the lack of a clear vision/consensus for the management and leadership of random protesters. The sense of powerlessness in this process is precisely the critical problem that revolutionaries face in complex political situations.

The role and influence of cognition:

In Kurt‘s article, Weyland emphasizes the critical element of revolution - cognition. The two groups of molecules involved in the revolution used cognitive shortcuts, simple logic and external success stories to determine their respective courses of action. The participants of the 1848 revolution were impressed by the success of the French Revolution, which became a model for revolutionaries in other countries to follow. In the Arab Spring, the insurgents, inspired by Tunisia's success in overthrowing a dictator, ignored the historical, social, and political differences between countries. There is no specific analysis, careful arrangement, and management according to the actual situation and strength. Such cognitive leaps lead to generalisations and blind imitation of external models that fail to address complex domestic problems.

This path of cognitive disorientation is closely related to the external ideological and internal political realities discussed in class. Idealists are one of the forces driving revolutions, and this force can easily lead to a corresponding over-optimism and insufficient attention to the differences that exist in other countries.

In addition, the cognitive bias caused the revolutionaries to seriously misassess the social and economic conditions after the revolution's success, believing that once the regime changed, the society would automatically move towards prosperity and stability while ignoring the social changes that needed to be achieved through hard work. As a result, revolutionaries often relax their requirements for governance capacity and policymaking after initial success, leaving the new regime lacking effective solutions to complex socio-economic problems. At the time of the uprising, these revolutionaries saw the bad things in today's society. Still, they did not think about how the new government would solve these problems once the revolution was successful. Even if, as in Tunisia, the revolution succeeds, the new government still cannot solve and improve the existing social problems, nor does it have a concrete operational program, even because the issues of the troubled society are more severe than before. So, it's hard to call it a successful revolution, and the new leaders are arguably no better at running the country and governing society than the dictators who came before them. This is also the case with many revolutions. Despite success or failure, society has not improved much, and people's lives are still as tricky as ever.

Conclusion:

By comparing the similarities, weaknesses, and effects of the revolutions of 1848 with the events of the Arab Spring, Weyland provides an essential framework for understanding contemporary revolutionary phenomena. This paper offers a specific historical and theoretical background to revolution's positive and negative aspects and a rich connection to the classroom discussion of revolution, dictatorship, and ideology. Using the cognitive heuristic approach, we gain insight into how revolutionaries are misled by external appearances of success, fail to analyze specific situations, and ultimately make revolutions unsustainable. This mechanism of disentangling events enables us to reflect more deeply on the relationship between ideology and practical action in modern political movements. It allows us to gain experience and lessons that can be used for reference in future political changes. It can be combined with the actual situation analysis and adequate preparation, and also consider the country's governance problems and solutions after the revolution's success. Just overthrowing the old government does not mean the revolution is a success. Real success is leading the country and the people out of the current situation, improving social problems, and leading everyone to a better tomorrow.

- Shengyao Sun