EBP 1 - Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt

 The introduction chapter of  "Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt" by Lisa Blaydes is an introductory piece to her book about competitive elections in authoritative regimes, specifically in Egypt when it was under Hosni Mubarak explaining that despite how authoritative his regime was elections were an important part in maintaining the status quo. In Blaydes's introduction, she outlines why the regime held elections, why there are candidates and why people voted as well as how the economic patterns changed around election time. Blayde mainly argues that holding these fake elections had allowed Murabak to maintain his authoritative regime for around 30 years until he died in 2010. These "elections" allowed Murabak to maintain the stability of the regime by easing distributional conflicts among elites, providing a facade for corruption, and enhancing the autocrat's international reputation, ultimately covering up any corruption. 

The reading written by Lisa Blaydes is a social scientific study which builds onto theories about authoritative regimes and elections, contributing to how institutions support stability in authoritarian regimes. Blaydes challenges the idea that elections are not just a tool for maintaining a democracy but can be equally important in maintaining a dictatorship. Blaydes uses Egypt under Murabak as the main example, as under Murabak, Egypt stepped back from direct economic control and created a neoliberal system, which makes it difficult for Murabak to have control over elites and public discontent. Therefore, the use of elections provided a structured way to manage conflicts among the elite and any public discontent with the ability to allocate resources and political positions in response to any threats to the regime. This historical context is important to understand why elections were held and why Murabaks Egypt is a prime case study for elections in authoritarian regimes. The reading stands in contrast to other theories that differ or outright deny the effects of elections. Such as Brownlee, 2007 states that it is effective parties that solve conflicts among the elite, not elections, and Geddes, 2005 states that besides managing conflicts is most important aspect is the ability of elections to counterbalance the military which tends to be a significant threat to a coup under any regime. Blaydes also expands on this by saying Egypt is a good example as it has a large population of 111 million and is a leading actor in its region. 

Some of the key points of the reading and how they connect to this week’s course theme on “Parties and the Institutionalization of Rule” the main one being that elections are a stabilising mechanic under authoritative regimes. The reason is that elections can be used to help manage distributional conflicts among elects by creating a competitive environment in which resources can be allocated among the elites in a rational way creating stability among the ruling class, who could overthrow the dictator. This is why we also see economic patterns similar to democracies around election time as it is a good time to invest in the public and elites as it creates tangible results immediately increasing the dictator's loyalty and giving them a better reputation which further reinforces stability. This use of the electoral system as a means to maintain a dictatorship links with the course theme on “Parties and the Institutionalization of Rule” as it shows how the regime is embedding its authority into the structured processes of government, making its control systematic. The reading also discusses how elections are useful for maintaining a dictatorship as they allow for a legitimate form of information-gathering, which allows them to keep track of the loyalty and performance of party leaders and bureaucrats. This allows for effective control over important people in the dictatorship making sure that high-ranking officials are not a risk to the dictatorship, for example, Blaydes states that Murabak would remove officials from the party if they did not perform well or gained too much power that could threaten his position. She also suggests that Murabak would economically punish voting areas that voted too favourably in the opposition.

Blaydes argument is logical however there are many criticisms to be made such as the risk of holding elections, as it gives opportunities for empowerment to opposing groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, However, the author acknowledges this as a trade-off that does not outweigh the benefits of elections despite the heightened risk of state-society tensions, particularly with the Muslim Brotherhood. The author also fairly states that the findings on Egypt can not be used as a universal model to say that all elections can help authoritarian regimes, specifically the author notes that in “the case in weakly institutionalized autocracies that hold elections primarily as a result of external influence. In such contexts, the destabilizing effects of competitive elections often outweigh the functional benefits.” Blaydes also acknowledges that elections can not provide permanent stability and that institutionalized corruption and inefficiencies could eventually undermine the regime leading to democratization or collapse. For example, while elections help manage elite competition they do not manage the accumulation of long-term grievances and corruption that will affect the regime's control and legitimacy. This was most notable when Murabak died showing the weakness of the regime without its central figure leading to the 2011 Egyptian revolution. In Blaydes's work, there are also methodological concerns like with most works, certain data sources and interpretations will be up for scrutiny. 

In conclusion, "Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt" by Lisa Blaydes provides a good understanding of how elections can be used to maintain an authoritarian regime using Murabak’s Egypt as a prime example. The reading connects with our course theme for the week by showing how parties and elections can be tools for institutions of authoritarian regimes. Overall, the reading shows how important it is to understand the impacts elections have on authoritarian regimes, as their purposes and effects can be much more important than previously understood.