EBP1 15 Aug

Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar

The Reading draws on theories from Geddes, Boix, and Svolik, hypothesizing that the professionalization of the Tatmadaw military regime is what has allowed this regime to maintain its influence. The Reading uses the 2008 constitution in Myanmar to explain how this regime has ensured that military influence remains unchallenged—drawing up a hypothesis that political institutions created a survival strategy to reflect the military's professionalization. Professionalized categories are categorized by complete control over troops, intact command structures, and autonomy from the leader. It is easier to threaten and replace leaders with power-sharing agreements. Both leader and Military coup profit from power sharing fictionalized. It states that all military regimes have personalization, and how long the coup lasts is "defined by discipline, unity and autonomy from the leader."

The professionalization of the military in Myanmar when the new government came in after an election in 2011, the Junta handed political power over to the Quasi-civilian government. The military council that had been present for over 20 years seized. Showing a survival strategy through transactional power. Although the military council is no longer configured under President Thein Sein (the current leader), the government only consists of former military members. It holds 25% of reserved seats in parliament for active members of armed forces. "justices can only be appointed with the consent of the Tatmadaw's commander-in-chief, and only former military officers are eligible for the presidency" This shows the idea that the military has politicized institutions being government to continue to hold power through transferring it from direct to indirect military rule. Looking further back at the history and the 1990 election, an example of this direct military rule is shown. When the military lost, the State of Law and Order Restoration Council reinforced the direct military. "With the declaration of a seven-point road map for political transition to a' disciplined democracy' on 30 August 2003, the military council resurrected plans for a new constitution." This links back to the idea of politicizing political institutions to mask their rule, allowing significant influence over the political process without ruling directly, which shows considerable strength in the regime. Changing the constitution would have made it harder for the leader to be challenged. 

Ruling coalition creditability is essential when discussing survival strategies. It builds institutions to enhance the coup's transparency. The military council uses its collective action capacities to make this possible. For collective action, there has to be a strong line of command. 

"By inducing power-sharing or rotation among military rivals, institutions such as legislatures and political parties enhance transparency and therefore increase the regime's stability" This portrays the idea of the importance of power-sharing; it becomes profitable for not only the leader but also the military coup, allows for the concept of authoritarian rule and the reproduction of it in these institutions as it allows the political dominance to stay in check. It enables the idea of why there was no challenge, as there was something in this system for many in the military coup with promotions. Collective action also shows the strength that allows more opportunity for collective power, as the military has in Myanmar; the stronger a coup is, the easier it is to stop another leader from backing out of deals. "This institutionalization is one of several possible strategies that military regimes can employ in order to secure their political survival." Moving away from direct ruling, allows for this balance of power, as military dictatorships are less likely to survive in office due to internal problems; it is essential for more than one resource, which the government shows through their indirect military-political government. With power-sharing, the coup would likely have been stronger and made it to where it is.

Another historical moment that showed a good chain of command but threatened this survival strategy was the 2007 protests led by the Buddhist monks, which included military suppression. The protest was economical until the violence was used, and it turned political because of the mistreatment of the monks. Government officials warned against this, which was ignored and resulted in gun violence. One of the very few weaknesses discussed throughout the reign of this military government coup was "the actions against the sangha undid all the regimregime's legitimize optimize its rule by appealing to religiousseself-stylizationf-stylization as protector of the nation's Buddhist traditions" However, the survival strategy itself of the military remains strong, as this is a large population of Myanmar's religion, soldiers therefor, shooting against their own beliefs "offer proof for the strong discipline and intact chain of command within the military."

There is great strength in this military coup, as it is still intact even if does not specifcally deligate the power first hand anymore, we can see that compared to the coup from Turkmenistan in the reading 'turkey: how the coup failed' where it states "popular mobilization, along with support for the government from the media and the political opposition, was instrumental in defeating the coup attempt." Turkemenistans failure, was dentramental because of these reasons as for myanmar there are checks that have ensured this from happening such as a good line of command and own autonmy, that allows members to feel as if they have their own sense of free will and balances of military and politcal insittuions.

The point of this article is a political science attempt to explain and understand the causes of institutions created in the course of the new constitution and argues that the long persistence and transition from direct to indirect military rule are related and a survival strategy for this military regime. "Despite the new constitution and the move from direct 'military rule' government to quasi-civilian government, the Tatmadaw's influence on Myanmar was and still is persistent." Also, there is an explanation that the best strategy for a dictator to survive is less dependence on the military and use of other forces. In the case of this article, Myanmar relies not only on the military but also on parliamentary forces as a way of counterbalance. Balance: This Reading is very credible, as it uses background knowledge and brings information from other theorists to explain each concept carefully and in detail. In the lecture, we learnt about what makes party regimes so successful, showing ideas of electoral management, specializing in winning elections, as we see in 1990 when the election a lot there new rules in place to allow military gain to stay in command. It is clear that military rule, especially in Myanmar, shows superior organization to hold all the power still. Finally, a question I asked myself while reading this article was: Is this Myanmar regime likely to change from a military regime? The answer to this lies in military dominance; this suggests democratic reform is unlikely in Myanmar because they use the political process to maintain power without any input from any persons outside of the military.

https://muse-jhu-edu.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/article/645538

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02185377.2013.823797#d1e499